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Foreword 
• 
The present text is the Commission's proposed Annual Economic Report for 1978-79, 
submitted to the Community institutions1 in accordance with the Council's Decisions2 
for attainment of a high degree of convergence of economic policies of Member States. 
The Council is required in the fourth quarter of each year - on proposal of the 
Commission and after consulting Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee 
- to adopt an annual report on the economic situation in the Community and to set 
economic policy guidelines to be followed by each Member State. Once the Report has 
been adopted by the Council, the respective governments must bring it to the attention 
of their national parliaments so that it may be taken into account in budget debates. 
This year the Commission has also submitted, as background material to the Annual 
Economic Report 1978-79, an Annual Economic Review 1978-79 which contains a 
factual analysis of economic developments.3 The latter document is also published in 
this edition of European Economy. This innovation in the procedures is intended to 
separate the policy matters on which it is appropriate for the Council to deliberate from 
background material which is needed for information purposes but is not necessarily a 
matter for Council decision. 
Originally document COM(78)529 final, 19 October 1978. 
Article 4 of Decision 74/120/EEC of 18 February 1974, amended by Decision 75/787/EEC of 18 December 
1975. 
Originally document SEC(78)4033 final, 19 October 1978. 
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1. Community objectives 
The theme of this report is that, while the economic 
performance of the Community is in several respects 
improving, the time has come for a stronger development 
of the Community's central economic mechanisms and 
procedures. This is aimed at enabling the Community to do 
still better in its economic performance in the period 
ahead. The objective is to provide a more effective 
common framework in both the economic and monetary 
domains for national efforts to secure the shared 
objectives of high employment and living standards, and 
monetary stability. Put another way round, the objective is 
to reverse, through action at the Community level, the 
undermining of the effectiveness of purely national 
economic policy that has resulted from the increased 
integration of the economies of Member States in the 
European and international economy. 
While intent on building up its economic and monetary 
system from within the Community is also seeking to 
strengthen the basis for its cooperation with third 
countries. This is illustrated by the positive collaboration 
that was in fact achieved in the summer of 1978 between 
the Community and the other participants in the Bonn 
Western economic summit, as also by the Community's 
intention that the European Monetary System be open for 
associated participation by non-member States having 
particularly close economic links with the Community. 
Moreover a major purpose of strengthening the Com-
munity's economic and monetary policy system is through 
achieving a sounder basis for internal growth, to restore 
conditions favourable to a rapid growth of an open world 
trading system, and, thus also to a continuous evolution of 
economic structures. This adjustment process must aim at 
an efficient division of labour between industrialized 
countries and the fullest opportunity for the growth of 
developing countries. Thus a strengthened economic and 
monetary policy is aimed at supporting the positive 
adjustment objectives of the Community's trade and 
sectoral policies. 
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2. The economic outlook 
The task of adjusting the Community economy to the 
difficult economic conditions prevailing since the oil crisis 
in 1973 is broadly portrayed in the following data-
although, of course, there have been major differences in 
The Community economy 1973-1979 
GDP Rise 
volume in 
growth consumer 
prices 
% % 
1973 5,7 8,3 
1974 1,7 12,8 
1975 -1,7 12,8 
1976 4,9 10,0 
1977 2,3 9,1 
1978 (2,6) (6,9) 
1979 (3,5) (7,0) 
and the current-account payments situations have become 
volatile stop-go in the Community economy, which has to 
be avoided in the future. The period ahead is seen as being 
one of gradual rather than dramatic economic recovery. 
The growth-rate is now strengthening, and valuable 
improvements have been made in price performance and 
in the external payments situations. The dispersion of 
inflation rates has been reduced as well as the average, 
and the current-account payments situations have become 
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the experiences of individual Member States. The data for 
1978 contain an element of estimation and forecasting by 
the Commission, and for 1979 they are Commission 
forecasts on the basis of policies described in this report: 
Current General Money Unemployed 
account government supply in 
balance of financial growth labour 
payments, deficits M;iM3 force 
'OOO million 
EUA % % % 
GDP 
1,6 -0,9 16,5 2,5 
-9,2 -1,7 12,8 2,9 
1,2 -5,2 12,7 4,4 
-6,3 -3,7 11, 1 5,0 
1,7 -3,2 12,5 5,5 
8,3 (-4,1) (5,7) 
(8,5) (-4,5) (5,6) 
much more balanced (the deficits of France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom have been reduced or reversed, and 
Belgium and the Netherlands have moved into balance or 
slight deficit-although the surplus of the Federal Re-
public of Germany has not declined). Unemployment 
appears to have peaked in the Community as a whole, and 
progress is beginning to be made in some Member States 
for its reduction. 
3. Concerted action 
The stronger economic outlook for 1979, with a prospect of 
real growth of nearly 3%%, is partly due to the concerted 
action decided by the Council on 24July 1978, 1 in 
implementation of the conclusions of the European 
Council of 6-7 July 1978 meeting in Bremen, and of the 
Western economic summit of 16-17 July in Bonn-at which 
the Community was represented by the President of the 
Council and the President of the Commission. 
The meetings in Bremen and Bonn decided on a broad 
range of policies beyond budgetary and monetary policy, 
and notably in Bremen on specific measures to promote 
employment, to strengthen the Community's energy 
situation, to facilitate structural change in industry and the 
Mediterranean region, to strengthen the open world 
trading system and to aid the developing countries. The 
Bonn meeting reached further agreement at the broader 
international level on largely the same policy issues. 
The aim of concerted action in the field of macro-economic 
policy at the Community level is to achieve a higher 
economic performance than would otherwise be possible, 
by making the use of macro-economic policy instruments 
more effective. 
More precisely, the economic rationale of concerted 
action is that: 
purely national action, in economies with large 
external trade sectors, will to a high degree be 
dissipated through the leakage of demand abroad; 
thus the multiplier effect of stimulatory action on the 
domestic economy will be lower than in a less open 
economy; 
this makes it less attractive to use possible room for 
manc:euvre in demand management policy, since, for 
example, the fiscal pay-back of budgetary measures 
is diminished in amplitude and the necessary 
confidence of consumers and investors weakened; 
this kind of preoccupation has been reinforced by 
doubts in industrial and financial circles as to whether 
expansionary action would have the desired effect on 
the real economy as opposed to an adverse effect on 
inflation and foreign exchange market expectations, 
and by concern in many Member States that the public 
finances have grown excessively in relation to the. 
GNP; 
OJ L 220/27 of 11.8.1978. 
the antidote to these problems must, at least in part, 
be to pool national initiatives into a broader and 
coherent Community action, and so to restore the 
prospect of favourable multiplier effects, a more rapid 
fiscal pay-back to demand management moves, and 
create a higher probability of inducing the positive 
real response from the private economy, rather than 
an aggravation on monetary instability. 
Beyond these general principles, however, the present 
Community action is more ambitious and concrete in 
further respects. 
There is the particular case of Member States whose 
economies are in the greatest need of monetary stabili-
zation and development. A deliberate concerted action by 
the remainder of the Community economy to strengthen 
demand improves the setting for domestic stabilization 
policies. In all stabilization programmes there is the 
problem of strengthening the monetary and public 
finances situation without creating recession. The pre-
paration of such stabilization programmes alongside a 
concerted recovery programme for the majority of the 
Community increases the chances of success and 
diminishes the risks inherent in stabilization policy. 
Ireland and Italy are both cases in point. This is why, as 
noted already in the terms of the concerted action Decision 
of 24 July, in the cases of Ireland and Italy the Community 
strategy includes a priority in the allocation of its financial 
resources in favour of investment and employment in 
these countries. 
There is also the need to systematize and strengthen for 
the tutu re the most positive features of 1978's concerted 
action experience and to identify the precise means of 
increasing its potential. The coordination process must be 
anchored in a more explicit setting of final objectives of 
economic and financial policy and monitoring of perfor-
mance. The setting of final objectives has to be worked 
through at the technical level more thoroughly in terms of 
the collective analysis of forecasts and instrumental 
objectives. The synchronization of national budgetary and 
monetary policy timetables has to be further improved in 
some countries. The link at the Community level in the 
decision-making process between the technical and 
political levels has improved in the course of the work that 
led to the 1978 concerted action Decision, and this 
progress needs to be built on for the future. Moreover the 
European Monetary System will itself (as indicated further 
below) strengthen the need for progress in the area of 
harmonization of budgetary and monetary policy. 
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4. European Monetary System 
Monetary stability is a priority objective in itself. But it is 
also the route through which to restore effectiveness to the 
instruments of macro-economic policy. Nothing is more 
damaging to the effectiveness of demand management 
policy and growth than to have to try to operate on a 
disturbed basis of domestic or external monetary in-
stability. 
Member States with revaluing and devaluing currencies, 
especially where there have been overshooting or 
exaggerated movements, have the common experience of 
recent years of being unable to obtain full satisfaction from 
demand management policy in the prevailing conditions of 
domestic and/or external monetary instability. Countries 
with revaluing currencies have found business investors 
unresponsive to expansionary policy moves where great 
uncertainty has surrounded their international competitive 
situation and the prospects for demand abroad. Countries 
with devaluing currencies have experienced how strongly 
and quickly exchange-rate depreciation can aggravate 
domestic inflation and also create a climate of uncertainty 
and instability detrimental to the objective of inducing a 
strong flow of new, competitive investment. 
These are the economic reasons which have led the 
Community towards establishing a European Monetary 
System. 
Discussions will be proceeding (in the Council, the 
Committee of Governors of Central Banks and other 
Community bodies) on the design of the European 
Monetary System at the time that this report is before the 
Community institutions. The European Council intends at 
its meeting on 4-5 December 1978 to take decisions on a 
scheme following the terms of reference adopted by the 
European Council at Bremen on 6-7 July. 
It would therefore be premature for this report to go into 
any details of the European Monetary System, beyond 
noting the main characteristics of proposals under 
discussion, and its implications for general economic 
policy in the period ahead. 
According to the Annex to the conclusions of the Bremen 
European Council, the European Monetary System would 
consist of an exchange-rate management mechanism at 
least as strict as the 'snake', changes in central rates 
would be subject to mutual consent; the European 
Currency Unit (ECU), having the same definition as the 
present European Unit of Account, would be at the centre 
of the system; a large volume of reserves and credit 
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facilities would be put at the disposal of the system; within 
two years of the start of the system the existing 
arrangements and institutions would be consolidated in a 
European Monetary Fund; the successful functioning of 
the system will require all participating countries to 
pursue policies conducive to greater internal and external 
stability. 
Alongside work on the monetary mechanisms the Euro-
pean Council requested that there be undertaken con-
current studies of the action needed to be taken to 
strengthen the economies of the less prosperous member 
countries in the context of the monetary system envisaged. 
The economic policy implications of the European 
Monetary System envisaged can be indicated in broad 
terms, although not yet in the precise form that will 
become appropriate at a later stage. 
The system will provide a more clear-cut frame of 
reference for domestic monetary stabilization policy, 
although the choice of instruments of stabilization policy 
will no doubt continue to differ as between Member States. 
However, the System will in any case need, in spite of the 
difficulties it involves, a more rigorous coordination of 
monetary policies in the Community framework, as well as 
of budgetary policies. 
The availability of larger volumes of credit implies that 
there would be a larger recourse within the Community to 
the collective negotiation of economic policy conditions 
accompanying credits of relatively long maturity. 
The successful functioning of the System will also require 
that the Community as i:i. whole strikes the right balance in 
policies for stabilization and growth, i.e. to aim at 
convergence on a low rate of inflation and stronger growth. 
To this end all Member States must accept obligations to 
manage their economic policies accordingly. 
In these respects the functioning of the European 
Monetary System will be strongly linked to the further 
development of the 'concerted action' approach to 
economic policy in the Community. 
Above all, for the system to be credible and durable further 
progress will have to be made in reducing the average and 
the dispersion of inflation rates; the progress achieved in 
external payments situations will have to be consolidated; 
a steady expansion of real demand and output will have to 
be maintained, with special responsibilities assumed by 
the most strongly placed Member States. 
5. Guidelines for 1979 
The guidelines that follow carry forward and extend the 
concerted action Decision of 24 July. The present time is 
therefore a significant one for economic policy not only 
because of the preparation of the European Monetary 
System, but also because it is a period of implementation 
of the Decision of July. 
In particular the budgetary measures decided by the 
Federal Republic of Germany of 28 July are now passing 
through the legislature. France has since implemented a 
larger budget deficit in 1978, and the United Kingdom's 
expansionary 1978/79 budget has now been enacted. 
Belgium and the Netherlands have been adopting impor-
tant new budget policy programmes in which the future 
growth of public expenditure is being constrained more 
tightly, permitting none the less a positive short-run policy 
stimulus to the concerted action programme. Luxembourg 
is proceeding with its stimulative measures. Denmark, 
while retaining a moderately expansionary policy, has 
taken steps to strengthen its public finance situation and 
its stabilization policies more broadly. Ireland and Italy are 
both in the course of preparing major changes in 
budgetary policy following the 'Green Papers' of earlier 
this year in Ireland and the 'Pandolfi Plan' in Italy; both are 
aimed at constraining or cutting current public expendi-
tures, reallocating resources to development oriented 
investment expenditure, while cutting the public deficit as 
a share of GDP. 
Overall this set of policy adjustments amounts to a 
substantial net stimulus for the Community economy. The 
differences in the measures as between Member States 
are deliberately aimed at achieving a more convergent 
and stable structure of balance of payments positions. 
They also reflect the need to correct public finance trends 
in a number of countries where the growth of public 
expenditure has become excessive, or inbalanced as 
between current and investment expenditure. 
As regards monetary policy the present strategy (and 
without prejudice to changes that may be required by the 
European Monetary System) is one in which all Member 
States pursue specific quantified objectives, be it money 
supply or credit norms in the case of the four larger 
economies, and/or the discipline of a fixed exchange-rate 
relationship in the case of the other five Member States. 
These objectives first of all aim at maintaining or 
improving monetary stability; however, at the same time 
the management of monetary policy must allow and help 
the Community economy to return progressively towards 
its potential performance. 
Strong efforts are still required in several Member States 
to bring trends in costs and prices into a range of 
performance compatible with a durable functioning of a 
European Monetary System. The modalities of policy can 
and do vary widely between Member States. However, in 
their different ways, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy and 
the United Kingdom all face a crucial period ahead in their 
need to achieve a further reduction in the rate of inflation. 
The normal occasion for considering adjustment of the 
following guidelines would arise in the framework of the 
first examination of the economic situation in the 
Community in 1979, notably during the first quarter of that 
year. 1 That occasion wil I be of more than usual importance 
because it is at the turn of the present year that, on the one 
hand, economic prospects in the light of the recent 
concerted action will be clearer, and, on the other hand, 
decisions will have been taken on the European Monetary 
System. 
Growth prospects for Denmark in 1979 are still moderate 
because the external constraint on economic policy leaves 
only a narrow margin of manoeuvre. The Danish Govern-
ment has confined itself, within the framework of 
concerted action, to granting some temporary reductions 
in personal income tax. On 31 August 1978 it decided to 
propose amendments to the system of index-linking for 
personal income tax scales, applicable from 1979, and 
raised VAT rates from 18 % to 201/ 4 % on 1 October 1978, 
as well as budget savings partly effected through 
postponement of certain public infrastructure projects. 
These provisions should mean that the spontaneous 
central government deficit will be reduced in 1979, and 
thus the 1979 general government deficit will increase by 
only%% of GDP in relation to 1978. Domestic costs will for 
the six months to the end of February be subject to severe 
control; only wage increases provided for under existing 
wage agreements may be passed on in price increases. In 
order that the effects of these measures are felt beyond 
this period, the authorities should ensure that incomes 
policy is strictly applied, so that the expected results of the 
budgetary measures are not endangered and that 
progress is made towards an improved internal and 
external equilibrium position. 
After a weak performance in the first quarter, economic 
activity in the Federal Republic of Germany has gained 
momentum over the past few months. It should be further 
stimulated after 1 January 1979 by the measures the 
Federal Government has adopted as part of Community 
concerted action. In particular, tax reductions are planned 
on low and medium incomes and additional public 
expenditure to stimulate investment and strengthen 
disposable income through increased family allowances. 
To reduce the burden on the budget resulting from these 
measures, the VAT rate will be increased on 1 July 1979. In 
accordance with the Council Decision of 24 July 1978, 
these measures will involve a net amount of about 1 % of 
GDP; as a result the general government deficit will reach 
about 4 % % of GDP. 
According to Article 2 of the Council Decision of 18 February 1974. 
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Guidelines for 1979 
The measures should contribute in particular to reinforc-
ing private consumption, and in general improving the 
short-term situation. They should permit annual average 
growth of about 3%% in 1979, compared with 23/4 % in 
1978. The stimulatory effects of the programme will 
continue to be felt after 1979, particularly on business 
investment. In view of the introduction of a new European 
Monetary System in 1979, it is of paramount importance 
that the German economy should keep up sustained and 
balanced growth. In the area of monetary policy, it would 
be desirable for the Bundesbank to bear in mind the need 
to support policy for growth and stability when fixing its 
monetary objective for 1979. 
In France the authorities have introduced a number of 
measures which, due notably to a faster growth of 
investment· ought to result in a moderate acceleration of 
growth in 1979. This should avoid a further significant 
increase in unemployment, without hindering restoration 
of balance on current external transactions-which should 
be consolidated. However, the deceleration of inflation will 
remain the priority objective, so as notably to contribute to 
the implementation and the smooth working of the 
proposed European Monetary System. The draft central 
government budget, in accordance with the guidelines laid 
down by the Council in its Decision of 24 July 1978, 
maintains the action introduced in 1977 and reinforced in 
1978 to support national economic expansion, notably 
through measures in the field of social transfer payments; 
and there are also employment measures aiming at 
favouring stable employment in sectors with promising 
future prospects. The finances of the large nationalized 
firms should be further strengthened. The net borrowing of 
general governments should thus be situated at a level of 
about 2% of GDP, as in 1978. 
In the framework of the fight against inflation the central 
government budget deficit should be financed mainly by 
non-monetary means. Monetary policy should for its part, 
aim at a small reduction in the level of liquidity in the 
economy. Finally, the efforts to avoid an excessive growth 
of earnings should be maintained and reinforced. 
The prospects for Ireland in 1979 are still favourable, and 
the rate of growth of the economy could remain higher than 
the Community average. If economic policy is to lay the 
foundation for lasting and balanced growth in the longer 
term, it should endeavour to reduce the central govern-
ment borrowing requirement. To this end, the projects 
described in the 'Green Paper' intended to reduce the net 
borrowing requirement of central government in 1979 to 
10,5% of GDP, by moderating current expenditure and 
reducing subsidies, should be accompanied by increased 
taxation. At the same time, economic development and 
employment could be supported by a transfer of resources 
from the Community to finance infrastructure investment. 
Incomes policy should try to moderate wage increases so 
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as to reduce inflationary pressures and thus establish 
favourable conditions for participation in the new Euro-
pean Monetary System. This implies that incomes policy 
should not aim at compensation for the effects of heavier 
taxation, but should also try to avoid too steep an increase 
in wage drift which was the case in 1978. Monetary policy 
management will be facilitated by the expected reduction 
in the central government net borrowing requirement. 
However, to limit domestic credit expansion and as 
reflected in recent measures, it is desirable to control 
more strictly the expansion of credit to private individuals. 
In 1978, Italy made considerable progress towards 
controllfng inflation, improving the external surplus and 
preparing for more rapid growth. It is therefore important 
that economic policy in 1979 should endeavour to 
consolidate the successes already achieved, to step up the 
fight against inflation and the effort to stabilize public 
finances, while ensuring the transfers of resources 
required to support economic growth. This is the intention 
of the 'Pandolfi Plan', the translation of which, into 
appropriate legislative terms, is now advisable. These 
efforts will be facilitated by Community action which could 
help the Italian authorities improve economic structures. 
As far as budgetary policy is concerned the enlarged 
public sector budget deficit (EC definition) in 1978 should 
be about 15%% of GDP. This latter ratio represents a 
ceiling, it being desirable to achieve a lower level already 
in 1979. In the course of 1979, the structure of public 
expenditure should in any case be improved, through 
restricting the growth of consumption expenditure, 
compensated in part by an increase in investment. The 
ratio should also be reduced in the two following years. 
The reduction should be achieved mainly by limiting the 
increase in current expenditure, in particular through 
measures to reduce the growth of social transfer 
payments and expenditure on health. Better management 
of public-owned companies and companies in which there 
is State participation cou Id also enable a reduction in State 
aid. Tighter budgetary management would facilitate the 
task of the monetary authorities and would help stabilize 
or even reduce the ratio of domestic credit expansion to 
GDP. The creation of monetary base should be strictly 
controlled, through the workings of the interest-rate 
mechanism, so as to avoid destabilizing capital flows. The 
success of this policy will depend to a large extent on how 
rigorously the incomes policy is applied, alongside the 
measures to promote investment. In this context, it is 
essential to control increases in costs by preventing any 
rise in real hourly wages. 
Economic growth in the Netherlands in 1979 should gain 
momentum, thanks to the favourable effects of concerted 
action, and in particular to vigorous support of domestic 
demand. If the medium-term prospects for employment 
are to brighten, competitivity will have to be strengthened 
through further reducing the rate of inflation, and 
improvements in the functioning of the labour market. This 
should stem the loss of jobs at present arising from high 
real labour costs, and encourage investment. The Dutch 
authorities have therefore stepped up their efforts to 
moderate the increase in wage costs, mainly by limiting 
the rise in compulsory levies while reducing at the same 
time the rate of growth of public expenditure so as to keep 
the structural government borrowing requirement over the 
next few years between 4% and 5% of national income. 
Demand support, as part of concerted revival action, will 
nevertheless have to continue next year; a temporary 
increase in the general government borrowing require-
ment from 5% in 1978 to nearly 6% in 1979 (provided for in 
the draft central government budget for 1979) is therefore 
consistent with the economic policy objectives set for the 
Community as a whole. A certain amount of monetary 
financing will inevitably be required to cover so large a 
budget deficit, but this is consistent with maintaining the 
liquidity ratio in the economy at its 1978 level. 
Economic growth could also gain some momentum in 
Belgium thanks to the prospect for exports which should 
develop notably in the framework of the concerted action. 
The effects of this improvement on the labour market will 
be reinforced by specific measures such as early 
retirement, training courses for young people and the 
creation of temporary posts in the public sector. Pursuant 
to the Community guidelines, the general government 
borrowing requirement could rise from about 5% of GDP in 
1978 to slightly over 5,5% in 1979. Although it does not 
seem advisable to reduce this percentage in the short 
term, since such a reduction would have unfavourable 
consequences on activity, in the longer term it will 
probably have to be reduced to establish a more 
favourable balance between national resources and 
collective uses. With this in mind, efforts to moderate the 
growth of current expenditure should be continued and 
intensified. Monetary policy should continue to help 
contain inflation to a modest rate; the European Monetary 
Guidelines for 1979 
System, for which preparations are in progress, will 
probably be a great help in achieving these aims. 
The Council's budget guidelines for Luxembourg recom-
mend a budgetary stimulus of over 1 % of GDP; in its draft 
budget for 1979, the Luxembourg Government accordingly 
announced or implemented a number of measures 
intended to stimulate business investment and exports. 
The draft budget also provided for a rapid increase in 
pub I ic investment, and for reinforcement of the program me 
of specific individual measures in favour of employment 
and encourage private consumption (selective reductions 
in direct taxation, improvement of certain social benefits). 
The borrowing requirement of general government will 
thus probably increase somewhat, which, however, could 
be covered by loans and for the remainder by recourse to 
the budgetary reserve constituted in the years of strong 
economic activity. 
In the United Kingdom, the significant reduction in the rate 
of inflation and strengthened balance of payments enabled 
the Government to propose, in the context of the concerted 
action programme, a stimulative budget for the fiscal year 
1978/79. The planned level of the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR) was raised to 8% thousand million 
pounds (51///o of GDP), just below the level com-
municated to the International Monetary Fund, as con-
firmed in the stand-by credit renewal of May 1978. The 
most urgent objective of policy must now be to keep the 
rate of inflation well below 10%. To this end there must be 
a marked deceleration in the rate of growth of earnings 
which, in the year to July 1978, rose a good deal faster than 
the Government's guidelines of 10%. For the fiscal year 
1978/79 the growth of sterling M3 needs to be contained 
within the range of 8-12%. For 1979/80 a lower target range 
for monetary growth should be considered. A more 
expansionary stance of fiscal policy should only be 
considered in the event that the growth of earnings is 
moderated, domestic demand is subdued and the balance 
of payments is strong. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this Annual Economic Review is to serve as 
background to the proposed Annual Economic Report 
submitted by the Commission for adoption by the Council. 
It analyses the main features of the Community's 
economic performance, and of macro-economic policy in 
the recent past. 
This introduction gives a brief guide to the chapters that 
follow. 
Chapter 2 analyses the Community's hesitant growth 
performance in the period since the 1973 oil crisis, against 
the pattern of stronger and more stable growth in the 
preceding decade. It describes how the sharp recovery of 
1976 gave way to a phase of slower growth in 1977 and 
1978, and how a more expansionary phase of policy 
opened up in the course of 1978, in part as a result of the 
concerted action Decision agreed by the Council on 
24 July. 
Chapter 3 shows how the low growth performance has 
affected labour markets: employment has stabilized at a 
low level after a sharp decline in 1975-76, while the rate of 
increase of unemployment has been aggravated by the 
rapid rise of the population of working age, compensated 
to some limited extent by a virtual cessation of net 
immigration from outside the Community. The results of 
some longer-run projections suggest that the rise of the 
working-age population will further accelerate in the first 
half of 1980s, butthen stop quite abruptly under the effect of 
the decline in fertility rates that began in 1965. 
Chapter 4 reviews progress in the fight against inflation. 
This progress has been significant in 1978, with the 
Community average consumer price rise falling well 
below the double-digit level for the first time since 1973. 
Price control policies are reviewed, both where such 
instruments have been used actively, and where, as in the 
case of France in 1978, they have been largely removed. 
Incomes policy and wage bargaining developments are 
also reviewed; the picture that emerges is one of the 
widespread efforts by governments to influence nominal 
settlements, falling short, however of statutory in-
tervention. 
Chapter 5 examines the convergence or divergence of 
economic performance as between the Member States of 
the Community, notably as regards p·rices, growth and 
income per capita levels; these criteria being relevant to 
the task of making renewed progress towards economic 
and monetary union. Considerable progress has been 
made in reducing both the dispersion (as well as the 
average), in inflation rates. Differences of income levels, 
by Member State and by region, have not on the whole 
lessened, although the high Irish growth is a relatively new 
and positive development. The inequality of income per 
capita between Member States is also shown to be 
substantially less when measured with purchasing-power 
parities, compared to market exchange rates. 
Chapter 6 reviews the course of budgetary policy in more 
detail, leading notably to the concerted action Decision of 
24 July 1978. It shows how policy has had to respond to the 
double challenge of countering both the deep recession 
and the tendency in many countries for public expenditure 
and transfers to grow to excessively high levels in relation 
to the gross national product. 
Chapter 7 reviews the course of monetary policy, and 
notably the relatively new experience for most Member 
States in pursuing quantified money supply or credit 
objectives. It also discusses briefly the prospects for 
harmonizing such policies to a higher degree in the 
Community, a task which will be increasingly significant 
with the establishment of a European Monetary System. 
ChapterB analyses the Community's balance of payments 
since the 1973 oil c;:risis. It shows how the Community's 
current balance has related to the world balance of 
payments structure; 1978 has seen the Community's first 
substantial current-account surplus since the oil crisis. The 
Community's balance of payments are then analysed in 
more detail, by type of transaction on current and capital 
accounts, and by Member State. Exchange-rate changes 
are compared with relative price performance, giving an 
indicator of developments in competitiveness. 
Chapter 9 examines the nature of structural changes in the 
Community economy in the period since the 1973 oil crisis 
by comparison with those that were in evidence in the 
previous decade of faster and steadier economic growth. 
The analysis concentrates on the shares in value-added of 
twenty sectors and branches, their rates of growth, and 
performance in terms of productivity, employment and 
external trade. It emerges that no single sector has been 
unaffected by the crisis; however, the wide 'hierarchy' of 
growth-rates between sectors that lies at the heart of 
growth process appears to have been attenuated. The 
situation of the food industry has relatively improved, that 
of investment and durable goods industries relatively 
moderately affected, while many branches producing 
intermediate industrial goods and non-food consumption 
goods have been among the most adversely affected. 
The Statistical Annex gives for a selection of main 
economic indicators a complete time series of annual data 
from the beginning of the EEC in 1958 to 1977 or 1978 
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wherever estimation has been possible. Four of the tables 
give Community budget expenditure and receipts, gross 
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borrowing and net indebtedness, both in a complete time 
series from 1958 to 1978 and, for the budget, 1979. 
2. Growth of demand and output 
GDP growth performance 
The fifteen years, 1958 to 1972, saw in the Member States a 
period of sustained expansion. Certainly there were slow-
downs-in most countries in 1961-62, 1966-67 and in 1971-
72-in which the rate of growth briefly faltered but 
generally remained positive. In 1974 the Community 
countries together with the rest of the industrialized world 
experienced the beginnings of the deepest recession in 
the post-war era. Despite a substantial recovery in 1976, 
prolonged into 1977 in the United States, the growth-rate in 
most industrialized countries seems to have reverted last 
year to figures generally about half the average of the 
1960s. There seems to have been a substantial reduction 
in the spontaneous momentum of economic expansion. It 
is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the factors which 
appear to be behind the change in the trend in growth-rate 
which· followed the 1974-75 recession. 
Table 1 gives growth-rates tor the countries of the 
Community, the United States, Japan and the OECD 
Table 1 
Increase in the volume of GDP 
1960-1970 1971/72 1973 
DK 4,9 4,0 5,2 
D 4,7 3,5 4,9 
F 5,6 5,7 5,4 
IRL 4,2 4,9 4,6 
I 5,6 2,3 6,9 
NL 5,4 4,2 5,9 
B 4,9 4,8 6,5 
L 3,3 5,4 11,3 
UK 2,8 2,6 6,6 
EC 4,6 3,8 5,8 
us 3,8 4,3 5,4 
JAPAN 10,7 8, 1 9,7 
OECD 5,3 4,6 6,0 
member countries as a whole for the decade 1960 to 1970 
and for subsequent years. For the 1960 to 1970 period the 
similarity of average growth-rates, notably among the 
original six member countries of the Community, is 
noteworthy though the actual annual rates show consider-
able variability from year to year. The standard deviation 
of growth-rates tor the period 1961 to 1970 varied from 0,9 
percentage points tor France with the steadiest growth-
rate to 2,7 tor Denmark with the most volatile. But one 
important difference between the decade to 1970 and 
subsequent years is that in the former period cyclical 
movements were less synchronous than in the latter 
period. Thus in the 1970s cyclical swings have been 
magnified by the coincidence of fluctuations in domestic 
and foreign demand, in turn interacting with commodity 
price movements which reacted to the cycle in the 
industrialized world. 
The various causes of the 1974-75 recession in the 
industrial countries are fairly well known, though their 
{percentages) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
-0,6 -1,2 6,3 1,8 0,0 
0,5 -2,1 5,6 2,8 2,7 
2,8 0,3 4,6 3,0 3,0 
2,1 1,2 2,9 5,5 6,0 
4,2 -3,5 5,7 1,7 2,2 
4,2 -0,9 4,5 2,4 1,9 
4,7 -2,1 5,7 1,3 2,0 
5,0 -11,0 2,9 1,3 2,5 
-0,6 -1,6 2,6 0,7 3,2 
1,7 -1,6 4,7 2,2 2,6 
-1,4 -1,0 6,0 4,9 3,75 
-1,2 2,3 6,0 5,0 5,75 
0,1 -1,0 5,2 3,6 3,75 
Note: EC 1otals based on 1970 exchange rates, OECD totals for 1960-1970 based on 1963 exchange rates and 1970 exchange rates thereafter. The price base ,s 1970, except for 1978. 
which is based on the prices of the preceding year. Official UK figures based on 1975 prices show rates of growth in 1976 and 1977 about 0,75% higher owing to the higher valuation of 
the output of North Sea oil. 
Source: Eurostat and estimates of the Commission services for 1977 and 1978. 
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relative strength remains disputed. In brief there was a 
surge in production in the developed economies in 1973, 
not because those economies were individually expand-
ing abnormally fast compared with earlier years (except 
perhaps Luxembourg which being a raw-material pro-
cessing country effectively proves the rule), but because 
they were atypically in phase. The resulting rapid rise in 
demand for raw materials led to an explosion of industrial 
raw material prices. This, together with the inflation in 
foodstuffs which was largely climatic in origin, and the 
quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74, in turn generated 
inflationary pressures in the industrialized countries; the 
adverse shift in the terms of trade and as will be seen the 
reaction of different economic agents to them, sowed the 
seeds of generalized recession. The export prices of 
developing market economies excluding crude petroleum 
rose 43% in 1973 and 42% in 1974. This rise was made up 
of 43% and 33% respectively for food, 84% and 14% for 
agricultural goods excluding food and 22% and 53% for 
minerals. 1 The boom in world activity leading to the 
detonation of the world price level was sanctioned in 
advance, some would say was brought about, by the. 
rapid rise in the world money stock from 1971 onwards. 
The world money stock grew at an average of 14% per 
year from 1971 to 1973 inclusive, compared with 7%% 
over the years 1968 to 1970 and 6 'I,% over the decade 1961 
to 1970. Also in the early 1970s in certain countries the 
stance of budgetary policy was significantly more expan-
sionist than on average during the 1960s. This was the 
case notably in the United Kingdom where the public 
sector borrowing requirement moved 4% of GDP in an 
expansionary direction from 1971 to 1973, and to a lesser 
extent in Italy, Ireland and Denmark. 
The recovery in the Member States which began in the 
second half of 1975 was vigorous but short-lived, and 
petered out towards the end of 1976 or early 1977. The 
growth in GDP in the Community in 1977 was, at 2,2%, the 
lowest for the nine countries together since 1958 apart 
from the 1974-75 recession years. The figure of 2,6% 
foreseen for this year is the second lowest, and reflects a 
weak demand in all countries except Ireland. 
The extent of the shortfalls in GDP growth below the 
previous average rates and thus an impression of output 
forgone is shown in Graph 1. Extrapolating the 1958 to 1973 
trend line would imply an increment to Community GDP by 
1978 of 25% rather than the 10% actually obtained, 
suggestiQg a 'loss' of 15% of 1973 GDP. For the individual 
countries the corresponding figures are: Denmark 18%, 
United Nations series, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Table 59. 
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Germany 11%, France 10%, Ireland 6%, Italy 18%, 
Netherlands 17%, Belgium 10%, Luxembourg 23%, and 
the United Kingdom 12%. However, in discussing the 
inadequacy of the recovery the effects of both the change 
in the structure of demand caused by relative price 
changes which may have rendered a lot of capital 
eq1:1ipment in certain industries permanently unprofitable, 
and the low rates of investment in the last three years on 
productive capacity are relevant. There are signs that in 
certain industries, such as automobiles and paper, 
capacity contraints are already beginning to bite, though 
other sectors remain characterized by considerable 
underutilization. Business surveys carried out by the 
Commission give evidence here. The measure consists of 
the average balance for all industrial sectors of positive 
over negative replies in the three surveys each year to the 
question 'is productive capacity more than sufficient to 
meet demand?'. Though these data, like all capacity 
utilization series, are to be interpreted with prudence, they 
do suggest that the degree of underutilization is in general 
on the increase. 
The difficulties experienced in putting the Community 
economy back on to its desired growth path are illustrated 
by a comparison of growth performance in recent years 
with official targets or forecasts. An average target growth-
rate for the Community for 1975 was published in the 1974 
Table 2 
Index of capacity underutilization derived from 
business surveys 
1973 1974 1975 1976 
D 4 26 52 32 
F -22 -20 39 22 
IRL 7 25 21 
I 10 13 57 41 
NL 3 10 52 43 
B -2 8 54 51 
L -27 -21 51 72 
EC 2 -4 13 49 30 
1977 1978 1 
37 37 
26 28 
4 5 
40 48 
45 43 
61 60 
72 69 
36 38 
Average of result of January and May surveys, except for FR of Germany, which 
shows January survey result. 
Based on weighted average of countries for which survey data are available. 
Note. Th A indAx represents the balance of thP. resrmndents who consider productive 
capacity more than sufficient to meet demand against those who consider it less than 
sufficient. 
Source: Commission business surveys. 
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Annual Report on the economic situation in the Com-
munity. Reflecting worries about the effects of the oil price 
rise, both on prices and balance of payments position, the 
figure was a modest 2%%. The following March it was 
revised downwards to 1 %% in the Commission Com-
munication to the Council on the adjustment of the 
economic policy guidelines. In the event the rate was 
-1,7%. The next Annual Report-that for 1975-set a 
target of 4% for 1976 and no revised figures were given the 
following spring though it was considered that the initial 
target was relatively unambitious. Indeed the average 
growth-rate in 1976 reached 4,9%. For 1977 the target was 
set at 4% and in the spring it was thought that 3% % would 
be the maximum obtainable in the light of the sluggishness 
of the recovery. The outcome was 2,3% growth. Last 
year's Annual Report established a target zone of 4 to 
4%% for the Community as a whole in 1978, compared 
now to a probable outcome of 2,6%. 
The most recent indication of,. an objective for the 
Community was contained in the conclusions of the 
President at the European Council in April, 1978. It was for 
a growth-rate of 4%% in annual average terms by mid-
1979, thus putting back for half a year the target adopted by 
the Finance Council in October 1977. This set in train a 
detailed analysis of how concerted demand management 
action by all Member States with individual contributions 
modulated according to balance of payments, inflation and 
public finance constraints, could enable a stronger 
growth-rate to be achieved. The final package was 
discussed at the European Council in Bremen and at the 
Western economic summit in Bonn in July and settled at 
the Economic and Finance Council in July. The policy 
commitments of individual Member States are discussed 
elsewhere in this report. 1 
Components of growth 
The major contribution to the growth-rates of the decade, 
1960-70, derived from the growth of consumer expendi-
ture. Table 3 gives the contributions of the various 
components of demand (with government fixed investment 
taken together with government consumption). Among the 
Member States consumer expenditure contributed from 
just less than half the rise in real aggregate demand in 
Belgium to just over two-thirds of the rise in Italy, and 2,7 
out of the 4,6% growth for the Community as a whole. As 
26 
See Council decision of 24 July, 1974, OJ L220/27 and The Economic 
situation in the Community, No 2/1978, Commission of the European 
Communities. 
regards private investment, its greatest contributions 
were in fast-growing countries, France and the Nether-
lands, but the contribution of private investment in Italy, 
also fast-growing, was relatively modest. In the slowest-
growing economy, the United Kingdom, the sluggishness 
of private investment was clearly a major explanatory 
factor. The government contribution to growth tended to be 
small, only 0,7 points for the Community as a whole with 
Denmark showing the highest contribution from this 
component, largely due to a high rate of public authority 
investment. Also over the decade only in Denmark were 
stock changes or the foreign balance significant in their net 
effect. 
Of course these average figures for a decade conceal 
many shorter-run fluctuations in economic behaviour. 
This decade of relatively stable growth contrasts with the 
1970s. In most countries, the contribution of private 
investment fell sharply in 1971 and 1972, the exceptions 
being Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg, and in all 
countries but Luxembourg a running-down of stocks had a 
negative impact, to the extent of cutting the average 
growth in the Community by 0,7%. 
1973 was a year of rapid expansion, save in Denmark 
where increased imports to a large extent met the rise in 
domestic demand. Elsewhere too imports responded to 
increased demand and the net trade effect was negative, 
save in Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In 
general, however, this was more than offset by the strong 
contribution of private consumption, private investment 
and stock-building, though their respective roles differed 
considerably between countries. 
In 1974-75 recession saw wild fluctuations in the role of 
different components of demand and major differences 
between countries. However, a certain amount of genera-
lization is possible. Taking the two years together there 
was clearly a lower contribution from consumer demand 
throughout the Community relative to previous years. 
Consumer expenditure in real terms actually fell in 
Denmark in 1974, in Italy in 1975 and in Ireland and the UK 
in both years. Elsewhere consumer expenditure showed 
some rise in volume terms but, in most cases, at a rate 
considerably lower than, say, the trend rate of the 1960s. 
However, the fall in private investment and stock 
decumulation contributed more to the recession than the 
weakness of household demand. With few exceptions 
private investment, both fixed and in stocks, fell in real 
terms in both years of the recession, while the role of the 
foreign balance tended, aided by exports to countries 
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Table 3 
Contributions to changes in real GDP as a percent of GDP in the previous year at 1970 prices 1 
1960·1970 1971/72 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
DK pr. con. 1 2,5 1,4 3,1 -1,5 2,7 3,8 0,5 -0,3 
pr. inv. 0,6 1,0 1,4 -1,9 -2,8 3,3 -0,4 -1,1 
pub. exp. 1,9 1,0 -0,4 0,4 1,2 1,4 0,7 0,8 
stocks -1,6 -0,6 1,3 -0,2 -3,0 2,6 -0,4 -0,4 
for. bal. 1,5 1, 1 -2,5 2,7 1,8 -5,1 1,5 1,3 
D pr. con. 2,7 2,8 1,4 0,7 1,9 2, 1 1,7 1,9 
pr. inv. 1,2 1, 1 0,0 -2,3 -1,0 1,3 0,9 0,9 
pub. exp. 0,8 0,7 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,7 
stocks 0,1 -1,0 0,5 -0,2 -0,9 1,6 -0,2 -0,2 
for. bal. 0,0 -0,2 2,4 2,1 -2,8 0,4 0,0 -0,5 
F pr. con. 3,4 3,8 3,4 1,8 1,8 3,1 1,5 2,1 
pr. inv. 1,6 1,2 1,3 0,1 -0,9 1,0 1,5 0,2 
pub. exp. 0,7 0,9 0,6 0,2 0,9 0,7 -1,0 0,6 
stocks 0,0 -0,3 0,5 -0,1 -2,6 1,5 0,1 -0,1 
for. bal. 0,0 0,1 -0,5 0,8 1, 1 -1,7 1,0 0,2 
IRL pr. con. 2,7 2,5 3,4 -0,3 -3,8 1,9 3,5 5,2 
pr. inv. 0,9 1,5 3,5 -3,1 -2,4 0,8 1,9 2,1 
pub. exp. 0,9 1,5 1,8 1,8 1, 1 1,3 0,3 1,4 
stocks 0,1 -0,5 0,4 1,8 -7,0 2,5 1,2 -0,4 
for. bal. -0,4 -0,4 -4,7 1,2 12,4 -3,3 -1,4 -2,3 
pr. con. 3,9 2,1 3,8 1,7 -0,3 2,2 1,4 1,4 
pr. inv. 1,0 -0,4 1,4 0,6 -1,0 0,2 0,2 -0,3 
pub. exp. 0,6 0,8 0,4 0,5 0,3 0,3 0, 1 0,4 
stocks 0,1 -0,9 2,5 0,0 -1,0 2,8 -1,6 0,1 
for. bal. 0,0 0,6 -1,3 1,4 0,9 0,2 1,6 0,6 
NL pr. con. 3,7 2,2 2,3 1,5 2,0 1,3 2,5 2,1 
pr. inv. 1,7 -0,1 1,3 -0,8 -1,3 -0,3 2,2 0,5 
pub. exp. 1,0 0,4 0,0 0,3 1, 1 0,6 0,6 0,3 
stocks -0,4 -0,8 1,2 1, 1 -3,6 2,3 0, 1 -0,2 
for. bal. -0,5 2,5 1, 1 2, 1 0,6 0,7 -3,0 -0,9 
B pr. con. 2,4 3,3 4,9 2,2 0,3 3,8 1,3 1,2 
pr. inv. 1, 1 0,1 1,5 1,5 -0,6 0,2 -0,1 0,0 
pub. exp. 0,9 0,8 0,6 0,5 0,9 0,7 0,5 0,8 
stocks 0,2 -0,4 1,0 0,9 -2,9 1,2 -0,1 -0,1 
for. bal. 0,4 1,0 -1,5 -0,3 0,1 -0,5 -0,3 0,0 
L pr. con. 2,2 2,9 2,5 2,8 1,3 4,0 0,9 1, 1 
pr. inv. 0,8 2,0 1,6 0,1 -1,7 0,4 -0,7 0,5 
pub. exp. 0,3 1,0 1,0 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,4 0,4 
stocks 0,3 0,4 4,1 0,3 -2,4 -1,5 2,0 -0,2 
for. bal. -0,3 -0,9 6,1 0,1 -6,0 -0,3 -1,3 0,7 
UK pr. con. 1,5 2,8 3,0 -0,8 -0,7 0,3 -0,5 3,4 
pr. inv. 0,6 0,4 0,5 -0,2 -0,2 -0,5 0,4 0,5 
pub. exp. 0,7 0,5 1,3 0,8 0,6 0,3 -1,1 0,3 
stocks -0,1 -0,4 2,5 -1,4 -2,5 1,9 0,7 0,3 
for. bal. 0,2 -0,7 -0,2 1,0 0,9 1, 1 1,6 -1,3 
EC pr. con. 2,7 3,0 2,8 0,9 1,0 2,2 1,3 2,0 
pr. inv. 1,2 0,7 0,8 -0,7 -0,9 0,6 0,9 0,4 
pub. exp. 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,3 0,5 0,6 -0,3 0,5 
stocks 0,0 -0,7 1,2 -0,2 -2,0 1,9 -0,2 -0,1 
for. bal. 0,0 0,2 0,4 1,5 -0,2 -0,4 0,5 -0,2 
Note: pr. con.: consumer expenditure; pr. inv.: private fixed capital investment; pub. table uses the expenditure measure of GDP growth while Table 1 uses the 
exp.: government expenditure on goods and services; stocks: changes in stocks. for compromise measure. The price base is 1970, except for 1977 and 1978 each of 
bal.: net foreign balance. which are based on the prices of the previous year. 
1 Differences between the sum of the components and the rates of growth in GDP 
given in Table 1 arise from rounding, and in the case of the UK, from the fact that this Source. As Table 1, which also gives the corresponding GDP aggregate data. 
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outside the Community, in particular the OPEC member 
countries, to support economic activity particularly in 
1974. 
In 1974 because of inflation and balance of payments 
worries, government expenditure was cut back in several 
countries and indeed in all countries, except Ireland, its 
real contribution to aggregate demand was much less than 
in earlier years but still slightly positive. In France the 
restraint in public expenditure was particularly marked 
compared to 1973. In 1975, the contribution of government 
expenditure generally rose moderately, though not in 
Germany or Italy. 
In assessing fiscal policy it is of course necessary to look at 
the general government budget as a whole and this is done 
in Chapter 6. At this point it may be noted that, partly 
because of discretionary fiscal policy and partly because 
of the automatic effects of lower tax revenues caused by 
the recession, the overall budget was in most countries a 
good deal more expansionist between 1973 and 1975 than 
public expenditure alone (see Annex Table 26). The 
budget deficit as a percentage of GDP increased most in 
Germany (by some 7%%) and Ireland (by 9%). Thus to an 
important extent governments were absorbing the de-
flationary effect of the deterioration in the terms of trade in 
those years, in which Community import prices rose 64%, 
Community export prices rose 48% and the Community 
current account deteriorated from 5,5 thousand million 
EUA in 1972 to 1,2 thousand million in 1975. 
The year 1976 showed a return to a stronger pattern of 
demand growth. The major motor behind the recovery was 
growth in consumer expenditure and the replacement of 
stocks. Private investment generally remained sluggish 
and actually fell in real terms in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. Public sector expenditure made some 
contribution to growth in most countries, more particularly 
in Denmark and Ireland, but noticeably less than in the 
previous year in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Indeed as a percentage of GDP the general government 
deficit was reduced in several countries, notably Ger-
many, France and the United Kingdom. The foreign 
balance contribution became significantly negative in 
Denmark, France and Ireland. 
1977 and 1978 have been years of sluggish growth. That 
growth thp.t has taken place has been on the whole due to 
the generally hesitant expansion in private consumption, 
though this has recently shown some greater dynamism in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, and in certain countries. 
In Denmark and Italy there has been a significant 
contribution from the foreign sector. Private investment 
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has been depressed in all countries except Ireland. The 
role of government expenditure has been marginal or 
even negative in its contribution to aggregate demand 
taking these two years together, again with the exception 
of Ireland. As is evident from Table 18 (and as analysed in 
more detail in Chapter 6) in most countries the general 
government deficit diminished in 1976 and 1977. This 
tendency was reversed in the course of 1978, in the first 
place through the more expansionary initial posture of the 
1978 budgets, and secondly, in the framework of the 
concerted action programme, by subsequent supplemen-
tary budgets and commitments, especially by Germany, to 
a more expansionary policy in 1979. 
The role of private consumption 
The fact that weakness of private consumption was in most 
countries the major immediate factor behind the 1974-75 
slump and that its recovery in 1976 preceded a new further 
slowing down 1 begs the question of whether there has 
been a change in the behaviour of households over and 
beyond that which can be explained by earlier reactions to 
changes in real disposable income or inflation. It has often 
been alleged that consumer reticence has been increased 
by the threat of unemployment or the fall in the real value 
of liquid assets. Certainly, the savings ratios given in 
Table 4 show a tendency to rise in several but not all 
countries up to 1975, when inflation was at its peak, but in 
most cases by 1977 they have reverted to their 1972-73 
levels. In Ireland there has been a substantial and 
continuous upward trend (which has coincided with high 
rates of investment and economic growth), and in the 
United Kingdom there was a significant increase up to 
1975, which has not been reversed. Germany is the only 
case where the 1977 level remained below that of 1972-73. 
The ratios of household savings to disposable income do 
not in themselves demonstrate a new reticence in 
consumer expenditure. The changes in the savings ratio 
may simply reflect the established reaction to higher 
disposable income or to inflationary expectations. Quar-
terly, or, where quarterly data are not available, annual 
series were used to estimate regression equations 
'explaining' the level of total consumer expenditure by real 
disposable income and the consumer expenditure de-
flator. Statistical tests were then carried out to determine 
whether there was clear evidence of a change in the role 
This is illustrated by the year-on-year differences in the contributions to 
real GNP change in Table 3 for the Community as a whole. 
played by either of the explanatory variables. In effect the 
quarterly data showed that in the case of Germany from 
the beginning of 1974 while households spent as high a 
proportion of additional disposable income-some 82%-
there has been a longer delay than in earlier years in 
adjusting consumption to a change in disposable income. 
In the case of the United Kingdom there appeared to be a 
change in the reaction of households to price rises. 
Whereas in the past, price increases, present and 
anticipated, appear to have stimulated expenditure, from 
mid-1973 onwards the effect of increased inflation seems 
rather to have been to depress expenditure. 
Of course consumer demand may also lack dynamism 
because of the slow growth of real disposable income. The 
latter generally moved very much in line with GDP over the 
period. However, the falls in Italy in 1974, and Denmark 
and Ireland in 1974 and 1975 and in the United Kingdom in 
1976 and 1977 were out of line with the evolution in GDP. At 
least in these cases there are grounds for attributing some 
of the sluggishness of consumers' expenditure to falls in 
real disposable income effected by demand-management 
or wages and prices policies, generally designed to 
protect the balance of payments. 
Apart from the new tendencies to react to changes in 
disposable income more slowly in Germany and to react 
negatively to inflation in the United Kingdom, the 
econometric evidence does not point to any clear changes 
Table 4 
Ratio of household savings to gross disposable 
income 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
DK 0,16 0, 16 0, 15 0,18 0,16 0, 16 
D 0,14 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,12 
F 0,17 0,17 0,18 0,19 0,17 0,18 
IRL 0,13 0,16 0,19 0,24 0,21 0,23 
I 0,25 0,24 0,23 0,27 0,27 0,26 
NL 0,17 0,18 0,18 0,16 0,18 
B 0,21 0,21 0,22 0,21 0,23 0,21 
L 
UK 0,10 0,11 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,14 
EC 0,16 0,17 0,17 0,18 0,17 0,17 
Source: 1972-1976, except Denmarl< and Ireland: Eurostat, otherwise national data, 
where necessary adjusted lo SEC definitions. 
1977, estimates of Commission services. 
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in consumption behaviour. The fact that consumer 
expenditure has not done more to sustain the recovery in 
1977 and 1978can largely be attributed to the low growth in 
real disposable income, which in certain cases has been 
reduced by stabilization policies but in others merely 
reflects the weakness of other demand components. 
The role of private investment 
The principal factors behind the low rates of private 
investment since the 1974-75 recession are generally 
considered to include the depressed level of profits, 
continuing high levels of capacity underutilization, un-
certainties created by fluctuating exchange rates, the 
effect of high nominal rates of interest on the cash flow 
implications of borrowing and a general lack of confidence 
in demand management policies. Different arguments 
apply with different force in different countries and indeed 
in different sectors within the same country. 
As regards depressed profits, the reverse side of the same 
argument is of course the excessive growth of earnings. 
The weight of the argument is seen in figures for the share 
of wage and salary earnings in net national income (see 
Table 5). It is clear that in general the wage share has risen 
substantially since the 1960s and though the timing of the 
rise has varied from country to country, the inflection has 
generally been accelerated by the 1974-75 recession. 
While labour was able to force up wage-rates to maintain 
the real value of earnings, the weakness of demand and in 
some countries, Italy, France, the United Kingdom in 
particular, price policies prevented the increased labour 
costs being fully passed on. For the Community as a whole 
the wage share was on average some 59% during the 60s. 
It rose to 66% in 1975 and since then it has fallen somewhat 
and should be about 62% in 1978. 
In order to test whether there has been a discontinuity in 
the behaviour of private investment, annual, and where 
possible quarterly, regression equations were estimated 
for each Member State. Changes in industrial output or 
total domestic demand, the relative costs of capital and 
labour and an index of the degree of capacity utilization 
were used to explain changes in the rate of private 
investment. This gives some evidence to suggest that in 
France, Italy and Denmark the fall in output during the 
recession discouraged investment relatively more than 
the earlier year-to-year fluctuations in output would have 
implied. In general, however, there is no clear pattern of 
underprediction or overprediction when the equations 
based on the years 1960-73 are used to forecast private 
investment in the post-1973 period. The recent lethargy of 
private-sector investment is largely explicable without 
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Table 5 
Share of compensation of employees in net national disposable income 
1960-1970 1971/72 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
DK 0,57 0,60 0,59 0,64 0,66 0,65 0,64 0,63 
D 0,59 0,62 0,63 0,65 0,65 0,63 0,63 0,62 
F 0,57 0,57 0,57 0,59 0,61 0,61 0,62 0,61 
IRL 0,55 0,55 0,53 0,57 0,59 0,59 0,58 0,58 
I 0,54 0,57 0,58 0,59 0,64 0,63 0,64 0,63 
NL 0,60 0,63 0,63 0,65 0,68 0,66 0,65 0,65 
B 0,58 0,59 0,60 0,61 0,64 0,64 0,64 0,64 
L 0,66 0,62 0,54 0,54 0,65 0,69 0,70 0,68 
UK 0,65 0,66 0,67 0,72 0,75 0,73 0,70 0,70 
EC 0,59 0,61 0,61 0,64 0,66 0,65 0,63 0,62 
us 0,67 0,69 0,69 0,71 0,70 0,69 0,73 
JAPAN 0,57 0,56 0,57 0,59 0,62 0,66 0,71 
Note: Series adjusted to eliminate the effects of variations in the proportion of wage and salary earners in total employment (1975 = 100). 
Source: Eurostat and estimates of the Commission services for 1977 and 1978. 
recourse to special arguments. In short the high degree of 
capacity available together with the expected level of 
demand does not warrant higher levels of investment, 
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though this does not rule out the role of such factors as 
uncertainties about exchange rates, low profit levels and 
high interest rates in certain sectors. 
3. Employment and unemployment 
Labour demand and supply 
In the period 1960 to 1973 the level of employment in the 
Community increased only at a slow rate from some 103to 
106 million persons, while the total population rose far 
more strongly from some 233 to 257 millions. Salaried 
employment, however, was growing a good deal faster 
than total employment-at about 1 % per annum. Unem-
ployment fluctuated, but stayed within a range from 2 to 
under 3 million (Graph 2). 
Since 1973 the Community labour market has been 
subjected to drastic changes, on both the demand and the 
supply side. 
Table 6 
The recession in 1975 led to a sharp reduction of 1,2% in 
salaried employment, whereas the following year's strong 
but temporary recovery in economic growth gave no 
increase in salaried employment at all. Since then, in 1977 
and 1978, there has been a modest increase in employ-
ment, essentially due to special employment measures by 
governments. While the form of these measures has been 
very diverse, the general pattern appears to be a 
continuing decline in industrial employment, with the 
increase in employment arising mainly through direct job-
creation in the public sector (see also Chapter 9 for a 
longer-run view). 
The weakening labour market has been due in part to 
r 
Development of salaried employment and productivity, changes over preceding year 
(percentages) 
1960-1970 1971/72 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1 
DK Employment 2,0 2,2 1,0 -0,3 -2,5 1,6 0,6 0 
Productivity 2,9 2,1 1,8 0,4 1,5 2,7 1,3 0 
D Employment 0,8 0,2 0,6 -1,1 -3,5 -0,5 0,1 0,3 
Productivity 3,7 3,5 4,2 2,4 0,9 6,1 2,7 2,4 
F Employment 2,0 1,6 2,3 1,5 -0,9 0,6 0,2 0,4 
Productivity 3,8 4,2 3,0 1,3 1,2 4,1 2,8 3,6 
IRL Employment 1,2 -0,1 1,8 1,9 -2,1 -1,5 
Productivity 3,1 5,6 2,6 -0,5 2,4 4,8 4,9 
Employment 0,8 0,5 1,6 2,0 0,4 1,3 0,5 -0,5 
Productivity 4,5 2,7 5,3 2,2 -3,9 4,5 1,2 2,7 
NL Employment 2,0 -0,8 0,4 0,4 -0,4 0,1 0,8 0,5 
Productivity 3,4 4,7 5,5 3,8 -0,8 4,3 1,6 1,4 
B Employment 1,6 0,5 2,0 2,0 -1,5 -0,5 -0,3 -0,5 
Productivity 3,3 5,0 4,4 2,7 -0,7 6,2 1,5 2,5 
L Employment 1,6 4,4 3,4 3,3 0,8 -1,6 -0,6 -1,0 
Productivity 1,7 2,3 12,0 0,2 -13,5 4,3 1,9 3,5 
UK Employment 0,3 -0,1 2,4 0,5 -0,4 -0,1 0,3 0,4 
Productivity 2,6 2,5 4,1 -1,1 -1,2 3,4 0,7 2,8 
EC Employment 1,0 0,5 1,6 0,4 -1,2 -0,0 0,3 0,2 
Productivity 3,6 3,5 4,0 1,4 -0,5 4,8 2,0 2,4 
Average: January-August. 
Note: 
Employment = Number of wage and salary earners. 
Production ~ Production por wage and salary earners. 
Source: Eurostat and estimates of Commission services for 1977 and 1978. 
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Graph 2 
Population, employment and unemployment in the Community 1960-1978 
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demograph ic trends. An increasing rate of growth of the 
working-age population has been apparent s ince the end 
of the 60s . 1 The most dramatic change has occurred in 
Ireland where the working-age population is growing in 
the present decade at over 1 % per year compared to a 
decline of almost 1 % per year two decades ago in the 50s. 
Germany represents the other extreme case, turning from 
a growth of working-age population of over 1 % per annum 
in the 50s to near ly%% per annum in the present decade. 2 
These changes are already doubtless having an effect on 
the pattern of economic growth in the co untries concerned , 
notably in Ireland's tran siti on to a high growth economy, 
compared to an adjustment to a more moderate growth-
rate in Germany. 
In most Member States acceleration in the rise of the rate 
of activity of women appears to have been more than 
offsetting the reverse trend of decl ining activity rates 
among the mal e population, the latte r due to the 
pro longation of education and some lowering of the 
average ret irement age; the proportion of the population 
undergoing full-time education rose from 16,4% in 1965-66 
to 19,9% in 1975-76. 
Immigration contr ibuted between 1963 and 1973 about 
one-q uarter of the total increase in population in the 
Source. The Economic Implications of Demographic Change in the 
European Commun ity 1975-1995, report of a study group of the 
Comm ission of the European Communities , Brussels , 1978. 
The decade as a who le, however, saw a change of trend with a stronger 
growth in the first half. 
Table 7 
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Commun ity, foreign workers reaching 7,8 % of the sa laried 
employment by 1973. The change since 1973, however, 
has been a radical one with restrictive measures app li ed 
in Germany and the Uni ted Kingdom since 1973 and 
France and Benelux countries since 1974. About 1 million 
foreign workers have returned to their home countries 
since 1973. 
A further factor supporting the labour market has been the 
modest rise in productivity, which in 1973 to 1978 rose on 
average at under half the rate experienced in 1960 to 1973. 
The only recent year of strong growth, 1976, saw on the 
other hand a sufficiently sharp rise in productivity to leave 
the employment level unchanged in that year. 
As the outcome of this series of (partly offsetting) 
influences, the main increase in unemployment occurred 
in the course of 1974 and 1975, the rate of unemployment 
for the Community as a whole rising from 2,5% in 1973 to 
4,9% in 1976. Since then there has been a continuing but 
decelerating increase in the Comm unity aggregate, and by 
1978 the trend was being reversed in some individual 
Member States , notably Ireland and Germany. 
Despite help from governmental measures it has been 
hardly possible to absorb the massive change in labour 
supply/demand conditions evenly throughout the labour 
force. A pattern observable in almost all Member States 
has been the increase in the share of female unemploy-
ment from 33% of the tota l in 1973 to 41 % in 1977, reflecting 
the increasing participation rates and the marginal 
econom ic situation of much female employment. The 
Rate of unemployment; registered wholly unemployed in the civilian labour force 
(percen tages} 
1960-1970 1971 / 72 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 I 
DK 1,2 1,2 0,7 2,0 4,6 4,7 5 ,8 6,6 
D 0,8 0,8 1,0 2,2 4 ,2 4, 1 4 ,0 3,9 
F 1,4 1,7 1,8 2,3 3 ,9 4,3 4 ,9 5, 1 
IRL 4,7 6,0 6,0 6,3 8,8 9,8 9 ,7 8,9 
I 5,7 5,0 4,9 4 ,8 5,2 5,5 6 ,4 7,0 
NL 0,9 1,8 2,3 2,9 4, 1 4,4 4 ,3 4 ,2 
B 2,2 2,5 2,9 3,2 5,3 6,8 7,8 8,3 
L 0,1 0 0 0 0,2 0,3 0,6 0,9 
UK 1,9 3,4 2,5 2,4 3,8 5,3 5,7 5,7 
EC 2, 1 2 ,6 2,5 2,9 4,4 5,0 5,3 5,5 
Average : January-Augus t. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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second general phenomenon has been the increase in 
youth unemployment (see Table 8), also reflecting of 
course the rigidities in existing employment structures in 
conditions of weak labour demand. This has in turn led to 
an increase in the average duration of unemployment for 
young persons. For example, in each of Germany, France, 
and the United Kingdom the number of youths unemployed 
for more than twelve months was very small in 1974 (1 to 
3% of total youth unemployment), whereas by mid-to-late 
1977 it had risen to more significant proportions (7 to 10% 
of the total). 
Table 8 
Distribution of wholly unemployed by sex and age 
The labour market in the Member States 
In Denmark, the stabilization of employment following the 
weakening in the recovery phase observed since 1976 and 
the accelerated growth in the labour force have been 
translated into a strong upsurge in unemployment. Thus, 
the unemployment rate which was traditionally lower than 
the Community average exceeded it; in 1978 the numbers 
out of work reached 190 OOO. The increase in participation 
rates of women, and more especially married women, has 
played an important role in this progression. 
Number of unemployed women, as % of total registered unemployed 
Number of unemployed aged less than 25, as % of total registered unemployed (May) 
1960-1970 1971/72 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
DK women 13,4 18,8 23,0 26,4 29,2 37,1 42,2 
less than 25 24,6 26,7 22,7 24,9 25,2 30,3 
D women 31,3 43,0 44,9 44,2 42,1 46,8 49,8 
less than 25 23, 1 24,9 25,6 26,6 
F women 40,4 45,9 50,9 52,9 49,1 52,5 53,4 
less than 25 27,1 29,8 31,6 36,4 37,0 38,3 
IRL women 16,3 18,3 18,0 18,8 19,4 19,1 20,1 
less than 25 
women 29,6 32,7 34,0 36,0 36,7 37,3 39,0 
less than 25 27,3 30,1 32,6 34,1 36,8 
NL women 14,6 16, 1 19,5 20,9 21,7 24,2 29,5 
less than 25 31,7 28,7 30,8 36,0 36,3 37,0 
B women 31,0 38,2 47,9 53,2 52,3 57,0 59,5 
less than 25 29,9 28,4 22,8 33,0 34,7 33,9 29,7 
L women 40,0 77,7 70,9 60,6 35,1 38,7 39,8 
less than 25 47,6 43,9 61,8 30,6 42,5 43,0 48,8 
UK women 22,4 16,8 16,7 16,6 20,5 24,8 27,9 
less than 25 31,6 25,4 30,4 41,8 43,9 45,6 
EC women 28,1 29,5 33,1 35,9 36,3 38,8 41,3 
less than 25 
Note: 
Denmark and United Kingdom, July, 
Belgium: 1972 and 1973 (March), 
Luxembourg: unemployed aged less than 21 (March), 
Italy: persons aged less than 21 seeking first employment. 
Source: Eurasia!. 
34 
In the Federal Republic of Germany the labour market 
situation deteriorated less rapidly in 1977 and slightly 
improved in 1978; none the less the total number of persons 
in employment fell by 1,7 million between 1973 and 1978. 
The number of unemployed increased by about a third of 
this figure, whilst 600 OOO people left the labour force and 
half a million immigrant workers returned home. Had this 
not been so, the present unemployment rate (3.9% for 
January to August 1978) could well have been doubled. 
The domestic labour supply, which had been steadily 
falling and had subsequently stabilized, began to rise 
again in 1976 for demographic reasons. 
In France, where relatively few jobs were lost because of 
the crisis, the slight recovery of employment observed in 
1976 and 1977 appears not to have continued into 1978. 
Production per employee increased faster than the 
Community average. The increase in labour supply due to 
demographic factors and to the increased participation 
rate of women contributed to unemployment. As in the 
other Member States, there is a continuing increase in the 
number of young people entering the labour market; but in 
France, this is combined with a relatively small number of 
workers reaching retirement. 
Employment in Ireland has started to rise again since 
1976; unemployment remained steady in 1977, and fell 
slightly in 1978. The improvement is due in particular to 
foreign firms moving in and to government measures to 
support employment. However, it masks problems in-
herent in the structure of the Irish labour market: the 
relatively marked influence of demographic factors, the 
paramount importance of agriculture and the shortage of 
skills in some sectors. 
The employment situation in Italy, already suffering from 
the effects of demographic factors (young people entering 
the labour market in very large numbers}, was further 
aggravated by the return of some 200 OOO emigrants 
between 1975 and 1977. Employment had increased during 
the recession years 1974 and 1975, a development 
contrary to that observed in the other Member States. After 
the statistics were revised it transpired that the labour 
force and the level of unemployment had both probably 
been much higher since 1977 than was previously thought. 
On the most recent assessment, the number of wholly, 
unemployed as a percentage of the labour force in Italy is 
now among the highest in the Community. 
In the Netherlands, where the employment situation had 
deteriorated sharply even before the oil crisis, the 
numbers of persons employed continued to fall between 
1975 and 1978. At the same time, productivity gains were 
Employment and unemployment 
becoming smaller, particularly in industry. Although the 
population of working age was increasing more rapidly 
between 1975 and 1978 than between 1971 and 1974, the 
number of unemployed increased on an annual average 
by about the same amount (20 OOO compared with 22 OOO). 
This is mainly connected with the increased numbers of 
those unsuitable for employment and of those wishing to 
take further their vocational training. 
Since the 1975 recession, employment in Belgium has 
fallen considerably more than has the Community 
average. The deterioration continued into 1977 and 1978. 
The considerable increase in the population of working 
age and fairly liberal social legislation had encouraged the 
extension of unemployment after 1970. This trend con-
tinued even after demographic factors became less 
influential. 
Only after 1976 did employment begin to fall in Luxem-
bourg. Since then, and for the first time since 1963, 
registered unemployment has been appreciable, in spite 
of the fact that migratory flows have been reversed and 
that measures have been implemented to support 
employment. 
In the United Kingdom, the level of employment, which had 
been falling since 1974, rose slightly in 1978. The 
improvement was not solely due to the improved 
economic climate, but also to some jobs being main-
tained, to a change in the structure of demand for labour 
and, in general, to specific employment policy measures 
that, according to official estimates, should make it 
possible to maintain some 300 OOO jobs. The upward trend 
of unemployment since 1969 continued until 1977 with the 
deterioration of the economic situation and the increased 
participation rate. Since then, unemployment stabilized 
between the autumn of 1977 and that of 1978, although the 
stabilization is probably temporary. The number of 
persons retiring and leaving the labour market is much 
higher in the United Kingdom than in other Member States, 
and this was no doubt a contributory factor in the 
stabilization of unemployment. 
Longer-run demographic trends 
Demographic changes have, as already seen above, been 
coming increasingly to the forefront as a variable of 
importance in the planning of economic policy. But 
knowledge in this domain is far from sure, especially when 
it comes to behavioural aspects of labour market 
participation. 
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A report recently prepared by a group of independent 
experts 1 has sought to explore the nature of the longer-
term trends at work for all Member States, using a 
consistent methodology, with a view to estimating 
potential labour supply through to 1995. Some of the main 
features of this work are summarized here. 
The purely demographic characteristics of the potential 
labour force can be calculated through to 1995 with relative 
accuracy since most of the working-age population of this 
period is already born (see Table 9). This age group (15 to 
64) has been growing faster at about 0,5% per annum in 
the 70s than in the late 60s. In the 80s, however, a double 
change of trend is expected, first a marked acceleration in 
the first half of the decade to a rate of 0,9% per annum, this 
reflecting the peak in fertility rates observed in most of the 
Community in 1964 (this in turn apparently related in part 
to the pre-war upswing in fertility rates in the late 30s and 
the fact that this generation was little affected by the war). 
The sharp decline in fertility rates since 1964 (also 
doubtless reflecting important sociological factors and 
improved contraceptive techniques) will then lead to only 
a small growth in working-age population in the second 
half of the 80s (0, 1 % per annum), followed by a small 
decline in the early 90s. 
The Economic Implications of Demographic Change, op. cit. 
Table 9 
Projections of labour supply then have to take account of 
actual participation rates, and their expected trends, for 
the various age groups and by sex. Table 10 shows 
separately the experts' estimates for the 'demographic' 
and 'activity rate' components in their total active labour 
force projections. 
In the period 1975-85 the demographic component is 
dominant with increases of about 4 million in each of the 
five-year periods 1975-80 and 1980-85. Thereafter the 
demographic component becomes less important, as one 
would expectfrom the simple working-age population data 
already noted. 
The activity rate projections necessarily rely on many 
assumptions notably as regards trends in female and male 
participation rates. Over the period 1975 to 1995 the female 
labour force is projected to grow at 1,4% per annum, the 
male labour force at only 0,3%, with a total of the order of 
0,7%. The female participation rates is assumed by 1995 to 
reach levels varying from 46,8% in the Netherlands to 
63,3% in the United Kingdom (as against respectively 
26,6% and 55% in 1975). 
By age group, a stabilization over time of the activity rate 
for youths (15-24) is expected, compared to the decline 
currently experienced; the fall in the participation ratesof 
Total populatlon of the Community 1955-1975 and projections to 1995 
/millions) 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Total population 
Children 0-14 52,7 56,3 58,9 61,0 60,6 55,7 52,3 52,2 54,0 
Working age 15-64 147,3 150,8 156,7 159,4 163,4 167,9 175,7 176,7 176,3 
Retirement age, over 64 23,1 25,1 27,9 31,0 34,3 36,5 34,7 36,5 37,6 
Total 223,1 232,2 243,5 251,5 258,3 260,2 262,7 265,4 267,9 
/percentages) 
50/55 55/60 60/65 65/70 70/75 75/80 80/85 85/90 90/95 
Annual growth-rate 
Children 0-14 0,32 1,32 0,91 0,73 -0,14 -1,65 -1,26 -0,05 0,68 
Working age 15-64 0,58 0,47 0,77 0,34 0,50 0,54 0,91 0,12 -0,5 
Retirement age, over 64 1,59 1,67 2,13 2,13 2,04 1,29 -1,05 1,02 0,58 
Total 0,62 0,80 0,95 0,64 0,54 0,15 0, 19 0,21 0,18 
Source: Commission services, derived from tables In Chapter 1 of The Economic Implications of Demographic Change ... , op. cit. 
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older people (60 and above) is expected to continue but at 
a slower pace than at present. 
The overall projection is for a rising activity rate 
component in the growth of the potential labour force, with 
the increases of the order of 0,9 million in each of 1975-80 
and 1980-85, rising to 1,5 million or more in each of 1985-90 
and 1990-95. In noting these figures it is to be stressed that 
the 'activity rate' projections are deliberately supposed to 
represent underlying tendencies as assessed at the time 
of the study and do not seek to reflect shorter-run 
developments in employment expectations. Indeed it is 
quite possible that a sustained weak outlook for labour 
demand in the period ahead could itself influence the 
underlying trend in the direction of lower participation 
rates. 
Employment and unemployment 
Table 10 
Projections of the total labour force, 1975-1995 
Total level of labour force, and projected changes (millions) 
Age group 1975 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990- 1995 
level 1980 1985 1990 1995 level 
Changes 
15-24 19,7 0,5 1,0 -1,0 -2,3 17,9 
25-44 49,8 3,4 2,8 4,0 1,8 61,9 
45-59 28,5 2,9 0,8 1,4 3,0 36,6 
60-100 8,1 -2,2 0,5 -0,5 -0,3 5,5 
Total '106,1 4,6 5,1 3,9 2,2 121,9 
Demographic component in changes 
Age group 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 
15-24 0,8 1, 1 -1, 1 -2,4 
25-44 1,9 1,6 3, 1 1,3 
45-59 2,3 0,3 0,3 1,9 
60-100 -1,2 1, 1 -0,7 
Total 3,8 4,1 2,3 0,8 
Activity rate component in changes 
Age group 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 
15-24 -0,4 -0,1 0, 1 0, 1 
25-44 1,6 1,3 1,0 0,5 
45-59 0,6 0,5 1, 1 1, 1 
60-100 -0,9 -0,8 -0,5 -0,3 
Total 0,9 0,9 1,7 1,5 
Source:The Economic Implications of Demographic Change ... , Part 1, Table 3.2, op. cil. 
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4. Prices and incomes 
Price and wage income trends 
After being halted in 1977, the deceleration in inflation in 
the Community was resumed in 1978. For the Community 
as a whole the increase in consumer prices may have 
been around 7%, compared with around 10% in 1976 and 
9% in 1977 (see Table 11). In terms of the implicit price of 
GDP the slowdown between 1977 and 1978 has probably 
been less marked. This mainly reflects an improvement in 
the Community's terms of trade in 1978 after a small 
deterioration in 1977 but also a higher rate of increase, in 
some countries, in construction prices than in consumer 
Table 11 
Increase in consumer prices and GDP prices 1 
1960-1970 1971/72 1973 
DK con. pr. 5,5 5,4 8,2 
GDP pr. 6,0 7,3 10,3 
D con. pr. 2,9 5,8 7,6 
GDP pr. 3,5 6,6 6,0 
F con. pr. 4,2 5,7 6,8 
GDP pr. 4,4 6,0 7,8 
IRL con. pr. 4,6 9,2 12,4 
GDP pr. 5,4 11,7 15,9 
con. pr. 4,0 6,2 12,2 
GDP pr. 4,6 6,7 11,7 
NL con. pr. 4,2 8,3 8,9 
GDP pr. 5, 1 8,6 8,2 
B con. pr. 3, 1 4,8 5,7 
GDP pr. 3,4 5,4 6,6 
L con. pr. 2,5 4,7 5,5 
GDP pr. 4,2 2,3 10,6 
UK con. pr. 4,0 7,6 8,2 
GDP pr. 4,2 8,5 7,4 
EC con. pr. 3,7 6,3 8,7 
GDP pr. 4,2 7,1 7,9 
us con. pr. 2,6 3,9 5,4 
JAPAN con. pr. 5,6 5,4 11,0 
prices in 1978 following a year when the reverse had been 
true. The slowdown in the increase in consumer prices 
which has been a feature of all the Community countries 
except France has been most marked in the member 
countries with the highest inflation rates: Italy, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom. (The question of convergence of 
inflation rates is considered in more detail in Chapter 5.) 
The rate of increase of consumer prices in the Community 
as a whole in 1978 came closer to the rates recorded in the 
US and Japan and to the OECD average (probably about 
7%) than at any time since the oil crisis. 
(percentages) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
15,3 8,4 9,3 10,9 9,0 
11,3 12, 1 8,5 8,9 9,5 
7,0 6,3 4,4 3,9 2,5 
6,9 7,1 3,2 3,6 3,8 
13,4 11,7 9,9 9,1 9,2 
11,6 13,2 10,0 8,8 10, 1 
15,2 21,8 17,0 13,9 8,0 
7, 1 23,6 18, 1 13,6 10,0 
21,0 17,6 17,9 18,0 12,5 
8,2 6,6 10,6 7,4 13,6 
9,7 10,3 9,2 6,7 4,4 
8,6 11, 1 8,3 6,6 5,4 
12,3 12,1 7,7 6,6 4,0 
12, 1 12,5 7,2 7,6 4,4 
9,5 10,7 9,8 6,7 3,1 
15,4 4,4 6,4 6,5 4,4 
16,4 23,3 15,5 14,3 8,6 
14,6 27,9 15,3 13,9 9,3 
12,8 12,8 10,0 9,1 6,9 
11,7 15,0 10,5 10,2 7,7 
10,8 8,2 5,8 6,5 7,5 
21,5 11,0 9,3 8,1 4,0 
For both consumer prices and GDP prices the EC figures are derived using current exchange rates. The EC figures for GDP are thus not directly comparable with those in Annex 
Table 5, derived using 1970 exchange rates. 
Note. con. pr .. implicit price of consumer's expenditure, 
GnP pr · implicit deflator of ornss rlnmAstir. rirnrluc:t 
Source: Eurostat. estimates of the Commission services for 1977 and 1978, OECD Economic Outlook. 
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At the level of consumer prices, the slowdown between 
1977 and 1978 has been most marked in food prices. 
Table 12 shows the profile of some components of 
consumer prices through the two halves of 1977 and the 
first half of 1978. After rising rapidly in the first few months 
of 1977, food commodity prices in dollars fell back, 
reflecting both an adjustment of tropical beverage prices 
and heavier temperate-zone crops in 1977 following the 
drought of the previous year. For the Community as a 
whole the annual rate of increase of consumer food prices 
halved from about 17% in the first half of 1977 to about 8% 
in the second half. Since food has a weight of around 30% 
in consumption in the Community the contribution to the 
decline in overall inflation in the second half of 1977 was 
substantial. 
Consumer prices for fuel and light have in part reflected 
the freeze in oil prices and the movement of exchange 
rates against the dollar, but in a number of countries they 
have been heavily influenced by public policy, as have 
rents and the prices of publicly-provided services. 
Table 12 
Components of consumer price developments 
Prices and incomes 
The deceleration in the prices of non-food consumer 
goods between 1977 and 1978 has been less dramatic but 
none the less important. For the Community as a whole the 
annual rate of increase declined from around 11 % in the 
first half of 1977 to around 7% in the second half. The 
increase in the first half of 1978 remained at or below the 
lower rate of the second half of 1977. 
The underlying rate of increase of manufacturing whole-
sale output prices appeared to be edging up to an annual 
rate of around 7 or 8% in the second quarter of 1978 (after 
very moderate rates of increase earlier in the preceding 
year, largely as a result of falling prices of fuel and 
materials imports in the second half of 1977 - see Graph 3). 
This may imply that the rate of increase of prices for non-
food consumer goods might remain in the second half of 
1978 at the moderate levels recorded in the previous two 
half-years, but with no marked further deceleration. 
The increase in nominal gross compensation per head in 
the Community as a whole slowed from 13% in 1976 to 
(increases from previous half-year at percentage annual rates, not seasonally adjusted) 
1977 I 1977 II 1978 I 
-
N N N 
"O "O <I) "O "O <I) "O <I) 
0 C: Q) 0 C: Q) 0 Q) 
.E "' 
() 
.E "' () .E () <ii "O Q) .c c ·~ <ii "O ~ .c c ·~ <ii "O C: .c c ·~ 0 C: 0 C: 15 0 0 0 0 ::, "' Q) Q) 0 0 0 ::, "' Q) Q) 0 0 'e' Q) Q) >- LL z LL :.= a: (J) >- LL z u..-= a: (J) >- u.. z a: (J) 
DK 9,4 11,2 7,3 5,0 12,4 9.5 14,2 13,8 15,6 19,4 9,9 12,3 8,9 9,4 9,8 9,8 8,4 10.0 
D 5,7 9,6 3,5 1,7 3,5 3,9 2,1 0,4 2,2 -0,2 2,9 4,3 3,7 2,8 5,2 4,7 3,3 3,2 
F 9,0 13,0 6,6 14,9 7,4 6,5 10,1 12,9 8,4 6,0 7,4 8,8 8,2 7,3 6,2 4,7 8,3 9,1 
IRL 16,6 20,3 14,9 30,3 8,0 11,9 7,8 11,0 6,5 4,0 -0,1 11,9 6,6 6,6 6,4 5,6 -20,3 4,9 
I 20,9 23,3 22,7 39,3 8,1 15,4 12,8 15,3 11,3 8,7 6,2 9,0 12,3 12,6 11,9 18,6 4,9 12,3 
NL 6,6 4,5 9,4 11,9 4,2 7,6 5,0 3,1 4,2 13,0 6,0 5,0 3,8 -1,2 7,7 10,5 0,7 5,0 
B 7,3 6,9 4,8 11,9 11,9 9,7 6,0 3,9 3,8 11,9 11,9 12,0 4,1 1,4 2,9 11,9 11,9 7,5 
L 8,0 9,6 7,1 14,0 : 3,3 6,8 -2,2 1,6 2,9 3,2 2,5 -0,2 : 
UK 20,3 26,8 19,2 14,5 18,1 10,8 9,5 6,5 11,3 15,2 4,9 4,8 7,8 9,2 7,4 4,3 4,1 14,9 
EC 12,2 17,0 11,0 14,4 14,6 9,2 7,8 7,9 8,4 8,3 7,1 8,2 7,1 5,0 6,7 7,4 7,2 6,8 
Non-food goods in Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, UK and Denmark. Total non-food consumption in Luxembourg and Ireland. 
Services excluding rent, except in Belgium. 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators, Commission departments. 
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Graph 3 
Prices and labour costs In manufacturing 
(1970-1978, quarterly figures, average 1970 100) 
260 
240 
220 
200 
190 
180 
170 
160 
150 
140 
130 
120 
110 -
100 
Raw materia ls prices in m anufacturing 
I 
I 
I 
I : 
I : 
-
.··. 
I 
/ 
~--/ 
/ 
/ 
I 
I 
I 
,• 
J Unit labour costs in manufacturing 
I : 
I . 
I : 
I : 
r .. ··wholesa le output prices in manufacturing (' . 
90 ___ ....__....__.___._ ....... __. ___ ....__...._ __ __._ ________ ....__...._ ........... __..__.__._.__.._~ __ _._ ................. 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 
Source : Eurostat and Commission services . 
Table 13 
Increase in wages and salaries per head 1 
1960-1970 1971/ 72 1973 
DK 10,3 10,8 14,0 
D 8,6 11,0 12,9 
F 9,4 10,8 12,7 
IRL 9,8 15,2 19, 1 
10,9 12,0 19,6 
NL 10,6 13,2 15, 1 
B 7,8 12,9 13,2 
L 6,8 9,1 12,5 
UK 7,0 12,6 12,3 
EC 8,8 11 ,2 14,4 
us 5,0 7,2 7,4 
JAPAN 13,2 14,8 21 ,9 
Gross wages and sal aries per wage and salary earner. 
Source: Eurostat and estimates of the Commission services. 
10,9% in 1977. The resurgence of consumer price inflation , 
fuelled large ly by commodity price movements, at the 
beginning of 1977 probably helped keep nominal pay 
settlements in the first half of that year in daub le figures. In 
a number of countries this effect was ensured through the 
indexation arrangements in operation . Although there was 
a deceleration in consumer prices for the Community as a 
whole in the second half of the year its incidence among 
countr ies was not such as immediately to produce a 
symmetrical effect on wage and salary movements. 
Despite the somewhat slower growth of gross nominal 
compensation per head in 1977, the increase in un it labour 
costs (whole economy) in the Community as a whole 
accelerated from 7,7 % in 1976 to 8,4% in 1977 as 
productivity growth fel l back , in the face of weakening 
output growth, from nearly 5% in 1976 to only 2% in 1977. 
In 1978 it appears that gross compensation per head in the 
Community as a who le may have grown s lightly less than 
10% . The re latively low growth of output in 1978 has 
probably limited the growth of productivity in the Com-
munity as a whole (al l industries and serv ices) to around 
2% %, hard ly better than the figure recorded in 1977. 
None the less the slight dece leration in compensation per 
head and the even s l ighter acceleration in productivity 
have been working in the same direction, producing an 
Prices and incomes 
(pe rcentages) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
18,8 16,8 12, 1 9,2 8,5 
12, 1 7,8 7,6 7,0 5,6 
17,5 18,4 14,8 13, 1 12,2 
17,8 29,6 22,2 17,5 14,0 
22,4 21,0 20,8 21, 1 15,5 
15,8 13,4 10,8 7,9 7, 1 
17,9 16,6 15,2 9,4 7,2 
22,0 14,5 12,7 9,1 5, 1 
20,5 30,7 15,7 9,5 12,6 
16,9 16,7 13,0 10,9 10,0 
8,0 8,4 8, 1 
24,5 17,2 
increase in labour costs per unit of GDP of around 7% in 
1978. 
Real pre-tax wages-gross compensation per employee 
deflated by the implicit price of consumption-grew by 
1,8% in 1977 and probably by about 3% in 1978 in th e 
Community as a whole (see Table 14). Thus while in 1977 
the increase in real pre-tax wages fell below that in 
productivity, in 1978 it may have about equalled it. Th e 
picture for 1978 varies from country to country, however, 
real pre-tax wage increases exceeding producti vity 
growth in Italy, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg , 
running at about the same rate as productivity growth in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, and falling below it in 
Denmark (where real wages have probably fallen ab-
solutely in 1978) , the Federal Republic of Germany and 
France. 
Pre-tax compensation of emp loyees per unit of output, 
def lated by the GDP price (an appropriate concept from th e 
employer's point of view }, probably fell by about %% in 
1978 after a fall of 0,2 % in 1977. In 1977 this had fallen 
sharp ly in the United Kingdom and had also fallen in th e 
smaller Community countries (except Lux embourg - see 
Table 14). had risen in France and Italy and was little 
changed in the Federal Republic. In 1978, by contrast , it 
has probab ly fa llen in a ll the Community countries except 
Belgium. 
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Table 14 
Increase in real compensation of employees and real labour costs per unit of output 
(percentages/ 
1960-1970 1971/72 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
DK (a) +4,5 +5,0 +5,3 +3,7 +7,8 +2,8 -1,7 -0,5 
(b) +0,7 -0,4 + 1,2 +6,0 +3,2 -0,7 -1,7 -1,0 
D (a) +5,5 +4,8 +4,9 +4,7 +1,5 +3,0 +3,1 +3,1 
(b) +0,3 +0,7 +1,7 +2,4 -0,2 -2,2 +0,5 -1,0 
F (a) +5,1 +4,8 +5,6 +3,6 +6,0 +4,4 +4,0 +3,0 
(b) -0,1 -0,6 -1,5 +3,0 +3,0 -0,1 + 1,1 -1,2 
IRL (a) +5,0 +5,5 +5,9 +2,1 +6,3 +4,6 +3,9 +6,1 
(b) -0,1 -1,6 -0,9 +9,4 +3,0 -1,3 -2,3 -2,5 
(a) +6,6 +5,4 +6,6 + 1,1 +2,8 +2,5 +3,1 +3,0 
(b) +0,1 +0,2 +0,9 +0,7 +2,7 -2,6 +0,8 -0,6 
NL (a) +5,8 +4,5 +5,6 +5,6 +2,9 + 1,5 +1,2 +2,7 
(b) +1,2 -0,2 +0,5 +2,4 +2,6 -2,5 -1,8 -0,2 
B (a) +4,5 +7,7 +7,1 +5,0 +4,2 +7,1 +2,8 +3,2 
(b) -0,1 +2,6 +1,0 +1,8 +4,6 +1,5 + 1,1 +0,7 
L (a) +4,2 +4,2 +6,6 +12,0 +3,2 +2,9 +2,4 +2,0 
(b) -0,6 +4,5 -10,0 +4,6 +26,3 +0,1 +2,8 -2,0 
UK (a) +2,9 +4,6 +3,8 +3,4 +5,7 +0,2 -4,8 +4,0 
(b) +0,1 +0,3 +0,4 +6,2 +3,3 -3,1 -4,9 +0,2 
EC (a) +4,9 +5,1 +5,0 +3,4 +4,3 +2,8 +1,8 +3,1 
(b) +0,1 +0,5 +0,9 +3,2 +2,6 -1,8 -0,2 -0,6 
la) 
(b) 
Gross compensation per employee deflated by implicit price of consumption._ 
Gross compensation per employee, per unit of output, deflated by 1mphc1t price of GDP. 
Source: Eurostat and estimates of the Commission services. 
Price policy developments 
With the notable exception of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, price control policies have been a feature of all 
Community countries over the past few years. In the period 
immediately following the oil-price shock, price-control 
policies based on detailed rules for the passing on of 
industrial costs at the industrial stage and on margin 
control at the distributive stage were in force in many 
Community countries; public sector charges and other 
administratively-controlled prices were held back; and 
temporary price freezes of varying coverage and duration 
were em_ployed in some countries. The controls were 
generally aimed at reducing or delaying the pass-through 
of sharply increased import prices and were often 
presented as a quid pro quo for pay controls or restraint. 
More recently, both the form and apparent emphasis of 
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price policies have been changing in a number of countries. 
Most notably, controls on the prices of industrial products 
in France have, with the exception of a small number of 
products, been freed. The new stance of policy in France 
aims at modifying the structure of relative prices so that 
prices bear as close a relation as possible to real costs of 
production. In the pursuit of this aim, and to reduce or at 
least stab ii ize the operating deficits of public enterprises, 
public sector charges have also recently been increased, 
by 10 to 20% in some cases. Control of distributive margins 
for the majority of goods, notably food (except for bread) 
and for many services remains in force. The freeing of 
industrial prices and the increases in public charges must 
initially add to the rate of price increases, but the French 
authorities hope that the effect will be limited by the 
pressure of foreign competition on manufactured pro-
ducts, while at the same time the relative price structure 
and the attitudes of businessmen to pricing and com-
petition can be improved. 
The main development in policy in Italy over the last two or 
three years has been the attempt to develop more 
objective rules tor the·fixing of Government administered 
prices (and also tor rents, for which a new system was 
introduced in July 1978). The aim, as in France, is that 
prices should reflect costs somewhat more accurately 
than hitherto, and new rules tor the better determination of 
costs were introduced in 1977. The Government has, in 
particular, succeeded in having accepted the principle that 
public-sector tariffs should as far as possible cover costs. 
The most recent manifestations of this principle have been 
sharp increases in the price of electricity (16%) and rail 
travel (20%) in the summer of 1978. 
The Belgian Government has been much less active in 
direct intervention {through the imposition of delays in 
price increases or ultimately the fixing of maximum prices 
of certain products and key sectors) in prices during the 
last two years of decelerating inflation. However, the 
general prohibition of indexation of industrial and 
commercial prices remains in force. Price increases can 
be justified only on the grounds of an increase in the costs 
on the enterprise in question. For 1977 only those salary 
increases limited to a percentage equal to the percentage 
increase in the cost of living were allowable. 
In Denmark prices in some periods were set in conformity 
with specific rules about imputed costs {the concept of 
allowable costs has varied at different times). Price 
controls have been regarded as a countervailing element 
to incomes policies and are intended to contain profits 
within normative limits. For the period from March 1977 to 
the end of August 1978 most of the previous restrictions 
were abandoned. No explicit limit for profits was set but the 
Price Committee was empowered to assure that profits in 
· specific sectors, e.g. liberal professions developed in 
accordance with the incomes policy norms. A temporary 
price and profits freeze was announced at the end of 
August 1978. 
Detailed cost-rules for industry and margin controls in the 
services sector are also in force in the Netherlands. For 
1977, there was initially no allowance for wage increas.es 
since it was thought that such increases would not exceed 
the growth of productivity. However, productivity in-
creases fell short of expectations and profit margins were 
compressed. Towards the end of the year industrial 
companies were therefore allowed to pass on the effects 
on their total costs of a 2% increase in wage costs. For 
1978 the pass-through of wage costs has again been 
limited to 2% times the share of wage costs in total costs. 
The liberal professions were allowed to increase charges 
by 2%% on 1 February 1978 and by a further 2% on 
1 August 1978. The food and entertainment industries have 
been brought within the scope of controls, as have small 
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enterprises in the hotel and restaurant sectors (in general, 
the controls apply only to large and medium-sized 
companies). 
Since the beginning of August 1977 the Price Code in the 
United Kingdom, which embodied detailed allowable cost 
rules, margin controls and reliefs of some complexity, has 
been replaced by a more flexible system. At present, a 
Price Commission is empowered to investigate a price 
increase announced or proposed by a company and, after 
taking account of certain statutory criteria such as the 
need to earn an adequate profit sufficient to encourage 
future investment and employment, can, if it feels the price 
increase unjustified, recommend to the Government a 
price freeze of up to twelve months on the goods or 
services in question or to allow a more modest increase in 
prices. In general terms the Price Commission sees its 
role as strengthening competitive forces within the 
economy and helping to pinpoint inefficiencies in pro-
duction and management. 
Incomes policy or major wage-bargaining 
developments 
1978 has been characterized by widespread attempts by 
governments to influence wage settlements by centralized 
guidance. This has often meant that policies have sought 
to restrain the growth of real incomes, virtually to zero in 
one or two countries, given that productivity growth 
remains relatively low and that only a small improvement 
in the terms of trade has been taking place. In a number of 
countries, governments have implemented or proposed 
reductions in the burden of income tax and/or employers' 
social security contributions, rather than increase social 
spending, in an effort to ease the path to wage moderation 
and to restrain the growth of total labour costs. The 
representatives of employees in some countries continue 
to press for increased public spending as part of wage-
deal packages. Not surprisingly in view of the harsh 
economic climate, consensus in negotiations has been 
difficult to achieve. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany it appears that the 
collective agreements concluded during the first tour 
months of 1978 will result in a slightly lower rate of gross 
nominal wage increase this year than last-around 5%% 
this year as against 7% in 1977. However, the operation of 
the wage-determination system in recent years has not 
proved completely acceptable to either side of industry. 
The share of non-wage incomes has generally been less 
than was expected when the relevant collective agree-
ments were signed. This is probably due to the fact that 
the general macro-economic expectations on which the 
collective agreements are based have often proved wide 
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of the mark: at various times either the growth of output or 
the rate of inflation or both have been overestimated. In 
every year except.one (1976) during the period 1970-77 the 
non-wage-and-salary share in national income declined. 
The provisional union withdrawal from the tripartite 
'concerted action' is symptomatic of a change in the 
climate of industrial relations, although this arose for 
reasons not related directly to the wage-bargaining 
process. 
In the United Kingdom the incomes policy in operation 
from mid-1976 to mid-1977 was remarkably successful in 
restraining nominal wages in the face of accelerating 
inflation as the fal Is in the value of sterling in 1976 worked 
through into consumer prices. In the year from mid-1977 
there was no formal agreement on incomes policy 
between the Government and the TUC, although the TUC 
recommended that settlements should take place only at 
twelve-month intervals and that negotiators should not 
attempt to recoup past losses in real wages. The 
Government set a 'guideline' of 10% plus the effects of 
'self-financing' productivity schemes, for settlements. The 
Government expectation for the extent of the deceleration 
in consumer prices consequent on successful implemen-
tation of the 'guideline' during the year to mid-1978 has in 
fact been realized. However, earnings appear to have 
grown by about 14%, somewhat faster than the 'guideline' 
and much faster than in the previous twelve months. This 
accelerated growth, combined with that recovery of 
sterling in the second half of 1977 which helped make 
possible the deceleration in prices, has reversed the 
improving trend in profitability evident during 1977. For the 
year from mid-1978 the Government guideline is reduced 
from 10% to 5% (including the effect of reductions in the 
working week), again with the possibility of 'self-financing' 
productivity schemes allowed. 
In France, the stabilization measures of September 1976 
had proposed that nominal wage increases should not, on 
average, exceed the increase in prices in 1977. The 
Government has had a similar aim in 1978. In the event, 
wages rose slightly faster than consumer prices in 1977 
(11,6% against 9, 1 %) and probably were so again in 1978 
(about 11% against about 9%). The current policy 
contrasts with the guaranteed annual increase in purchas-
ing power in public-sector wage contracts, emulated in 
some private-sector contracts, during the period from 1969 
to 1976. Such contracts rendered adjustment to the 
deterioration of the terms of trade in 1973/74 very difficult. 
It remains Government policy in France to increase the 
salaries of lower-paid workers relative to those of the 
higher paid. To this end the purchasing power of the 
minimum wage has been raised by nearly 6% this year, 
but the Prime Minister has warned that the priority being 
given to improving the incomes of the lower-paid will be 
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compatible with the constraints on the economy only if the 
progression of higher income groups is slowed, and that 
wage restraint, enforced if necessary by credit and public 
contract sanctions, is an essential condition for reducing 
unemployment. The September 1978 budget moreover 
rejected the implementation of a shorter working week or 
earlier retirement. 
In Italy, th·e containment of labour costs is, along with 
control of public borrowing, a central feature of the 
Government's economic programme. As in France, the 
announced aim is that there should be an approximate 
standstill in real wages. In addition, the temporary 
'budgetization-' of employers' social security contributions 
is being made permanent. For the present, the system of 
quarterly index-linked increases in wages is to be 
retained, but the Government will review the position in 
tripartite discussions at the beginning of 1979. The 
implication of the retention of the system is that the 
Government would like to see a virtual standstill in the 
collective wage agreements being negotiated from the 
autumn of 1978. The three major trade union organizations 
seem to be in favour of moderation in wage demands. 
In the Netherlands, as was the case in 1977, no centralized 
wage agreement has been arrived at. The employers wish 
to introduce more flexibility into wage-bargaining than has 
previously been the case, while the unions continue to 
press 'non-materialistic' demands concerned with, for 
instance, disclosure of company information. They also 
wish to see an increase in public spending as part of any 
centralized deal. For its part, the Government has been 
attempting to hold back the growth of labour costs by 
reducing employers' social security contributions some-
what and by introducing various wage-cost subsidies. 
Individual contracts have now been concluded for 1978. 
Apart from price compensation the rise in agreed wages 
will be about 0,9%. Total compensation in real terms has 
increased in 1978 more or less in line with productivity. 
The outline of Government medium-term economic 
policies published in mid-1978 foresaw a need to 
strengthen business profitability and restrict the share of 
public expenditure in national income. 
In Denmark the two-year wage agreement covering the 
period from March 1977 to March 1979 had to be imposed 
by law. The guideline for nominal wage increases was 6% 
annually (or 2% annually in real terms). In the event, 
nominal wage increases in the private sector have 
exceeded the guidelines, largely because of wage drift 
aimed at maintaining differentials in the face of the rise in 
the minimum pay. Real wages nevertheless fell absolutely 
in 1977, mainly because indirect taxes were raised sharply 
in the autumn. But the Government in effect introduced a 
temporary wage-cost subsidy by taking over additional 
indexation payments into supplementary pension funds. 
At the end of August 1978, still faced with a need to improve 
the balance of payments and the competitiveness of 
Danish industry, the new Government coupled an increase 
in VAT rates with a six-month freeze on rises of incomes 
and prices during which the next national pay agreement 
is to be negotiated. 
The rate of growth of salaries having moderated signi-
ficantly in 1977, the Belgian Government has intervened 
less actively in income-determination in 1978 after the 
strong measures taken in 1976 and the still-considerable 
restrictions imposed in 1977. The question of the inclusion 
of a shorter working week has proved a stumbling-block in 
negotiations between the two sides of industry on the 
accord interprofessionnel which usually serves as a 
general framework for sectoral negotiations. In fact, 
settlements in a number of sectors, and a settlement for 
public servants, have contained provisions for reductions 
in the working week. Settlements have in general been 
Prices and incomes 
moderate, largely reflecting weak labour-market con-
ditions and decelerating prices. 
National Pay Agreements between unions and employers 
have been in force in Ireland in both 1977 and 1978. In both 
years the Government made tax concessions conditional 
on the conclusion of an acceptable agreement. In both 
years the Government found the agreements acceptable, 
even though the 1978 agreement provided for an increase, 
at national level, of 8% in basic pay as against the 5% 
increase initially deemed the maximum desirable by the 
Government. It appears that the increase in gross 
compensation per employee will again be in double 
figures in 1978 and perhaps not very much lower than in 
1977. Real wages have risen very sharply in 1978, helped 
by improving terms of trade and by Government con-
cessions including the abolition of some local taxes. 
Negotiations for the 1979 National Agreement may be 
more difficult, given the large pub I ic-sector deficit and the 
delicate balance of payments position. 
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5. Convergence and divergence 
in the Community economy 
It is general ly fe lt that bo th econo mi c polic ies and 
economic performance m ust conve rge mo re c lose ly if th e 
Commun ity is to make progress towa rds economic and 
monetary integrat ion , and in pa rt icul ar to introduce a 
successful European Monetary System in the nea r futu re. 
However, the cri ter ia by w hi ch co nve rge nce is evaluated 
are often ill -defi ned , both as rega rds th e ir impo rtance in 
the integration process and as regards th e ir stat istica l 
measurem ent. Th is chapte r is a br ief contribution to th is 
important discussion ; it exam ines the most freq ue nt ly 
mentioned crite r ia and supp li es ce rtai n bas ic data. 
If the process of eco nom ic and m oneta ry integ rat io n is to 
conti nue, the n it is esse nt ial to reduce both th e ave rage 
rates of moneta ry depreciati on in the Com mun ity and 
dev iat ions fro m thi s ave rage. Th e basi c co ndi tion for 
durab le s m ooth funct io ning of th e new Eu ropea n Mo neta ry 
System is the co nvergence of inf lation rates at as low a 
level as poss ib le. 
Th ere is no s ing le and s im pl e ind icator of the degree of 
convergence of infl at ion rates ; usefu I benc h m arks for 
assessi ng t h is convergence over the past twe nty yea rs a re 
the Communi ty average and the rate in the m ost stabl e 
Member State. A n assessm ent based o n the def init io ns 
adopted for Table 15 a nd Graph 4 e mphas izes how w ide 
are the diverge nces the Community is overcom ing at 
prese nt. No Comm uni ty country had an ave rage inf lat io n 
rate for 1958 to 1967 that was substanti a l ly d ifferent (more 
than 2 % pe rce ntage po ints) f rom the Com m un ity 
ave rage . Onl y o ne country had a substanti a ll y di ffe ren t 
inflat ion rate o n average betwee n 1968 a nd 1973. In 1974. 
th e re were s ix co untr ies ; no less than seven in 1975 a nd 
1977 , and there we re still fo ur in 1978. 
Ave rage rates for 1958 to 1967 and for 1968 to 1973 we re 
nowhe re s ubstant ia ll y d ivergent from the average rate of 
th e country w here p ri ces were m ost stab le ; in 1974, 
however, s ix countr ies had inflat ion rates substantia ll y 
d ivergent from that of th e most stab le Mem ber State , bu t by 
1978 the number had fa l len to t h ree. Dur ing 1978, 
moreover , in f lat io n rates in th e Bene lux co untr ies we re 
suffic ient ly c lose to th e German rate (whi ch has been the 
benchmark for m any years now) to be co ns ide red c lose ly 
co nvergent. 
Graph 4 adopts the sam e c lass if icat io n of inflat io n rates 
into zones of conve rge nce ; it a lso s hows the rates of 
inf lat ion for each cou ntry in the yea rs f ro m 1958 to 1978. It 
shows c lear ly that the degree of co nve rgence has been 
c losely co rre lated with the average rates of infl at io n in the 
Commun ity and in the most stab le Mem ber State, wh ich in 
turn w e re strongly affected , in the wake of th e o i l cr isis , by 
the co l lapse of excha nge-rate stab i l ity . 
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Th e a bove results for pr ice trends in the Community a re 
accentu ated if the degree of co nverge nce is assessed o n 
the basis of a n in d icator of dispersion, such as the 
standard dev iation: relat ive ly l itt le dispers ion unti l 1972 
(except in 1958 when prices rose except ionall y s harp ly in 
France), m a rkedly greater d ispers ion in the period 1974to 
1977, st ro ng converging trend in 1978 (see Graph 5). The 
standard dev iation from the average increase in pr ic es for 
the Community w as about 1 or 2% durin g the 60s ; it rose to 
ove r 5% % in 1975. In sp ite of the improvement observed 
s ince the n , the disparity between infl at ion rates in 1978, 
w ith a p robabl e standard dev iation of a lmost 3%, w ill still 
be much hi g her than before 1973/ 1974. 
Differences in leve ls of per capita income are genera ll y 
recog n ized as another important cr iterio n of 'co n-
vergence ', altho ug h their sign ificance for econo mi c and 
monetary integrati on is not precise ly the same as for 
infl ation differenti a ls. It is general ly agreed that a ll the 
Mem ber States shou Id share in the advantages of 
in tegrat ion , and t hat the reduct ion of d isparit ies in li ving 
standards f rom regi o n to region and from country to 
country is one of t he Community 's fundamenta l aims . 
Indeed , it is obvious that progress towards integrat ion 
wou ld be greatly fac ilitated by the narrowin g of economic 
and social differences. Th e Commun ity's reg iona l po li cy is 
based on these assumpti o ns. The ach ievement of more 
nearly comparab le per capita incomes is an im portant 
lo ng-term ai m of gene ral integ rat ion policy. However, its 
pursuit has to go together w it h the reduction of differences 
in product iv ity . 
Gross per capi ta product m ight be used as an indicator of 
l iv ing standards , but it w o ul d requ i re data expressed in 
nat ional c urrency to be reduced to some common 
deno mi nator if d ifferent countries were to be compared. 
Co nc lus ions about the degree of convergence are large ly 
dependent o n th e denom inator chosen. 
There are two main reasons for exerci s in g caution when 
exchange rates are adopted as the basis for convers ion. 
First , co mpari son on th is basis tends to overestimate 
d ifferences in living standards. Fo r examp le, services that 
are not inte rnat io nall y trad ed are in general re lat ive ly 
expens ive in th e rich er countries, but their pr ice is 
insuff ic ie nt ly ref lected in exchang e rates. Secondly, other 
facto rs such as s ho rt-term capita l movements affect 
excha nge rates a nd di stort the compar ison at certa in 
t im es. 
T he d iverge nce in per cap ita domestic produ ct assessed 
o n the bas is of excha nge rates widened between 1960 and 
1976 (sec t he left-hand s id e of Graph 6) . During the same 
pe riod the re lat ive pos it ions of the Member States 
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Table 15 
Convergence and divergence of inflation rates (consumer prices) in relation to the Community average (A) and the most 
stable Member State (B) 
1958-1967 1968- 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
(percentage increases) 
Standard (A ): 
Comm unity average 3,3 5,5 13,0 13,5 10,8 10,5 7,5 
C lose convergence: D - F + F + B - L - DK + IRL + 
(A) ± 1 % standa rd I + I - B - UK + 
IRL - NL + 
NL - B -
B -
UK -
Medium conve rgence: DK + DK + DK + F - DK - F - DK + 
(A) ± 1-2,5% standard F + D - F - F + 
L - L - NL - B -
UK + B -
Substant ial d ivergence: IRL + D - DK - D - D - D -
(A ) ± 2,5% standard IRL + D - IRL + IRL + I + 
I + IRL + I + I + NL -
NL - I + UK + NL - L -
L - NL - B -
UK + L - L -
UK + UK + 
(percentage inc reases) 
Standard (B): 
Mos t stab le Member State 2,2L 3,80 7,00 6,00 4,60 3,90 3,30 
Close co nvergence: D NL 
(B) + 2% standard B B 
IRL L L 
NL 
B 
UK 
Med ium conve rg ence : DK DK NL DK DK F IRL 
(B) + 2% stand ard F F L NL F NL UK 
+ 5% stand ard IRL L NL B 
NL B L 
UK 
Substantial d ivergence : DK F IRL DK DK 
(8) + 5% stand ard F IRL IRL F 
IRL I L I 
B UK UK 
B UK 
UK 
Note : Figures based on consumer price indices (not consumption price deflate r). 
Source : Commission services. 
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Graph 5 
Dispersion of inflation rates between Member States (standard deviation) 
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changed considerab ly . The ratio of the hig hest per capita 
gross product in the Community to the lowest was about 
·2,2 in 1960 and 3 in 1976. 
These d ispar ities are much sma ller if calcu lat ions are 
based on purc hasing power parities instead of exchange 
rates. The purchasing power parit ies worked out by the 
Stat istical Office of the European Communit ies are stil l 
prov isiona l, but as a basis for calculat ion they do avoid the 
overestimat ion of divergences that cou ld resu lt from us ing 
market exchange rates . This measure is a lso more stable. 
Evaluating per capita gross product on the basis of 
pu rchasing power parities results in sma ller d isparit ies 
between the Member States than does eva luating it on the 
basis of exchange rates , both for 1960 and for 1976 (see the 
r ight-hand s ide of Graph 6). On this bas is, the dive rgence 
of gross per capita products decreased , although only 
slight ly, instead of increasing , between the two years: the 
rat io of r ichest to poorest country fe l I from 2,0 in 1960 to 1,9 
in 1976. Moreover, the re lative pos itions of the Member 
States changed less than on the basis of market exchange 
rates . 
Turn ing to the co nve rgence of l iving standards in the 
different regions of each Member State , we find that 
inequalit ies in gross per capita product have tended to 
shrink slightly in most Member States during the m ost 
recent years for which data are available (see Table 16) . 
This is less obvious when we compare the gap between 
the richest and the poorest reg ion in a given country than 
when we analyse inequality by considering the relative 
positions of all the regions. The index of the degree of 
inequa l ity fe ll in five out of the six member countr ies for 
wh ich data are given in Table 16; suitable regional data 
for th is kind of analysis are not available for the three 
countries that are not inc luded . 
The Statistical Office of the European Communities 
regu larly draws up harmonized statistics , based on 
nat ional data , for the trend of remuneration in industry in 
the various Member States . The results are summarized in 
Table 17, which shows that the divergence from country to 
country of gross hourly remuneration in industry as a 
who le is similar to that of per capita gross domestic 
product. Comparing the divergence of gross hourly 
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Table 16 
Regional inequalities in GDP per head 
Country Yea r Poorest Average Richest Average Ra ti o Degree 
reg ion level = 100 region level = 100 min./max of 
inequa lity 
expressed 
by 
The ll index 1 
D 1970 Schleswig- 81 Hamburg 165 2,0 0,0044 
Holstein 
1975 Schleswig- 84 Hamburg 178 2,1 0,0036 
Holstein 
F 1970 Quest 77 lle de 151 2,0 0,0130 
France 
1973 Quest 80 lle de 155 1,9 0,0123 
France 
1970 Sud 61 Lombardia 137 2,2 0,0174 
1974 Sud 65 Lombardia 135 2,1 0,0160 
NL 1970 Noord/ 88 WesV 112 1,3 0,0021 
Nederland Nederland 
1974 OosV 85 Z uidwesV 115 1,4 0,0023 
Nederland Nederland 
B 1970 Region 87 Reg ion 154 1,8 0,0076 
wal lonne bruxelloise 
1974 Region 86 Region 153 1,8 0,0072 
wal lonne bruxelloise 
UK 1970 North 80 South East 115 1,4 0,0027 
1975 Northern 82 South East 113 1,4 0,0019 
Ireland 
The Theil index measu res the ·inequality' of the series and 1s defined as the logarithm of a weighted geometric mean of the per capi ta product in e ach regi on compared to th e per 
c apita product of all the regions together . The index varies with th e degree of d ispers ion of per capita produ ct (a value of zero corresponding with a zero degree of inequal ity) 
Source · Eurostat and Commission services. 
remuneration w ith that of per capita gross domestic 
product in European units of account, on the basis of the 
coeffic ient of variation, we find a fairly similar develop-
ment between 1972 and 1976 (the coefficient for hourly 
remuneration increases from 21 % to 33%, while that for 
per cap ita gross product increases from 25% to 38 % ) . Like 
per capita gross domestic product, gross hourl y re-
muneration d iverges much less if purchasing power 
parities, instead of current exchange rates (as shown in 
Table 17) , were used to convert data in national cur-
renc ies. 
The pursuit of lo w inflation and substantial real growth are, 
of course, permanent and simultaneous objectives of 
policy in a ll Member States. It is a lso of cruc ial importance 
to the Commun ity that the arbitrage between these two 
obj ect ives is pursued w itt1 tl1e highest degree possibl e of 
compatibility between Member States, since the two 
factors together large ly determ ine balance of payments 
and exchange rate developments, and the constraints that 
the Community economy imposes on each Member 
State's policy. 
A fuller picture of convergence and divergence in the 
Community can be obtained from study of how the two 
obJect ives have in fact been combined. A comparison of 
growth-rates and inflation-rates shows that the com-
bination has improved in most Member States over the 
past few years , and that previous years were in general 
marked by stagf lation. The arrows on Graph 7 represent 
the development of the two variables between 1969 and 
1978. From any one year to the next , the most favourable 
direction is downwards and to the right (higher growth and 
less infl ation). A deterioration on both fronts is shown by 
an arrow pointing upwards and to the left. The oth er two 
direct ions show an improvement on one front w ith a 
deterioration on the other. 
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Table 17 
Average gross hourly earnings in industry as a whole 
(EUA) 
1964 1970 1972 1975 1976 1977. 
DK 2,40 4,39 5,28 5,37 
D 0,93 1,70 2, 12 3,26 3,95 4,16 
F 0,67 1,04 1,34 2,30 2,52 2,66 
I 0,58 1,00 1,27 1,94 1,73. 
IR L 
NL 0,74 1,35 1,86 3,27 3,93 4, 18 
B 0,79 1,34 1,81 3, 19 3,95 4,25 
L 1,07 1,69 2,08 3,46 4,45 4,82 
UK 1,56 2,20 2, 10 
Arithmetic mean 0,74 1,29 1,77 2,94 3,49 
Rat io max./min. 1,6 1,7 1,9 2,3 3,0 
Standard 0,16 0,28 0,37 0,76 1, 16 
deviation 
Coeff icient of 22 % 22% 21 % 26% 33% 
variat ion 1 
Standard deviation as percent of arithmetic mean . 
Note : All data refer to October of the yea r in question, except those marked with an 
as terisk, which refer to April. 
Source . Eurostat and Commission services. 
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In any g iven yea r we find th at a good number of countr ies 
(never less than ha lf} have arrows point ing in the same 
direc ti on. 
Th e preva iling trends in the results obta ined by the 
countri es have va ri ed from year to yea r. 1970 and 1971 saw 
a deterioration on both fronts for most member countries , 
whi le th e recove ry of 1972 and 1973 was dom inated by 
more rapid growth combined with a worsen ing on the 
prices front in five countr ies . At the begi nning of the cr isi s , 
in 1974, growth was losing momentum everywhere, and 
infl at ion w as ris ing except in Germany. In 1975, a year of 
c r isis to r growth , the inflation-rate fe l I in five cou ntr ies. The 
1976 recove ry meant a higher growth-rate than in 1975 in 
a ll countries , and an improvement in pr ice trends in all but 
two countr ies. In 1977, slower econom ic growth comb ined 
with lower rates of inflation was prevalent, and in 1978 all 
member co untr ies except France , wi ll probably have st ill 
lower inf lat ion , but there wil l be two d ifferent trends in 
growth : f ive countries wil l have higher growth in 1977, the 
other three w ill have lo wer growth. 
The to ta l picture eme rging from this two-fold standard of 
convergence shows a Community eco nomy deteriorating 
rapid ly betwe en 1969 and 1975, and recover in g to an 
appreciable extent s ince then ; a recovery , however, w hi ch 
needs to be extended and consolidated in the future . 
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6. Budgetary trends and policies 
Budgetary policies from 1975 to 1978 
Efficient regulation of the economy by means of budgetary 
policy has been found very difficult over the past few 
years; this is mainly because economic circumstances 
have been unsure since the recession that followed the oil 
crisis in 1973. On the whole, policies have been designed 
to compensate for deficient demand; average deficits 
have been considerably higher than their full-employment 
levels of the years before the crisis. But the degree of 
support given to demand has been adjusted at different 
times to presumed variations in the economic situation. 
Policies have thus been tightened and loosened by turns, 
but it has not always been possible to achieve the specific 
effects required for efficient control of the economic and 
financial imbalances they were intended to remedy. 
The use of budgetary policy to adjust economic magni-
tudes has met an additional difficulty in that a large part of 
current expenditure is becoming increasingly dependent 
on automatic mechanisms, and is therefore both dynamic 
and incompressible. In particular, the burden of interest 
payments has increased, and expenditure on social 
security has grown rapidly because of improved pro-
tection and, often, because of a large increase in the 
number of recipients. These commitments leave only a 
narrow margin of resources for more powerfully stimulat-
ing expenditure, such as direct or indirect investment. 
They have also restricted the authorities' scope for using 
tax reductions to stimulate private demand. The monetary 
risks inherent in large deficits have thus led the authorities 
to be fairly cautious, which has sometimes meant that 
direct actions and incentives to stimulate investment and 
employment could not be used to the extent required. 
However, within the limits set by general constraints, 
growing efforts at stimulation have been made, both 
through capital expenditure, which began to increase once 
more in real terms in 1978 after stagnating or even 
diminishing for a fairly long period, and through measures 
specifically intended to create or maintain jobs. 
Many important aspects of budgetary policy in the Member 
States have been similar over the past few years, 
especially timing. Policies of powerful stimulation in 1975, 
when deficits reached unprecedented levels, gave way 
more or less rapidly to contrary policies after the recovery. 
Management in 1976, and even in 1977 in most countries, 
tended to be restrictive in spite of automatic adjustments 
when economic circumstances again became less favour-
able. In 1978, however, the prevailing trend is towards less 
restriction; for it has once more become urgent to 
stimulate activity. 
But beyond these similarities, there have been important 
differences between budgetary policies, due not only to 
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the wide variety of the imbalances requiring adjustment in 
the different countries, but also to differences in the role 
assigned to public finance, for structural or practical 
reasons, in regulation strategies. Budgetary policies were 
most effective and varied in countries where the imbal-
ances were greatest and where budgetary instruments 
were most widely used to achieve the desired results. 
Budgetary policy has been most varied and has influenced 
short-term economic evolution most, to judge from the 
large, widely fluctuating deficits, in Italy on the one hand 
and in the United Kingdom and Ireland on the other. 
Powerful budgetary stimulation in all three countries was 
followed, in 1976 and 1977, by especially energetic 
restrictions to deal with worsening internal and external 
imbalances that were partly due to the stimulating effect of 
earlier policies. The means employed, however, were 
rather different in the different countries. In Italy, where 
current expenditure was subject to powerful constraints, 
restriction mainly consisted in a massive strengthening of 
the burden of direct and indirect taxation-increased by 
about 1 %% of GDP in 1976 and again in 1977. This action 
was supplemented by a deliberate cut-back in capital 
expenditure. In Ireland too, the deficit was reduced mainly 
through the rapid growth of tax revenue, which increased 
twice as fast as expenditure between 1975 and 1977. In the 
United Kingdom, on the other hand, a programme has 
been announced in early 1976 progressively to reduce the 
ratio of public expenditure to national output. Remedial 
action during 1976 was concentrated on intensifying the 
impact of this programme in 1977-78. In the event, the 
volume of public expenditure in 1977-78 turned out 7% 
lower than two years earlier, and considerably below the 
planned level. Taxation and other government receipts 
were more buoyant than expected. In 1978-79, public 
expenditure is growing but it is still expected to fall short of 
the published planning total by a rather greater proportion 
than was customary in the early 1970s. The reduction of 
public expenditure has been combined with reductions in 
income tax in support of policies to restrain the growth of 
money incomes. The imbalances in all three countries had 
been sufficiently corrected by these actions by the end of 
1977 for budgetary policies to move once more towards 
stimulation in 1978. The change was marked in Ireland, 
where substantial tax reductions combined with a massive 
increase in capital expenditure will probably entail an 
increase in the deficit of about 3% of GDP. It was also 
marked in Italy, where most of the planned measures to 
restrict current expenditure and to increase revenue have 
been postponed, while capital expenditure has been 
considerably increased. The stimulus afforded by tax 
reductions in the United Kingdom, whilst substantial, was 
not so great. 
In France and Denmark, where serious adjustment 
problems also arose, budgetary policy also underwent 
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Table 18 
Net borrowing requirement of central government 1 and of general government 2 as a percentage of GDP 
Net central government borrowing requirement General government financial balance 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
DK +0,6 -4,1 -3,3 -2,8 -3,3 +4,6 -1,7 -0,7 - 0,4 -0,7 
D -1,9 -5,3 -3,9 -2,5 -3,4 -1,3 -5,9 -3,6 -2,6 -3,1 
F +0,4 -2,6 -1,0 -1,0 -1,4 +0,6 -2,3 -0,4 -1,3 - 1,8 
IRL -12,0 -16,2 -11,0 -9,9 -13,0 -9,1 -13,9 -9,4 -9,0 -11,8 
I -8,6 -12,4 -9,8 -9,4 -13,4 -5,9 -12,3 -9,7 -9,1 -11,0 
NL -1,4 -3,3 -3,2 -2,1 -4,0 +0,9 -2,9 -2,2 -1,6 -3,0 
B -3,6 -5,2 -6,0 -6,3 -7,1 -1,9 -3,8 -5,0 -5,1 - 5, 1 
L +3,5 + 1,1 -0,2 + 1,4 -0,2 + 4,5 +0,2 0 +0,6 0 
UK :i -5,8 -8,1 -4,7 -3,0 -3,8 -4,0 -4,8 -5,0 - 3,2 -4,2 
EC -3,2 -5,8 -4,1 -3,3 -4,6 -1,7 -5,2 -3,7 - 3,3 -4,0 
Borrowing requirements resulting from the implementation of central government budgets, including financial transactions (loans, advances and equities). 
General government financial balance of the basis of harmonized national accounts, not including financial transactions (loans, advances and equities). 
For the United Kingdom the reference period is the financial year (1 April to 31 March). 
Source: Services of the Commission. Balance of central governments: cash outturns provided by national services for 1974-1977 and estimates for 1978. Balance of general 
governments: economic budgets. 
similar changes, but only the initial relaxation phase was 
really marked. Indeed, as a consequence of the recession 
and of the measures taken to combat it, both countries-
especially Denmark-experienced a sharp deterioration 
of their budgetary position in 1975, although the well-
balanced starting position of both countries in this respect 
resulted in deficits much lower than the Community 
average. Consequently, the efforts required to bring them 
down to levels consistent with gradually reducing internal 
and external disequilibrium were also relatively less. The 
results obtained on both fronts were, however, insufficient 
to allow for a substantial relaxation of the budgetary 
stance in the two countries in 1978. 
In Germany and the Benelux countries, inflationary 
pressures have been weaker and have never endangered 
external equilibrium; there was a wider margin of 
manoeuvre in these countries for budgetary policies to 
support activity. However, it could not always be fully 
exploited, because it was feared that excessively high 
deficits might rekindle inflation or absorb too great a 
proportion of savings. Belgium was an exception to the 
general rule in that the deficit expressed as a percentage 
of gross national product grew steadily throughout the 
period, so that the need for a medium-term revision of 
expenditure policy became pressing in 1978. The other 
countries, free of payments difficulties, began as early as 
1976 to correct the budget imbalances caused by the 
recession. The persistent lack of economic dynamism, 
however, led them to abandon their restrictive line and to 
return gradually to more flexible policies. By 1977 the 
German authorities were already taking measures to 
support activity, with extra expenditure and tax reductions 
totalling more than 1 % of GDP. The measures included a 
new pluriannual programme of investment, an increase in 
family allowances and reductions in income tax, wealth tax 
and tax on enterprises, partly offset by an increase in VAT 
rates; they resulted in a considerably higher budget deficit 
in 1978. The deficit in the Netherlands will also be quite a 
lot higher in 1978 than in 1977, owing in particular to the 
effects of support measures agreed in the spring which 
involve a sum equal to over 1% of GDP, and to increased 
assistance to private investment agreed when the 
investment account was introduced at the end of May 1978. 
Prospects for budgetary policies in 1979 
The Member States agreed at the European Council 
meeting in Bremen on 6 and 7 July 1978 on the principle of 
joint action to stimulate demand. At the meeting of 24 July 
1978, the Council adopted detailed arrangements for such 
action as proposed in a Commission communication on 
the adaptation of public budgets in 1978 and the prepara-
tion of public budgets in 1979 in the context of Community 
concerted action. The Member States are counting mainly 
on the increased flexibility of budgetary policy, and on its 
spillover effects, to obtain the desired result. 
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The Council decision of 24 July 1978 thus committed all the 
Member States to increase budgetary support; this will 
mean higher deficits in 1979 than was originally planned, 
in spite of the stabilizing effects expected from the 
acceleration of growth. The general trend is adapted in 
widely varying ways in the different countries, in view of 
the margin of manoeuvre left to each by its external trade 
and price prospects, the specific features of its short-term 
economic situation and the constraints on its budgetary 
and tax systems. It has therefore been provided that the 
stimulation measures considered necessary may be 
partially offset by restrictions, particularly where bud-
getary management is tight. On the whole, the characteris-
tic feature of the Member States' budgetary policies in 
1979 will be their selectivity with a view to achieving the 
highest possible degree of efficiency rather than the extent 
of the effort they will require. The Council considers, in its 
decision of 24 July, that in countries where the balance of 
payments situation and the behaviour of prices are still 
uncertain, arrangements for 1979 should not reinforce the 
support which increased deficits-sometimes consi-
derably increased-afforded to activity in 1978. 
The policy sketched for Italy and Ireland, indeed, is slightly 
restrictive, for the aim is to reduce the net deficits in 1979, 
as a proportion of GDP to below their 1978 levels. In both 
countries this will require a reduction in some items of 
current expenditure and some increases in taxes and 
levies especially as it now appears necessary to increase 
budget aid to investment. The guidelines are less strict for 
the other countries where the restoration of equilibrium is 
still causing problems. Some reduction in direct taxes is 
even considered possible in Denmark if it is justified by the 
results of the policy to moderate wages. The Danish 
budget measures adopted in September include an 
increase in the personal income tax allowance; however, 
to control the spontaneous increase in the budget deficit 
and reduce the external deficit, restrictive provisions have 
also been adopted including raising the VAT rate from 
18% to 201/4% in October, reinforcing direct taxation by 
changing the system of index-linking the income-tax 
schedule, and introducing expenditure savings, parti-
cularly through postponement of certain public infrastruc-
tures. The decision of 24 July recommends for France that 
the measures planned to bring the deficit below its 1978 
level should be postponed. The draft budget for 1979 
respects this recommendation, in spite of the moderating 
influence on the rate of increase in expenditure of earlier 
decisions (mainly concerning public service charges and 
support to employment). The decision noted that, beyond 
tax cuts proposed in the United Kingdom 1978-79 budget 
equivalent to more than 11///o of GDP, there was limited 
room for manoeuvre for the UK Government. For Germany 
and the Benelux countries, the guidelines in the decision 
are more resolutely geared to stimulation. However, it was 
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conceded that the margin of manoeuvre necessary for the 
essential revival measures could not be created in 
Belgium unless action were taken at the same time to 
reduce some of the current expenditure items of the 1978 
budget. The draft budget for 1979 therefore confirms the 
measures taken in the law on economic and budgetary 
reform by limiting the rate of increase in this expenditure 
to below that of gross domestic product and providing for a 
particularly vigorous effort in favour of investment. In 
Germany, after the Council's decision of 24 July provided 
for budgetary stimulation with tax reductions and with 
supplementary expenditure of about 1 % of GDP in 1979, 
the Federal Government adopted an appropriate pro-
gramme on 28 July with a series of measures to be 
introduced between the beginning of 1979 and the 
beginning of 1980. The measures for 1979 mainly concern 
income tax and increases in certain items of transfer 
expenditure. On the other hand, there will be an increase 
in VAT rates on 1 July 1979. The Netherlands, too, have 
complied with Community guidelines, in their draft budget 
for 1979, supplementing the provisions adopted in the first 
half of 1978 with incentive measures. The central 
government budget deficits as a percentage of gross 
domestic product should thus be considerably higher in 
1979 than in 1978 in Germany and the Netherlands, and 
remain about the same in Belgium, while the slight surplus 
expected for 1978 in Luxembourg should give way to a 
slight deficit. 
Long-term trends in public finance 
Over the past few years the share of government 
expenditure in the Community as a whole has been fairly 
stable. After increasing more or less regularly between 
1958 and 1973, it accelerated sharply in 1974 and 1975 
under the influence of the mechanical effects of the crisis 
and the short-term policies adopted. During these two 
years, general government expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP increased by nearly 6%, or almost as much as it 
had over the preceding fifteen years (7,7%). Public 
expenditure as a share of GDP reached 46,4% in 1975 
compared with 40,6% in 1973 and 32,9% in 1958. 
These general trends cover considerably different de-
velopments at national level; the extent of the deceleration 
in the growth of public expenditure since 1975 has varied 
according to each country's specific budgetary constraints 
and ability to control the spontaneous evolution of public 
finance. General government expenditure increased most 
sharply in 1974-75 in Ireland, Denmark and the Benelux 
countries. These were also the countries where the rates 
of growth of public expenditure were highest between 1958 
and 1973. Except in Ireland, public expenditure continued 
to grow after 1975, although more slowly. In Germany, 
public expenditure in relative terms, which had been rising 
since 1971, and especially in 1974-75, has remained stable 
over the past few years. The effects of the 197 4-75 crisis on 
public finance were less marked in France and Italy, where 
public expenditure continued to expand at a moderate rate 
after 1975. Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP is 
considerably lower in 1978 than in 1975 in the United 
Kingdom. 
The general effort to control the growth of public 
expenditure in a slack economic situation concentrated 
mainly, as Table 19 shows, on consumption and capital 
expenditure, while current transfers and interest pay-
ments continued to progress. 
Between 1958 and 1973, revenue as a percentage of GDP 
grew parallel to expenditure, rising from 33% to almost 
40% over the Community as a whole. In 1974-75, the trend 
of government receipts did not allow the rapid rise in the 
level of government expenditure to be covered, even 
though it rose as a proportion of GDP in all member 
countries except Germany, Ireland and Denmark. After 
1975, the temporary recovery of economic activity in 1976 
made it easier to increase taxes and levies in an attempt to 
reduce budget deficits; the effort continued in 1977, but it 
was relaxed in 1978. The increase was highest and widest-
ranging (covering all categories of compulsory contri-
bution) in Italy and Ireland, the countries where the burden 
Table 19 
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of taxation and social security contributions was con-
siderably lighter than the Community averages and where 
budget deficits were greatest. The increase in revenue in 
Germany, France and Belgium is mainly due to direct 
taxes and social security contributions; in the Netherlands 
and Denmark, it comes from indirect taxes. The per-
centage of total taxes and social security contributions to 
GDP in the United Kingdom has fallen more sharply away 
from its peak but has not returned to its earlier levels. 
Recent increases in indirect taxation have been less than 
the large reductions in the burden of direct taxes. 
Recent developments continue the long-term trend 
towards an increase in social security contributions as a 
proportion of the current receipts (see Table 20); this trend 
should be related to the increase in current transfers from 
social security schemes, which are financed by these 
contributions. Over the Community as a whole, the share 
of social security contributions in GDP rose from 7,8% to 
14,4% between 1958 and 1977, while the burden of direct 
and indirect taxation rose from 22,7% to 25,8% during the 
same period. At the moment, social security contributions 
represent a higher proportion of GDP than either direct or 
indirect taxation in most of the Community's founder 
member countries. They are not so high in the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland, because a higher 
proportion of social transfers is financed out of tax 
revenue. 
The trend towards an increase in the share of direct taxes 
Development of main categories of general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
Consumption Other current expenditure 1 Capital expenditure "l 
1958 1973 1975 1977 1978 1958 1973 1975 1977 1978 1958 1973 1975 1977 1978 
DK 13, 1 21,9 24,9 23,0 22,8 9,6 14,4 16,9 16,7 17,7 3,3 4,6 5,5 5,9 6,0 
03 13,2 18,2 21,0 20,0 19,9 16,7 16,9 20,8 21,3 21,4 4,3 5,2 5,7 5,3 5,3 
F 14,1 12,6 14,6 14,9 14,9 17,0 21,2 24,9 26,0 26,4 4,0 4,3 4,3 3,6 3,6 
IRL 12,4 15,2 19, 1 18,7 18,4 12,0 19,5 21,9 22,2 22,2 3,7 5,9 7,1 6,2 6,7 
I 12,0 14,7 13,9 13,7 14,2 13,7 22,9 27,2 28,8 30,4 3,9 4,0 4,9 4,2 5,0 
NL 14,3 16,3 18,4 18,3 18,4 15,2 26,5 31,0 32,6 34,2 5, 1 5,0 5,5 4,5 5,3 
B 12, 1 15,0 16,9 17,3 17,9 14,0 21, 1 26,0 27,8 29,0 1,8 3,5 3,7 3,6 3,7 
L 12,6 11,4 15,0 15,7 15,9 15, 1 25,4 27, 1 30,4 30,7 6,7 7,5 9,5 9,0 9,3 
UK 16,3 18,4 22,3 20,7 20,1 12, 1 15, 1 18, 1 18,6 19, 1 2,9 5,3 5,3 4,0 3,8 
EC 14,2 16,3 18,4 18,0 17,5 14,8 19,4 23,0 24,0 24,5 3,7 5,0 5, 1 4,5 4,6 
Current transfers and miscellaneous current expenditure (mainly interest on national debt). 
Gross fixed investment and capital transfers (net of capital transfers received). 
Differs from Table 8 of the Statistical Annex. Expenditure on health services in kind are included in public consumption and not in current transfers in conformity with German 
national accounts definitions. 
Sources: 1958-1973: OECD National Accounts; 1975-1978: Economic budgets of the services of the Commission. 
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Table 20 
Trends in the composition of tax and social security revenue as a percentage of GDP 
Indirect taxes Direct taxes Social security contributions 
1958 1973 1975 1977 1978 1958 1973 1975 1977 1978 1958 1973 1975 1977 1978 
DK 11,7 15, 1 13,9 15,5 16,7 11,9 27,9 27,9 26,0 26, 1 1,5 1, 1 0,7 0,6 0,6 
D 14,2 13,4 12,3 12,4 12,7 8,8 12,3 12,0 13,7 13,0 9,8 13,2 14,9 15,5 15,4 
F 16,7 15,4 14, 1 13,8 13,8 6,4 6,4 7,3 8,4 8,4 11, 1 15,2 17,2 18,4 18,3 
IRL 17,2 19,3 17,4 17,5 15,9 4,9 9,2 9,8 11, 1 11, 1 1,0 3,0 4,5 4,8 4,6 
I 12,2 11,0 9,6 11, 1 11, 1 5,4 6,8 7,3 9,2 10,2 7,9 11,9 15,3 14,8 14,9 
NL 9,8 11,8 11,3 12,4 12,7 12,0 15,4 16,4 16,5 17,2 8,1 16,9 18,4 18,0 18,2 
B 10,7 11 ,6 11,7 11,8 12, 1 7,4 13,5 16,4 17,0 18,6 6,4 11,3 12,6 12,7 12,8 
L 9,7 11,7 13,4 13,2 13,2 11,5 14,8 18,2 20,7 20,4 8,5 11,8 15,6 17,2 17,2 
UK 13,3 13,9 13,8 14,6 14,2 11,8 12,8 16, 1 14,4 14,2 3,8 5,4 6,6 6,7 6,5 
EC 14,0 13,6 12,6 13,0 13, 1 8,7 11,0 11,8 12,7 12,6 7,8 12, 1 13,8 14,4 12,6 
Sources 1958-1973: OECD National Accounts: 1975-1978: Economic budgets of the services of the Commission. 
in GDP observed between 1958 and 1975, however, has 
become less general in the past few years. The countries 
with the largest increase in the burden of direct taxes from 
1958 to 1975, Benelux, Ireland and Denmark, are also 
those where the share of indirect taxes in GDP increased 
or remained steady. The increase in compulsory contri-
butions in these countries affected all categories of 
revenue, so as to cover the very rapid expansion of 
expenditure. In France, Italy and Germany, the increased 
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burden of direct taxation was partly offset by a reduction in 
the importance of indirect taxation; combined with higher 
social security contributions, it did make it possible to 
finance more expenditure, although the rate of increase in 
expenditure was less rapid. After 1975, the share of direct 
taxation in revenue continued to increase in the countries 
where it was originally the lowest (France, Italy and 
Ireland) as well as in Belgium and Luxembourg. It fell in all 
the other Community countries. 
7. Monetary trends and policies 
Developments in intermediate objectives and 
monetary policy 
The role assigned to monetary policy in the different 
member countries may be assessed with reference to the 
intermediate objective adopted (money, credit) and to the 
operational value attributed to this objective. By compar-
ing the objective with the results obtained, we can assess 
the problems faced by the authorities during the period 
concerned. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bundesbank uses 
a money supply growth objective (money supply defined, 
according to the Bundesbank's special criteria, as 'central 
bank money') 1 . Since 1975 the rate of growth aimed at has 
always been 8% (in 1975 this was defined as the 
December-on-December rate; since 1976 it has been 
defined as an annual average). Over the years the criteria 
for setting the target rate have changed a little, but the 
Paper money plus compulsory reserves on resident's deposits 
calculated at constant rates. 
Table 21 
Monetary policy's intermediate objectives and realizations 
D F 
basic aims have been to reduce gradually the rate of price 
increases while also assuring the means of financing the 
real growth of the economy. In 1977 central bank money 
increased by an annual average of 9% over 1976. The 
excess was due more to the public's increased preference 
for liquid as opposed to longer terms assets than to a great 
increase in bank credit. To contain the rate of expansion 
within the 8% limit, the monetary authorities would have 
had to raise short-term interest rates; this could well have 
further hampered growth, which was already only 
moderate, as well as creating further upward pressures on 
the Mark. These same risks explain why the Bundesbank 
did not take restrictive measures in 1978 in spite of the 
strong acceleration of monetary expansion, due mainly to 
the rapid expansion of credit to private sector residents. 
Even if the supply of central bank money were to settle at 
its mid-August level, the annual average increase would 
still be over 10%; however, with the moderate level of 
present growth-rates there is little risk that price stability 
will suffer from the extra expansion of money supply. 
lntfrest rates on money and capital markets, which had 
been falling since early in 1977, levelled off in the spring of 
1978, and long-term rates even showed a slight upward 
NL UK 
Central M2 Total Monetary M2inet Sterling M3 DCE 
mrds 
UKL 
Bank domestic base 
money credit 
mrds LIT 
1975 Norm Realization 
1976 Norm 
Realization 
Norm 
1977 
Realization 
Norm 
1978 
Realization 
Annual average. 
December/December. 
+8 %2 
+ 10,0 % 2 
+8 %' 
+9,2 % 1 
+8 0;0 1 
+9,0 % 1 
+8 %1 
+ 24 700 4 
+ 33 710 4 
+29 500 +5 700 5 
+33 530 + 8 981 5 
+12,5 % 2 +30 600 +4 OOO 5 
+13,9 % 2 +35 856 -4 296 s 
+12,2 % 1 
+ 12 %2 +46 OOO + 7 500 6 
Targets appearing in the EEC directives fixing the conditions of Italian economic policy. 
Period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976. 
Monetary base created by the Treasury. 
Total monetary base. 
Source: 1977 Annual Report of the Nederlandsche Bank. 
Year lasting from mid-April of year indicated to mid-April of following year. 
Target succoodod a target of + 12% for M3. 
Source: Commission's departments, except where otherwise indicated. 
national 
income 
+9-13 % 8 9 +9 8 
39,6 % 7 +7,2 % B +4,3 B 
-1 % by reference + 9-13 o;0 s + 7,7 8 
to 76 level 
39,3 % 7 +16,3%8 +4,4 8 
- 1 % by reference + 8 +6 8 
to 77 level 
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tendency. However, they are still the lowest in the 
Community (3,7% on short-term rates and 6,8% on long-
term in August); this is mainly because of differences in 
inflation rates between Germany and other Member 
States. 
In France the first target for the growth of money supply 
(M2) was fixed for 1977. At 12,5% (therefore slightly lower 
than the estimated growth in the value of GDP (13,2%) it 
was part of a medium-term strategy to stabilize the 
economy's liquidity ratio, which had been increasing 
rapidly up to 1975, thus contributing to the elimination of 
inflationary pressure. The manipulation of interest rates 
plays a smaller part in the regulation of the money supply 
in France than in the Federal Republic of Germany; 
regulation in France is based on the strict control of the 
counterparts of the money supply, particularly private 
sector bank credit. The average annual money supply 
increased by 12,2%; the liquidity ratio remained about the 
same as in 1976. The December-on-December increase 
was 13,9%, but statistical uncertainties mean that this 
figure is (by about 1 percentage point) too high. 
The authorities set a target of 12% for money supply 
growth in 1978, about the same as the expected nominal 
GDP growth, and thus consistent with the medium-term 
aim of stabilizing the liquidity ratio. The ceiling on bank 
credit has been adjusted to make it easier to manage 
m9netary growth; if the 12% target is to be met, close 
control of Treasury money creation is required, since the 
policy of external borrowing contributes to the increase in 
liquidity. 
The relative stability of interest rates recorded in 1977 has 
given way, since March 1978, to a downward trend. 
In the United Kingdom, the monetary authorities first set 
intermediate objectives in the 1976/77 financial year; 
these objectives covered both money supply and, pur-
suant to the agreement with the IMF, domestic credit 
expansion (DCE). 1 The DCE objective was predominant 
while balance of payments problems were being faced, 
since a payments deficit results in destruction of liquid 
assets. After the improvement in the balance of payments 
situation, the authorities concentrated more on the money 
supply objective. 
Experience over the past few years has led the authorities 
to adjust the monetary norms applied to defining the 
aggregate (at present: Sterling M3) and the method for 
setting the target; for the 1978/79 financial year, the target 
was again expressed as a margin (8-12%) subject to 
· review and adaptation after six months. 
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As in other countries there is a close link between 
monetary and budgetary policies because the public-
sector deficit is one of the main elements affecting 
domestic credit expansion and the growth of the money 
supply. The extent of this depends largely on the difference 
between the Public-Sector Borrowing Requirement 
(PSBR) and the volume of national debt securities that can 
be placed with the non-banking private sector. 
The norms laid down for the fiscal year ending in mid-April 
1977 were largely respected, mainly owing to control of the 
PSBR. Against a norm set at UKL 9 OOO million, DCE 
registered an outcome of UKL 4 300 million. The pre-
scription for monetary expansion was within a 9-13% 
bracket; and the actual figure 7,2%. In the-year ending in 
mid-April 1978, DCE was once more, at UKL 4 400 million, 
well below the norm of UKL 7 700 million; however, 
monetary expansion was 3 percentage points higher than 
the upper limit of the 9-13% prescribed target, because of 
rapid acceleration towards the end of the financial year. 
The balance of payments surplus, and in particular the 
inflow of capital, was one of the main factors in the growth 
of the money supply; the prevention of an excessive 
appreciation in the value of the pound was at times given 
priority. 
Interest-rate policy is very actively exercised to control the 
development of the money supply and bank credit as well 
as to influence capital movements. The minimum lending 
rate (MLR), which is generally varied fairly flexibly, fell 
from 141/4% in December 1976 to 5% in October 1977. 
However, the trend has been reversed since the end of 
1977: the monetary authorities raised the MLR in stages 
from 61/2% in April 1978 to 10% in June, with a view to 
containing monetary expansion. Over the same period, the 
rate on twelve-year Government bonds rose from 11,4 % to 
12,4%. In June, the supplementary special deposits 
scheme ('corset') which penalizes excessive growth of 
interest-bearing bank deposits was reintroduced; since 
then, monetary expansion has been much slower. 
The intermediate objectives, established in agreements 
between Italy and the EEC in connection with loans 
granted to Italy, cover total credit of domestic origin 2 and 
the monetary base. Total credit is both a conjunctural and 
a structural indicator. Compared with most of the other 
member countries the ratio of total credit to GDP is 
especially high in Italy (25% between 1973 and 1976). This 
reflects the size of the borrowing requirements of the 
DCE is mainly composed of bank credit to the public and private sectors 
(domestic counterparts of the money supply). 
" The concept of total credit used in Italy includes, not only public and 
private sector bank credit, but also funds obtained by these sectors 
through other financial intermediaries and the capital market. 
public and enterprises sectors. In the medium term, there 
are reasons to expect a stabilization or even a reduction in 
the global credit/GDP ratio as well as a redistribution of 
credit in favour of the private sector. However, such 
developments would require a radical change in struc-
tures and behaviour. 
From the short-term point of view, the objectives set for 
total credit must be consistent with restoring balance of 
payments equilibrium and slowing down the rate of 
inflation. In 1977 the target was exceeded by about LIT 
5 OOO OOO million (approximately 2,5%) ;1 the excess, most 
of which arose at the end of the year, was mainly due to the 
deterioration of pub I ic finances as a result of the slowdown 
of economic activity. This year, total credit has developed 
within the limits set (LIT 46 OOO OOO million, or about 23% of 
GDP). 
The monetary conditions set in the agreements with the 
Community include limits on the creation of monetary 
base, to which monetary expansion is linked by a 
multiplier. In the medium term, the Treasury is by far the 
most important creator of monetary base in Italy; however, 
experience in 1976 and 1977 has shown that, in the short 
term, other sources can be very important. Consequently, 
the target for 1978 refers to total monetary base. Over the. 
two years concerned, short-term rates moved steadily 
downwards, while rates on the capital market dropped 
only slightly. 
In the Netherlands the monetary authorities took control 
measures in May 1977 with the purpose of halting the rapid 
expansion in liquidity that had raised the liquidity ratio (M2 
as a percentage of GDP) to the unprecedented level of 
39,6% at the end of 1976. The medium-term aim was to 
re·duce this ratio gradually (by about 1 percentage point a 
year). The specific features of control, which applied only 
to credits granted from short-term resources, enabled the 
rate of money supply growth to be cut back from 20,5% in 
1976 to about 7% in 1977 with minimal effects being felt on 
interest rates or the distribution of credit. 
The renewal of the control system, decided upon in March, 
limiting the increase in bank credit from monetary 
resources to 8% over the period from the second quarter 
of 1978 to the second quarter of 1979 will allow the money 
supply to increase more or less parallel with the value of 
GDP, without creating pressures on the markets; long and 
short-term interest rates showed a downward trend until 
autumn 1976 after the temporary rise in December 1977. 
Increase of global credit of 17.7% instead of 15.2%. 
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The.policy of the Belgian monetary authorities is geared to 
credit granted to the private sector (firms and households) 
by the financial intermediaries; however, no target figure 
is set in advance, and the monetary authorities consider 
this concept important only in periods of restriction. 
Private-sector credit is regulated on the basis, among 
other things, of the Public-Sector Borrowing Requirement. 
Total domestic credit in 1977 was about the same, in 
absolute terms, as in 1976, but with the public sector 
increasing its share of this amount to about one-half. The 
drop in the proportion of total credit granted to firms and 
households is not due to restrictive monetary policy, but to 
the weakness of demand that has resulted from the loss of 
momentum of economic activity; interest rates, parti-
cularly short-term rates, moved downwards during the 
year (except during the short periods when exchange 
markets were under pressure); the downward movement 
has continued until autumn 1978. It is expected that, even 
this year, domestic credit will expand only moderately and 
that the proportion granted to the public sector will 
increase again. 
Denmark's open economy and persistently high current 
balance of payments deficits have led the authorities to 
control the development of the domestic components of 
the money supply (domestic credit expansion: DCE), so as 
to attract foreign capital. Quantitative limits are therefore 
set in terms of the expansion of bank lending commit-
ments, and interest rates are kept at a considerably higher 
level than in other countries. Since high budget deficits 
appeared in the financial year 1974/75, the means of 
covering the deficit has become a vitally important factor in 
regulating OGE. For this year, the authorities consider that 
an increase in DCE approximately equal to that recorded 
in 19·77 is consistent with the aim of stimulating the inflow 
of capital. The slowdown in monetary expansion during 
the early part of the year was due to adjustments limiting 
the remuneration of short-term bank deposits; these 
adjustments caused a considerable volume of private 
funds to be transferred into less liquid assets, mainly short 
and medium-term Government securities. 
In Ireland, too, monetary policy is mainly geared to 
influencing external reserves. In 1977, credit expansion 
was broadly in line with expectations and objectives, but 
one component, bank credit to the private sector, 
increased by 22%, compared with an expected 18%, 
whilst the creation· of money by the Government was 
moderate, mainly as a result of placing Government 
securities with the private non-banking sector. The 
securities were easier to place because interest rates 
were tending downwards and because the structure of 
rates was favourable to capital market securities. The 
combined effects of the increase in credit expansion and 
the balance of payments on liquidity led to a growth in 
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money supply (M3) of 16%, consistent with aims and 
expectations. 
A 20% increase in bank credit to the private sector and the 
creation of about IRL 560 million by the State were 
regarded as consistent, for 1978, with the Government's 
plan for real and nominal GDP growth and with monetary 
expansion of about 16 to 18%. It was recognized that this 
fairly expansionist monetary policy could lead to some 
loss of reserves, the amounts of which the authorities 
considered tolerable. However, in the first part of the year 
the increase in bank credit to the private sector was 
substantially in excess of the targets. This led the 
authorities, in October, to place limitations on the banks, 
so as to limit the increase in credit extended to the private 
sector to 10% in the six months to end-March 1979. 
The use of intermediate objectives for a better 
coordination of monetary policy 
All the countries of the Community set intermediate 
objectives in terms of money and/or credit, but they do so 
in different ways. One of the main differences concerns the 
role of the objectives and the amount of publicity they are 
given. Germany, France and the United Kingdom publish 
the target figures in order to influence expectations. The 
monetary targets for Italy are published in the Com-
munity's Council Directives on economic policy con-
ditions. The Netherlands' objective of gradually reducing 
the liquidity ratio is theoretically a medium-term aim, and 
immediate considerations may temporarily override it. In 
Ireland and Denmark, DCE and money supply projections 
are both aims and predictions which must be realized 
when account is taken of general objectives and con-
straints on general economic policy. Belgium is the only 
Member State that does not officially formulate any 
projection or objective for monetary aggregates. 
There are also differences in the type of intermediate 
objective adopted (money supply or credit), and the way 
the objectives are defined. A preference for money or for 
credit may be partly due to theoretical considerations, but 
it is much more closely dependent on the balance-of-
payments situation. An objective in credit terms, adopted 
by a country experiencing balance-of-payments difficul-
ties would imply that the monetary authorities were 
refraining from compensating for the destruction of 
liquidity resulting from a balance-of-payments deficit; 
accordingly an automatic stabilization factor is introduced 
into the system. On the other hand, a country with a 
balance-of-payments surplus would be more likely to 
adopt an objective in terms of money supply; the 
realization of such an objective would imply that, in a 
floating exchange-rate system, the authorities were not 
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seeking to avoid an appreciation of their currency through 
intervention by the central bank; however, were this 
appreciation to become excessive, the authorities could 
intervene on the market and attempt simultaneously to 
compensate for the creation of liquidity resulting from 
such interventions by tightening up credit. Such an action 
has limits however, because of the fact that credit 
restriction is liable to provoke further capital inflows. 
The differences arising from the definition of the monetary 
aggregate chosen are due to institutional and structural 
differences between the member countries. On the other 
hand the quite frequent changes in definition of the chosen 
aggregates made with a view to finding increasingly 
significant monetary variables, demonstrate the growing 
importance attached to intermediate objectives in the 
implementation of monetary policy. The same applies to 
changes in the way the objectives are expressed (annual 
averages, margins and so on). 
Some progress is being made towards harmonization, but 
it is necessarily slow since it requires structural changes. 
Moreover, a difference in intermediate objectives may 
reflect a difference in the degree of priority assigned to the 
various final objectives of economic policy. 
Nevertheless, present differences are not a great obstacle 
to the use of intermediate objectives on a Community 
level. The main condition for such use is that each country 
should understand the intermediate objectives of the 
others: such is the principal aim of the Working Party on 
the Harmonization of Monetary Policy Instruments. 1 
Money supply and credit, the two intermediate objectives, 
are connected both functionally and in an accounting 
sense which would allow each Member State to appreciate 
the intermediate objective of another country in that 
latter's own financial context and also to compare it with its 
own objectives. 
Briefly, total credit in its widest definition, is made up of all 
the funds obtained by public and private sectors from the 
financial intermediaries, the capital market and abroad; 
other definitions of credit represent only the sum of certain 
components of this global sum. The counterpart of total 
credit is represented by the formation of financial assets 
(money, long and short-term securities), and the differ-
ence between the two totals is the balance-of-payments on 
current-account position. 
Despite certain differences in the method of determination 
certain basic elements such as the real rate of growth and 
a normative rate of price rise are always taken into 
This Working Party is dependent on the Community's Monetary 
Committee and Committee of Governors of the Central Banks. 
account in the setting of intermediate objectives; more-
over, in most countries, the Public-Sector Borrowing 
Requirement and its financing play an essential role in the 
quantification of these objectives. Consequently, the 
intermediate objectives are established within a general 
framework which allows, during the prescribed period, a 
link up between the orientation of monetary policy, 
fundamental objectives and other compartments of 
economic policy. 
Monetary trends and policies 
Intermediate objectives have often been advertised at 
national level to influence the behaviour of economic 
agents. However, there is no need to publicize in-
termediate objectives at Community level for the moment. 
The coordination bodies might, however, find it useful to 
use them, in order to bring out any inconsistencies 
between monetary policies. Comparing intermediate 
objectives could therefore facilitate more real and more 
effective coordination of monetary policies. 
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8. Balance of payments 
World balance-of-payments summary 
The balance of payments of the Community on current 
account has improved considerably over t~e last two 
years, showing a turn-round from a deficit of USD 6 500 
million in 1976 to a surplus of some USD 10 OOO million in 
1978 (see Table 22). These figures imply a shift of about 
1 % of Community GDP to the external sector over that 
period. 
The establishment of figures for world payments flows is 
difficult, but such data as are available suggest that the 
overall current-account position of the OECD countries as 
a whole, which in 1977 still seemed to be in durable deficit 
as a result of the four-fold increase in the price of oil at the 
end of 1973, has in fact greatly improved in 1978, largely as 
a result of increases in the prices of OECD merchandise 
exports. There has at the same time been a reduction in 
the surplus of the oil-exporting countries. 
However, the admittedly imperfect figures suggest that 
the improvement in the OECD position has also resulted 
from a deterioration in the current-account balance of the 
non-oil-producing developing countries. The present 
equilibrium of the world economy depends to a consider-
able degree on a continuing flow of private lending to the 
non-oil-producing developing countries (and to the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe) on a scale unheard of before 
1974 and would be called in question by any impediment to 
that flow. This flow of lending is also of interest in the 
Community context because a significant proportion of the 
loans have been made by banks resident in the EEC. 
Within the OECD area, the improvement in the Com-
Table 22 
World current account balances 1973-1978 
1973 1974 
EC 1,50 -11,25 
us 7,00 1,75 
JAPAN 0,00 -4,75 
OECD total 3,00 -32,75 
OPEC 9,00 61,25 
Other developing 
countries -8,00 -24,00 
USSR and Eastern 
Europe -6,00 -7,00 
p.m. 1 EUA :, USO 1,23 1,19 
Forecast. 
At current exchange rates. 
munity's current-account position has been overshadowed 
by more dramatic developments in the accounts of the US 
and Japan. The US, whose current-account surplus was 
not completely eliminated by the oil crisis and was in fact 
substantial in 1975, has since moved into a position of 
substantial deficit, which represented about 1 % of GDP in 
1978. The deterioration in the US current balance was 
more than accounted for by a deterioration in that 
country's merchandise trade account; and of the adverse 
turn-round of some USD 40 OOO million between 1975 and 
1978 in US merchandise trade, about two-fifths repre-
sented a worsening in the US oil bill. 
The rapid decline in the US surplus in non-oil trade should 
also be noted, particularly as this appears to have been the 
major element in the further deterioration in the US current 
account between 1977 and 1978. One aspect of this 
problem has of course been the higher dollar prices paid 
for US imports as a result of the fall of the US currency on 
the exchanges, an effect which should be outweighed, in 
due course, by an increase in the volume of net exports as 
a result of improved competitiveness. 
Even more striking has been the very rapid build-up of 
Japan's current-account surplus to almost 2% of GNP, a 
development virtually completely accounted for by the 
growth in that country's favourable balance of merchand-
ise trade. To some extent this phenomenon can be 
explained by the improvement in Japan's terms of trade 
resulting from the revaluation of the yen, but the imbalance 
within the OECD cannot be explained by price factors 
alone and depends also in part on the relative cyclical 
position of the main countries. 
(USO OOO million) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1 
1,50 -6,50 1,25 10,00 
18,50 4,25 -15,25 -18,00 
-0,75 3,75 11,00 18,00 
-6,25 -24,50 -32,00 0,00 
28,75 39,25 34,00 28,00 
-39,50 -26,50 -26,50 -31,00 
-15,00 -11,00 -10,00 -9,00 
1,24 1, 12 1,14 1,30 
Source. OECD Economic Outlook, except first line which is from Eurostat and Commission·s departments. 
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Table 23 
Alternative indicators of cyclical positions 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Source. Commission's departments. 
EC 
101 
98 
98 
A - Ratio of real GDP growth-
rate to pre-1974 average 
(1967-1973 average ~ 100) 
us 
102 
101 
100 
The quantification of the cyclical position of an economy 
involves many problems of interpretation, and the above 
table therefore presents two alternative measures. In the 
first the rate of economic growth in 1976 to 1978 is 
compared to the average rate achieved by each economy 
in the seven years immediately preceding the oil crisis, 
while the second shows whether unemployment has been 
above or below its long-term trend. In order to make the 
second measure comparable with the first, the former has 
been inverted, i.e. unemployment greater than its trend 
value, which corresponds to a low cyclical point, is 
represented by a value below 100. Of the two indicators, 
the one related to unemployment is the more volatile, but 
they agree in indicating that for three years now the USA 
has been running its economy much closer to full capacity 
than either the EEC or Japan (see Table 23); the first 
indicator also implies that Japan has gone deeper into 
recession than the Community. The cyclical position of an 
economy has a considerable influence on its current 
account balance, a high cyclical point being associated 
with a high propensity to import and a weaker perfor-
mance in export markets by domestic producers. 
The structure of the Community's balance of 
payments 
The most constant feature of the Community's balance of 
payments is the substantial outflow of unrequited trans-
fers, representing both remittances outside the Com-
munity by migrant workers and official transfers, made 
principally by member governments, which represent, 
broadly speaking, the Community's grant-aid contribution 
to world development. Prior to the oil crisis the Community 
could expect to earn a sufficiently large surplus on trade in 
goods and services to finance the unrequited transfers and 
ensure a modest surplus on current account, but since 
JAPAN 
96 
95 
95 
B-
EC 
85 
85 
89 
Balance of payments 
Ratio of unemployment to 
long-term trend, inverted 
(1963-1978 trend ~ 100) 
us JAPAN 
91 88 
106 92 
128 87 
1973 the situation has been much less stable. In 1975 the 
re-emergence of a merchandise trade surplus was short-
lived, fast economic growth in 1976 leading quickly to a 
renewed deterioration in that account. 1977 and 1978 have 
however seen the emergence of a more satisfactory 
position (see Table 24). The balance on services has 
remained positive, in spite of the growing interest charges 
incurred by some member countries on the various forms 
of borrowing needed to finance their post-1973 current-
account deficits. This satisfactory overall performance has 
been due to rising net receipts from tourism and to the 
operations of Community financial centres, and in 
particular the City of London, which have acted as 
intermediaries for the substantial funds which OPEC 
countries in particular wish to keep in liquid form. 
The Community is both a receiver and an exporter of direct 
and portfolio investment on a large scale, but in net terms 
these operations of the non-bank private sector have had 
only a secondary role in financing the Community's 
current-account deficits. Net flows of this type have 
oscillated around ± 1-2 OOO million EUA as against gross 
flows of 7-8 OOO million EUA in each direction. The major 
role in financing the 1974 current-account deficit was 
played by drawings on official reserves, but the principal 
instrument used in 1976 and 1977 was the issue of bonds by 
the public sector-both central governments and public 
corporations. Another feature of the capital account in 
1977 appears to have been a turn-round in the position of 
the banking sector (with a certain amount of official 
encouragement) from being a net lender to being a net 
external borrower. These net figures for the transactions 
of the banking sector conceal very large gross flows. 
Financial institutions in the Community have been takers 
of additional external deposits to the extent of about 60 OOO 
million EUA per year recently, an increase of some 30 OOO 
million in terms of annual flows since the desire of the 
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OPEC countries to save opened new opportunities for the 
financial centres of the Community. The line labelled 
'other non-monetary transactions' in Table 24 includes a 
wide variety of operations of the non-bank private sector, 
the principal constituents being trade credit, and certain 
operations of oil companies in the North Sea Zone. 
In 1977 the emergence of the US deficit, with OPEC 
remaining in substantial surplus, resulted in very large 
international capital flows, a substantial proportion of 
which came into the EC, giving rise to an unprecedented 
increase in the Community's international reserves. Such 
information as is available for 1978 indicates that, as might 
be inferred from estimates of a much lower OPEC surplus, 
the rise in EC reserves has been only slightly greater than 
the EC current-account surplus. 
The positions of Member States 
Denmark has suffered from a substantial current-account 
deficit for some years now-in spite of the substantial 
favourable impact on that account of Denmark's inclusion 
in the Community's agricultural system since 1973-and 
this deficit rose in 1976 to the equivalent of some 5% of 
GDP. The deficit is more than accounted for by merchand-
ise trade, but a fall in the surplus on services account 
caused by rising debt service charges should be noted. 
The current-account deficit has been smaller in 1977 and 
1978, but Denmark has nevertheless faced a substantial 
Table 24 
Balance of payments of the Community 1973-1978 
1973 
Net balances: 
Merchandise trade (fob/fob) 5,65 
Services 2,79 
Transfers -7,24 
Current account 1,20 
Capital account: 
Direct and portfolio investment 0,19 
Public-sector transactions 0,38 
Other non-monetary transactions 6,07 
Commercial banking operations 0,24 
Errors and omissions -1,04 
Official settlements balance -9,12 
Source: Eurostat and estimates of the Commission·s departments for 1977 and 1978. 
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financing task, in which the major role has been taken by 
public-sector bond issues; these operations were suf-
ficiently successful in 1977 to permit an increase in official 
reserves. 
The current-account surplus of the Federal Republic of 
Germany rose in 1973 and has since remained high, 
apparently unaffected by the oil crisis: indeed, the 
beginning of the recession produced a record surplus in 
1974. This performance has been dominated by the large 
surplus on merchandise trade account, which has risen 
again in 1978; the deficit on services has recently shown a 
tendency to diminish, but this has been offset by a rise in 
official transfers. In merchandise trade, there was little net 
change in the balance in volume terms between 1973 and 
1977: the oil crisis did not require any volume adjustment 
in the external accounts of the Federal Republic since the 
terms of trade, while varying strongly in given years, have 
overall remained virtually unchanged since 1970. In effect, 
the rise in value of the Deutschemark on the exchanges 
has enabled the rise in the dollar price of oil to be offset by 
a rise in the dollar price of German exports generally. 
In the years before 1974 there was a strong net inflow of 
capital into Germany, and the world-wide demand for 
assets denominated in Deutschemarks was a further 
factor in the rise in value of the German currency. The 
associated purchases of reserves by the Bundesbank 
caused, as is well known, problems of domestic monetary 
(OOO million EUA) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
-2,91 8,74 -0,93 10 17 
2,08 1,54 4,85 2 4 
-8,58 -9,08 -9,92 -11 -13 
- 9,41 1,20 -6,00 8 
0,82 1,40 1,29 -1 -2 
-1,04 -0,31 3,40 6 -2 
3,20 3,41 0, 13 5 6 
-1,55 -7,07 -0,88 5 -2 
1,07 1,20 1,02 8 
-6,91 -0,17 -1,04 24 8 
management and were one of the factors leading the 
Federal authorities to opt for a float of the Deutschemark in 
1973. The result of that decision was that the Federal 
Republic became an exporter of capital on a scale 
corresponding to its current-account surplus in 1974 and 
1975; conversely, renewed intervention to prevent an 
excessive appreciation of the Deutschemark in 1976 and 
1977 was associated with a reduction in the size of net 
capital transactions. Behind these modest recent net 
capital movements, however, lie substantial gross flows. 
In 1977 exports of 4 900 million EUA of long-term capital, in 
which outward direct investment was very important, were 
offset by a favourable position in respect of trade credit 
and increases in the external liabilities of German 
financial institutions. 
Table 25 
Summary balance of payments of Member States 1966-1978 
1966- 1971-
1970 1972 
DK Current account -0,32 -0,23 
Capital movements 1 0,30 0,37 
Official settlements balance -0,02 0,14 
D Current account 1,61 0,77 
Capital movements 1 -0,51 3,77 
Official settlements balance 1,10 4,54 
F Current account -0,57 0,34 
Capital movements 1 0,17 2,07 
Official settlements balance -0,40 2,41 
IRL Current account -0,09 -0,15 
Capital movements 1 0,16 0,31 
Official settlements balance 0,07 0,16 
Current account 1,81 1,65 
Capital movements 1 -1,71 -1,44 
Official settlements balance 0,10 0,21 
BL Current account 0,18 0,92 
Capital movements 1 -0,10 -0,41 
Official settlements balance 0,08 0,51 
NL Current account -0,14 0,50 
Capital movements 1 0,30 0,04 
Official settlements balance 0,16 0,54 
UK Current account 0,30 1,35 
Capital movements 1 , 2 -0,51 0,64 
Official settlements balance -0,21 1,99 
Including errors and omissions. 
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In 1976 France had the largest current-account deficit in 
the Community, attributable in part to the poor harvest of 
that year, equal to some 2% of GDP, but since then a 
substantial turn round has occurred in both the volume and 
value of merchandise trade, which is expected to show a 
surplus in 1978. Further support came in 1977 from a 
remarkable improvement on services account, with 
marked gains from civil engineering and professional 
services. These gains are expected to be held in the 
current year, virtually offsetting France's large net 
outward transfers. The overall balance of payments 
benefited in 1976 from a favourable shift in trade credit; but 
a major role had to be taken in that year by drawing on the 
official reserves. In 1977 the French banking system made 
substantial net loans and repayments to non-residents, but 
(OOO million EUA) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
-0,38 -0,77 -0,41 -1,71 -1,5 -0,9 
0,75 0,41 0,39 1,63 2,2 0,9 
0,37 -0,36 -0,02 -0,08 0,7 0,0 
3,51 8,23 3,21 3,44 3,2 5,0 
4,56 -8,85 -3,94 -0,32 0,7 -3,0 
8,07 -0,62 -0,73 3,12 3,9 2,0 
-0,55 -5,01 -0,05 -5,45 -2,9 0,6 
-0,91 4,75 2,95 2,01 2,7 0, 1 
-1,46 -0,26 2,90 -3,44 -0,2 0,7 
-0,19 -0,56 -0,02 -0,24 -0,2 -0,3 
0,19 0,68 0,34 0,69 0,6 0,2 
0,0 0,12 0,32 0,45 0,4 -0,1 
-2,06 -6,72 -0,47 -2,52 2,0 4,4 
1,89 2,86 -1,75 2,73 3,0 2,1 
-0,17 -3,86 -2,22 0,21 5,0 6,5 
0,94 0,77 0,55 -0,29 -0,3 0,0 
-0,18 -0,61 -0,15 -0,24 0,2 -0,2 
0,76 0,16 0,40 -0,53 -0,1 -0,2 
1,88 1,70 1,27 2, 14 0,2 -0,3 
-1,29 -0,87 -0,98 -1,91 0,1 0,3 
0,59 0,83 0,29 0,23 0,3 0,0 
-1,95 -7,04 -2,88 -1,38 0,4 -0,4 
2,90 4, 12 1,77 -0,61 12,6 -2,6 
0,95 -2,92 -1, 11 -1,99 13,0 -3,0 
For the sake of consistency, the UK figures for capital movements include foreign currency borrowing by the Government, and th~ µulilic sector under the exchange cover scheme. 
Source: Eurostat and estimates of the Commission's departments for 1977 and 1978. 
67 
Balance of payments 
this activity was more than offset by external fixed-interest 
finance raised at long term by French companies and by 
unidentified capital inflow, so that there was very little use 
of official reserves. The favourable balance of payments 
position in 1978 has been used to increase those reserves. 
Ireland has a substantial deficit on merchandise trade 
account, as is appropriate for a country in a stage of rapid 
economic development, and this will amount to about 10% 
of gross national product in 1978. This deficit is very 
largely offset by other current-account items, in particular 
net official transfers from the Community, and by direct 
investment. Prior to 1977 the Irish Government was a 
borrower on a large scale through bond issues, but over 
the last two years a more important role has been played 
by net borrowing by the commercial banks. Further, net 
drawings have been made in 1978 on the official reserves, 
which had reached a very high level at the end of 1977. 
Between 1976 and 1977 Italy achieved a remarkable turn-
round in its current-account position, representing a 
nominal shift of some 2% of GDP to the external sector. 
While Italy's traditional surpluses on both transfer and 
services accounts contributed to this achievement, and in 
particular a rapidly growing surplus in respect of tourism, 
the major contribution came from the merchandise trade 
account, which has continued to improve and shows a 
substantial and unprecedented surplus for 1978. This 
performance is the more remarkable for the fact that Italy's 
terms of trade have recovered very little from the shock of 
the oil crisis and that this country has therefore had to 
achieve a substantial shift in trade volumes: export 
volume rose 21 % from 1975 to 1977 while import volume 
rose 14%. The result, and particularly the slow growth of 
import volume, has been achieved because the economy 
has been in a very low cyclical position, but a situation has 
now been reached at which imports can be allowed to 
grow at the same rate as exports. 
Italy was a net receiver of direct and portfolio investment 
on a significant scale in 1977, but this was offset by the 
repayment of trade credit which was taken in exceptional 
quantities in 1976. The most important feature of the Italian 
capital account in 1977 continued to be heavy net 
borrowing by the commercial banks, while in 1978 there 
have been significant net receipts of capital by the private 
non-bank sector. As a result of the favourable position of 
both current and capital accounts the Italian authorities 
have made large purchases of foreign currencies, which 
they have used both to build their reserves to record levels 
and repay all drawings under IMF standby agreements, 
the Community's medium-term financial assistance, and 
loans from the Deutsche Bundesbank. Community loans 
and borrowings under the IMF oil facility remain outstand-
ing. 
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The Netherlands surplus on merchandise trade, which 
benefited greatly from the effect of the post-1973 rise in 
energy prices on the value of natural-gas exports, 
deteriorated markedly in 1977 as a result of a rapid 
increase in imports. Further, the surplus on services 
seems to be in secular decline, partly as a result of rising 
expenditure abroad by Dutch tourists. Given the continu-
ing deficit on transfers, it would appear that the current 
account has moved from its traditional strong surplus into 
a slight deficit in 1978. Past current-account surpluses 
were used to enable the company sector to build up 
substantial assets abroad; in 1977 the effect of this flow 
was largely offset by external bond issues made by Dutch 
companies. There was also a substantial inflow last year in 
the form of record net external borrowing by the banking 
system, and operations of this type in 1978 should suffice to 
obviate any need to draw on official reserves. 
The oil crisis appears to have produced a permanent 
change in the structure of the balance of payments of the 
Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU). The deficit 
on merchandise trade which appeared in 1975 has not 
subsequently been eliminated, as has occurred in certain 
other countries; it has in fact increased each year. It has, 
however, been partially offset by a rapidly increasing 
surplus on services account, particularly net receipts of 
interest, profits and dividends and net receipts resulting 
from governmental transactions. At the same time the 
transfers deficit has been rising (and notably the com-
ponent attributable to the Government). There was a small 
current-account deficit in 1976 and 1977 but this appears to 
have been eliminated in 1978. Until 1976 the BLEU was 
regularly in deficit on the capital transactions of the 
company sector, substantial inward direct investment 
being offset by an outflow of portfolio and real-estate 
capital; more recently, however, the outflows associated 
with this sector have moderated, leaving its capital 
account with the external sector with a slight surplus. The 
banking sector was a net borrower abroad in 1977 (after 
three years in which it increased its net external assets) 
and as a result the Banque Nationale de Belgique saw its 
net reserves fall only slightly last year. 
The United Kingdom's deficit on merchandise trade fell by 
some 2 900 million EUA between 1976 and 1977, about half 
of the improvement being attributable to North Sea Oil. The 
trade balance has however deteriorated somewhat since 
the end of 1977 in spite of a further improvement in the 
balance of trade in oil-North Sea production is expected 
to be the equivalent of half of the UK's consumption in 1978. 
The rise in the volume of imports of manufactured goods 
has been particularly strong this year. At one stage it was 
feared that North Sea Oil was leading to a current-account 
surplus which would cause an unrealistically high 
exchange rate for sterling. In fact this tendency has not 
persisted, with an increase in the rate of economic growth 
effectively using North Sea Oil as a cushion to pay for the 
ensuing extra imports in a time of world recession. The 
current account has also been affected by a fall in the 
traditional surplus of invisible trade, prominent features of 
which have been higher payments of interest, profits and 
dividends and higher net transfers to the Community. The 
UK had a small surplus on current account in 1977 and is 
expected to show a small deficit in 1978. 
The United Kingdom benefited from an unprecedented 
capital inflow in 1977 associated with Government bond 
sales to non-residents and a rise in external holdings of 
money-market assets. Transactions involving the UK non-
bank private sector also showed a surplus, mainly due to 
net receipts resulting from the operations of oil compan-
ies. This massive inflow posed problems of monetary 
management for the authorities and led them to allow 
sterling to float upwards on the exchanges in the autumn of 
last year. As was to be expected, some of the 'hot money' 
received in 1977 has moved out again in 1978 while 
sterling has moved back to a around its average level in 
the first half of 1977. UK borrowings from the IMF (since 
partly repaid) meant that the rise in UK gross reserves was 
even larger than the balance of payments for official 
settlement: at the end of June 1978 UK debtto the IMF was 
USO 3 200 million. 
Exchange rates and competitiveness 
The dominant development on the exchange markets over 
the past year has been the fall in value of the US dollar, 
whose effective exchange rate 1 as calculated by Commis-
sion staff depreciated 7, 1 % over the year to the end of 
August 1978, as the markets responded to an excess 
supply of dollars resulting both from the US current-
account deficit and a more general reluctance to hold that 
currency. The readiness of the US authorities to intervene 
to support their currency, and in particular the activation of 
their swap facilities with the Deutsche Bundesbank at the 
beginning of 1978, and willingness in principle to use IMF 
credit, have temporarily moderated, but did not end the 
dollar's virtually continuous fall. Conversely the Swiss 
franc appreciated very rapidly until the end of February 
1978, when the authorities announced new measures 
limiting monetary flows into Switzerland; thereafter this 
An effective exchange rate index measures the change in value of a 
currency against other currencies in general. In the Commission's work 
the currency of each country is compared to seventeen other 
currencies, the latter being weighted according to the competition 
which each of them presents to the exports of the first country in each of 
twenty-four markets. 
Balance of payments 
currency remained reasonably stable until August 1978, 
when it resumed its rise, showing an appreciation of its 
effective exchange rate of 26% over twelve months. Over 
the same period the effective exchange rate of the 
Japanese yen which had remained remarkably stable for 
several years up to the end of 1976, rose by 33% in spite of 
substantial intervention by the Bank of Japan which 
moderated its rise at the year end. These phenomena of 
course related to the very large current-account surpluses 
of both Switzerland and Japan. 
Coordinated intervention by the US and Federal German 
authorities has ensured that the effective exchange rate of 
the Deutschemark rose only 4,8% over the twelve months 
to the end of August 1978, but even this modest 
appreciation has on occasion posed problems for the 
other countries participating in the European system of 
limited margin of fluctuation (the 'snake'). Towards the end 
of 1977 the Belgian franc and the Norwegian krone 
alternated at the lower intervention point, while in the 
early weeks of 1978 the pressure came exclusively on the 
latter currency until the Norwegian authorities devalued 
the krone by 8% on 13 February. The Danish krone 
remained strong for some months after the realignment of 
August 1977. 
The French franc came under pressure on the exchanges 
in the weeks preceding the elections for the legislative 
assembly, intervention by the Banque de France limiting 
the fall in the effective exchange rate over the six months to 
March 1978 to some 8%; since the elections that rate has 
returned approximately to its level of August 1977. The 
effective exchange rate of the pound sterling rose about 
5% between the end of August 1977 and the middle of 
February 1978, responding to the withdrawal of the Bank of 
England from the market, but since then revised opinions 
in the market about the likely UK balance of payments 
have brought the pound's effective exchange rate close to 
its level of mid-1977. Constant and massive purchases of 
foreign currency by the Italian authorities in order to 
improve their net reserves have prevented the lira from 
showing more than a moderate rise against the US dollar 
and the effective exchange rate of the lira has in fact fallen 
slightly over the twelve months to the end of August 1978. 
It is of considerable importance to know to what extent 
recent developments on the exchange markets cor-
respond to differing rates of inflation in the various 
countries. In order to do this it is necessary to measure 
price performance, the ratio of each country's own price 
index to an average index representing inflation rates 
among its competitors. The method used employs the 
same weights as those used in the calculation of effective 
exchange rates. The choice of price index raises pro-
blems; the figures for price performance appearing in this 
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Table 26 
Recent development of effective exchanges rates, price performance and competitiveness 
Indices 1972 QI = 100 DK D F IRL BL NL UK CH us JAP 
Effective 
exchange 
rate 1 
(quarterly 
averages) 
1977: I 116,3 135,0 99,0. 72,1 60,8 112,9 121,0 61,5 149, 1 97,7 106,2 
II 113,9 136,5 98,9 72,1 60, 1 114, 1 122,0 61,4 148,8 97,0 110,0 
Ill 112,6 139,3 99,6 72,4 60,0 114,9 121,8 61,7 154,9 96,3 113,4 
IV 110,5 142,0 98,2 73,8 58,9 115,0 121,8 63,2 166,3 93,9 120,9 
Year 113,3 138,2 98,9 72,6 59,9 114,3 121,7 61,9 154,6 96,2 112,5 
1978: I 113, 1 147,1 95,4 75, 1 57,5 119,3 125,6 65,0 181,6 90,5 122,5 
II 114,2 146,2 98,6 72,5 57,1 118,0 125,4 61,3 182,2 89,3 132,3 
Price 
performance 
1977: I 102,0 78,1 92,9 122,2 164,9 87,2 86,3 139,0 75,5 98,3 98,7 
II 103,4 77,2 93,5 123,2 165,8 85,6 86,5 142, 1 74,2 98,7 97, 1 
Ill 102,5 76,0 94,4 124,0 166,3 84,9 86,6 145, 1 73,2 99,4 94,8 
IV 103,0 75,0 95,5 125,1 167,6 84,2 86,0 147,2 72,3 99,8 93,2 
Year 102,7 76,6 94,1 123,7 166,3 85,4 86,5 143,5 73,8 99,1 95,7 
1978: I 102,5 74,2 95,9 126,4 169,2 83,2 85,5 149,5 71, 1 100,4 91,3 
II 102,1 73,3 97,3 127,2 170,8 82,0 84,3 150,4 69,8 101,3 90, 1 
Competitive-
ness 2 
1977: I 118,6 105,5 91,9 88,1 100,2 98,4 104,4 85,5 112,5 96,0 104,8 
II 117,7 105,3 92,5 88,8 99,7 97,7 105,5 87,2 110,3 95,7 106,7 
Ill 115,4 105,9 94,0 89,8 99,8 97,6 105,5 89,5 113,4 95,7 107,5 
IV 113,8 106,5 93,8 92,3 98,7 96,8 104,7 93,0 120,3 93,7 112,7 
Year 116,4 105,8 93,1 89,8 99,6 97,6 105,0 88,8 114, 1 95,3 107,7 
1978: I 115,9 109,1 91,5 94,9 97,3 99,2 107,4 97,2 129,1 90,9 111,9 
II 116,6 107,2 95,9 92,2 97,5 96,8 105,7 92,2 127,1 90,5 119,2 
An effective exchange rate greater than 100 indicates an Appreciation. 
A competitiveness index greater than 100 indicates relatively high international prices. therefore a deterioration in position. 
Note: Indices of ettective exchange rates and price performances (or relative inflation) compare, respectively, each country's own exchange rate and rate of domestic inflation -in this 
case based on the wholesale prices of manufactures -with the average of the corresponding indices for its main competitors. Further information about these concepts and about their 
relation to competitiveness appears in the text. 
Source: Commission's departments. 
report are based on the wholesale prices of manufactures, 
in so far as they are available, in order to concentrate 
attention on the prices of goods entering into international 
trade. The concept of price performance takes no account 
of exchange-rate changes; in order to arrive at an 
assessment of what has happened to the competitiveness 
of a country it is necessary to adjust its index of price 
performance by its effective exchange rate index and this 
has been done in Table 26. If exchange rate changes 
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completely offset changes in a country's price perfor-
mance (or relative inflation), that country's index of 
competitiveness will remain at 100. 
It emerges that the countries participating in the 'snake' 
system have undergone little change in competitiveness 
recently-in all cases not more than a 2% change from the 
beginning of 1977 to the second quarter of 1978. The 
Federal Republic lost slightly in competitiveness whereas 
the BLEU has gained slightly. Over the whole period since 
the 'Smithsonian' agreement Denmark 1 has suffered a 
loss of competitiveness while the Federal Republic and the 
Netherlands have seen a lesser deterioration in their 
positions. This has reflected the willingness of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank to make large purchases of dollars 
in 1976 and 1977 and by the cooperative measures worked 
out to support the US dollar this year. 
Exchange rate and inflationary developments over the last 
few years have given both the United Kingdom and France 
a significant competitive advantage which has, however, 
been somewhat eroded in 1977 and the present year. The 
interventions of the Italian authorities have contributed to 
a small gain in competitiveness by their country. 
The most striking figures are, however, those relating to 
There is some difficulty about interpreting the figures for Denmark 
because agricultural goods are important in the trade of that country. 
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the major non-Community countries. US inflation, as 
measured by the wholesale prices of industrial products, 
has not been worse than inflation similarly measured 
among its competitors; no depreciation of the US currency 
has been called for by US price performance and 
exchange market developments of the last twelve months 
have therefore markedly improved the US competitive 
position. Analogous estimates based on unit labour costs 
suggest an even greater US advantage. At the same time 
Switzerland and Japan, in spite of recently showing very 
low rates of inflation, have suffered very large losses of 
competitiveness. 
The international financial system has thus been character-
ized for over a year by large exchange-rate changes and 
significant changes in competitiveness which have not yet 
rectified current-account imbalances within the OECD 
area, or even altered their trend. This may occur in time, 
but meanwhile differences in relative cyclical positions 
appear to be the major explanation of intra-OECD 
imbalances. 
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9. Structural changes before and 
since the oil crisis of 1973 
Structural change in demand and production 
between 1960 and 1973 
The structural change which the European economies 
underwent in the period before the 1973 crisis closely 
reflected the conditions of the period: rapid growth, near-
full employment, heavy foreign investment in Europe, low 
energy and raw materials prices, a virtual monopoly, 
shared with the United States and Japan, of trade in 
manufactures, and relative price and exchange-rate 
stability. Market forces, supported by overall demand 
management policies, generally sufficed by themselves to 
ensure the changes needed. 
The countries of the old Community of the Six, given this 
context, were all able to develop their economies and 
adapt their structures to the requirements of economic 
change, without major adjustment difficulties. But growth 
in the United Kingdom was slower and the slowdown of 
activity in the industries in which the United Kingdom had 
traditionally been powerful was not offset by rapid growth 
of enough replacement industries. 
None the less, the main features of the adaptation process 
are common to all the countries, differing only in scale. 
Economic growth was rapid and relatively smooth in these 
countries and final demand structures changed along 
corresponding lines: the share of investment increased, 
the share accounted for by private consumer's expendi-
ture contracted, and public consumption increased in 
terms of value. The sharp increase in personal incomes 
brought with it a harmonization, in relative terms, of the 
structures of household consumption, a smaller share 
being devoted to food and current consumption goods in 
general, with more being spent on durable goods and on 
services. 
As the patterns of demand in the various countries tended 
to come into line, production structures also began to 
acquire a family resemblance. The establishment of the 
common market did not lead-at any rate, not at the level 
of the main sectors of the economy-to specialization, but 
in fact to relative harmonization, since each country 
tended to diversify and build up its industrial sector, so that 
its structure came gradually closer into line with those of 
Germany and of the United Kingdom. 
However, while both these countries possessed very 
extensive industrial facilities atthe beginning of the period, 
with heavy exports, only Germany pressed forward 
with adaptation, moving away from traditional industries 
to gain a strong foothold in sophisticated technology 
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industries, with high added value, enabling it to go on 
earning a heavy surplus on foreign trade even when oil 
prices had been quadrupled. 
Examination of the high-growth industries reveals a 
number of industries common to all the countries-
chemicals and derived products, oil products, energy 
industries other than coal, electrical and electronic 
equipment-although their growth-rates were different 
and are more closely related to the overall growth-rates of 
the domestic economy than to the growth-rates of the 
same industries in the other countries (see Tables 27 and 
28). 
To this common list of growth industries must be added in 
each case one or more industries in which the country 
concerned was lagging behind, in relative terms, at the 
beginning of the period. Examples are steel in Italy and in 
Netherlands, agricultural and industrial machinery in 
France, motor manufacturing in the Netherlands, equip-
ment industries generally in Belgium, construction of 
means of transport (other than motor vehicles) in 
Germany. 
The declining industries are much the same in all the 
countries: agriculture, coal-mining, and textiles-clothing 
(Italy is a special case, since in this country textiles 
enjoyed a sound growth-rate and remains an important 
industry). 
Another aspect of the convergence of the various 
economies is the fact that in Germany and in the United 
Kingdom industries in respect of which the country 
enjoyed a privileged position atthe beginning of the period 
(agricultural and industrial machinery in Germany, 
construction of means of transport other than motor 
vehicles in the United Kingdom) are now among the low-
growth industries. 
The first conclusion that can be drawn from this tendency 
for the economies to converge is that the countries of 
Europe generally tended to follow the same logic of 
development. They accepted (though some moved faster 
than others) the replacement of coal by oil and gas, and 
production processes run on more capital-intensive lines, 
entailing the more rapid development of industries 
producing capital goods; those industries employing 
relatively large amounts of capital and with high tech-
nology grew rapidly whilst those with a low added-value 
per person employed tended to decline. 
The pattern of convergence also shows that no country 
ignored deliberately and completely the development of 
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Table 27 
Relative shares of value-added by industry and branch 1960-1973, at 1970 prices 
(percentages) 
No. Branches D F UK' NL B 
1960 1973 1960 1973 1960 1973 1960 1973 1960 1973 1960 1973 
Agricultural products 4,1 3,1 8,9 5,6 12,3 7,8 2,8 2,9 7,5 6,1 7,8 3,7 
2 Energy products 5,0 4,9 5,5 6,6 4,6 6,1 5,0 4,6 3,8 6,2 4,5 6,2 
21 of which: Solid fuels 2,1 0,9 1,1 0,3 2,6 1,1 1,3 0,2 2,0 0,4 
22 Crude petroleum, refined gas 0,9 1,5 2,9 4,1 0,2 0,3 1,3 3,3 1,5 2,8 
23 Electricity, gas, water 2,0 2,5 1,5 2,2 2,2 3,2 1,2 2,6 1,5 3,0 
3 Intermediate products 7,2 8,8 6,1 7,3 5,2 7,2 5,4 6,3 4,5 6,8 6,5 9,8 
31 of which: Metal products 2,5 2,4 2,6 2,3 1,5 2,2 2,4 1,8 1,3 1,5 2,9 4,1 
32 Minerals, building material 2,2 2,2 1,5 2,2 2,0 2,1 1,3 1,6 1,6 1,5 1,6 2,3 
33 Chemical products 2,4 4,2 2,0 3,0 1,7 2,9 1,8 2,8 1,7 3,8 1,5 3,3 
4 Equipment products 16,4 16,9 9,1 12,9 6,3 8,0 12,9 13,1 9,0 9,6 5,7 9,3 
41 of which: Metal products 4,4 3,7 2,2 2,6) 
51 ) 
2,7 2,3 1,5 2,5 
42 Agric. and industr. machinery 5,5 4,6 2,9 4,1 3,5 3,8 1,5 2,3 
43 Pree. instr., data proces. equip. 0,4 0,9 0,6 0,9 6,0 0,6 0,9 0,1 0,1 
44 Electrical equipment 2,9 3,9 1,5 2,4 2,0 2,7 2,4 3,4 1,4 2,4 
45 Motor vehicles 2,7 3,3 1,6 2,0} 1,2} 2,0 1,4 1,7 0,4 0,5 0,7 1,4 46 Other means of transport 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,5 2,7 1,7 0,5 0,6 
5 Food, drink, tobacco 5,6 5,5 5,6 4,7 4,3 4,6 3,1 3,2 5,7 5,1 5,8 5,3 
6 Current consumption products 9,0 8,6 8,6 8,1 7,7 8,5 8,1 8,0 7,1 6,1 7,6 8,1 
61 of which: Text., leather, cloth. 4,3 3,2 4,1 3,3 3,8 4,0 3,5 3,0 3,1 2,0 4,4 3,6 
62 Paper, printed material 2,6 2,7 2,2 2,1 1,4 1,5 2,7 2,7 2,1 2,3 1,6 1.7 
63 Rubber, plastics 0,7 1,2 0,8 0,9} 2,4 } 3,0 0,6 1,0 0,4 0,6 0,3 0,9 64 Other industrial products 1,4 1,5 1,5 1,9 1,3 1,4 1,5 1,3 1,3 1,9 
Tot. manufacturing industry 2 38,2 39,8 29,4 33,1 23,4 28,4 29,6 30,6 26,3 27,7 25,7 32,4 
7 Building and civil engineering 8,2 8,2 8,4 9,6 10,4 7,5 6,6 6,8 6,9 7,4 3,4 7,6 
81 Transport services 4,0 3,6 4,0 3,7 } 5,7} 6,2} 7,2 6,9 } 8,2 } 8,0 6,2 6,0 82 Communication services 1,4 1,8 1,2 1,6 2,5 1.4 1,4 
83. Trade services 13,0 12.4 11,1 11,6 10,4 12,0 11,1 11,2 12,12 13,7 14,5 12,4 
Other market services 16,6 16,7 18,9 19,1 19,0 21,5 19,8 21.4 22,3 18,0 21,3 19,2 
84 of which: Credit, insurance 2,3 3,0 3,3 4,0 4,3 5,5 4,0 3,4 
85 Hotel, accomm. catering 1,7 1,2 3,3 2,9 1,6 1,7 2,3 1,9 1,4 1,2 
86 Other market services n.e.c. 
8 Total market services 35,0 34,6 35,2 36,0 35,0 39,7 39,9 42,0 42,6 30,7 43,3 39,9 
9 Non-market services 9,6 9,6 12,7 9,1 14,2 10,5 16,1 13,1 12,9 12,9 9,8 11,1 
Total services 44,5 44,1 47,9 45,1 49,3 50,2 56,0 55,1 55,5 52,6 53,2 50,1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1 United Kingdom: value-added at factor cost (other countries at market prices). 
" Industries 3, 4, 5, 6. 
Source: report of the Group of Experts on sectoral analyses, Sectoral change in the European economies from 1960 to the recession, Brussels, January 1978 (available on request). 
73 
Structural changes before and since the oil crisis of 1973 
Table 28 
Relative shares of value-added by industry and branch 1960-1973, at current prices 
/percentages) 
No. Branches D F UK 1 NL B 
1960 1973 1960 1973 1960 1973 1960 1973 1960 1973 1960 1973 
Agricultural products 5,4 3,0 9,2 5,9 14,1 8,1 4,0 2,9 8,6 5,8 6,9 3,6 
2 Energy products 6,0 4,6 7,0 6,2 5,3 5,3 5,5 4,5 5,5 6,1 7,2 5,6 
21 of which: Solid fuels 2,3 0,9 1,2 0,4 2,7 1,2 1,3 0,2 2,7 0,4 
22 Crude petroleum, refined gas 1,3 1,2 3,9 3,8 0,2 0,2 2,1 3,5 2,2 2,5 
23 Electricity, gas, water 2,4 2,4 2,9 2,0 2,5 3,0 2,3 2,5 2,4 2,7 
3 Intermediate products 8,6 7,8 7,6 7,3 7,0 6,8 7,4 5,6 5,2 6,5 7,1 8,3 
31 of which: Ores, iron and steel 2,8 2,1 3,1 2,5 2,1 2,0 2,7 1,7 1,4 1,4 3,0 3,5 
32 Minerals, buiding material 2,3 2,1 1,7 1,9 2,4 2,0 1,7 1,5 1,5 1,5 2,5 2,1 
33 Chemical products 3,5 3,5 2,8 2,9 2,5 2,8 2,9 2,5 2,3 3,7 1,7 2,7 
4 Equipment products 15,8 16,0 11,3 12,4 6,6 8,5 14,4 12,9 10,3 9,2 6,6 7,9 
41 of which: Metal products 4,7 3,5 2,5 2,5) 48) 2,9 2,2 1,7 2,1 42 Agric. and industr. machinery 4,8 4,3 3,4 4,0 6,3 3,6 3,7 2,1 1,9 43 Pree. instr., data proces. equip. 0,4 0,8 0,6 0,8 0,6 0,8 0,7 0,1 
44 Electrical equipment 3,2 3,9 1,9 2,2 2,6 2,4 3,6 3,2 1,3 2,0 
45 Motor vehicles 2,3 3,0 2,1 2,5} 1,8 } 2,2 1,7 1,7 0,5 0,5 0,0 1,2 46 Other means of transport 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,5 2,8 2,0 0,9 0,6 
5 Food, drink, tobacco 6,7 4,9 5,9 4,7 5,9 4,1 3,5 3,1 7,4 5,2 7,6 4,5 
6 Current consumption products 9,2 8,0 9,4 8,5 8,4 8,9 8,5 7,5 9,0 6,0 7,9 7,4 
61 of which: Text., leather, cloth. 4,3 2,9 4,7 3,3 4,5 4,4 4,0 2,7 4,1 1,8 4,6 3,3 
62 Paper, printed material 2,4 2,7 2,1 2,4 1,4 1,5 2,6 2,7 2,7 2,3 1,6 1,7 
63 Rubber, plastics 1,0 1,0 · 1,0 0,9} 2,5} 3,0 0,6 0,9 0,7 0,5 0,3 0,8 64 Other industrial products 1,5 1,3 1,6 2,0 1,3 1,3 1,5 1,4 1,4 1,7 
Total manufacturing industry' 40,3 36,7 34,2 32,9 28,0 28,3 33,7 29,0 31,8 27,0 29,2 28,1 
7 Building and civil engineering 7,5 8,4 7,8 9,6 7,6 7,8 6,3 7,6 7,0 7,8 6,5 7,4 
81 Transport services 4,6 3,6 3,9 3,4} 6,1 } 5,4 7,2 6,9} 8,6} 7,4 5,6 6,7 82 Communication services 1,5 1,9 1,3 1,6 1,9 2,5 1,3 1,4 
83 Trade services 13,7 12,6 13,0 11,6 12,1 11,2 13,0 11,3 } 
27,4 } 
12,2 17,6 
31,9 
Other market services 13,5 18,2 14,5 19,2 16,4 22,6 17,1 20,9 21,4 18,3 
84 of which: Credit, insurance 2,3 1,9 3,0 4,7 3,9 5,7 2,9 4,1 
85 Hotels, accom., catering 1,4 1,3 2,7 2,9 1,6 1,7 1,9 1,9 1,2 1,0 
86 Other market services n.e.c. 
8 Total market services 33,3 36,3 32,7 35,7 34,6 39,1 39,2 41,6 36,2 39,3 40,4 43,9 
9 Non-market services 7,5 11,0 9,1 9,7 10,5 11,4 11,3 14,4 10,7 14,0 9,8 11,5 
Total services 40,9 47,4 41,8 45,4 45,1 50,5 50,4 56,1 46,9 53,3 50,2 55,3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1 United Kingdom: value-added at factor cost (other countries at market prices). 
> Industries 3, 4, 5, 6. 
Source: see Table 27. 
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fundamental industries-for example in the interests of its 
own industry, domestic consumption or exports-by 
leaving to apparently better-placed countries a monopoly 
of development of certain activities: Italy and the 
Netherlands acquired steel industries, Belgium and 
France built up their equipment industries, and Germany 
and the United Kingdom developed powerful food pro-
duction and processing industries. 
However, the salient factor in the convergent movement of 
the patterns of the economies is the build-up of trade, in the 
first instance trade with other Community countries, and 
then with all other countries, as the Community gradually 
reduced its tariffs to reach a point at which it is now 
probably the world's least protected economic area. 
The dismantling of barriers to trade undoubtedly had a 
generally favourable impact, since per capita income 
grew at a spectacular rate throughout the Community and 
was all the more rapid the faster the growth of trade. The 
country whose trade grew least fast-the United King-
dom-was also the country which came last in the growth 
table and last in the income expansion table. 
The opening up of economies to trade exercised on the 
principal sectors engaged in trade a constraint of 
competitiveness which limited the growth of costs of 
production. The rate of inflation progressed less rapidly in 
industry in general and in those sectors most open to trade 
in particular. This low rate of inflation was made possible 
by a constant rationalization which thus implies a rapid 
growth in labour productivity. Faced with this constraint, 
the creation of employment in industry could only be 
achieved in those sectors in which expansion was 
sufficiently rapid to ensure at the same time large gains in 
productivity and a growth in employment. Therefore, the 
balance of the creation of employment in industry between 
1960 and 1973 was weak and almost zero for some 
countries, with an overall deterioration since 1970 (except 
in France and Italy). As shown in Table 33 the share of 
employment in manufacturing industry has remained 
stable in the majority of countries with the exception of the 
UK where it registered a net decline. 
The other key feature of change in the European 
economies is the growing share accounted for by service 
industries, both in respect of numbers employed (see 
Table 33) and in terms of added-value. As Table 28 shows 
(changes in added-value at current· prices), by 1973 
services accounted for between 45 and 55% of overall 
added-value in the various Member States, compared with 
40 to 45% in 1960, although this advance is partly 
accounted for by faster price increases in the services 
sector than in the rest of the economy. The vigorous 
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expansion of this sector, a feature of all industrialized 
countries, is apparently a necessary concomitant of rapid 
economic expansion: both the growing demand for market 
and collective se(vices by households and the expansion 
in the supply of public services were possible because of 
the steady improvement in individual and collective 
incomes generated by growth. 
At the same time, industrial development was accom-
panied by increased consumption by firms of services 
connected with the development of production techniques 
(R & D, consultant engineering), management techniques 
(advertising, market research, etc.). 
Services grew all the faster because the supply of 
production factors was ample. Both capital and labour 
were strongly attracted to these industries. Investment 
grew in them at a rate higher than that in the economy as a 
whole and these industries took more than their share of 
increase in the labOur force, especially the increase in the 
number of women at work. 
Lastly, tt'le outstanding feature of developments between 
1960 and 1973 in the production facilities of the European 
countries is the rapid growth of productive capital. 
Although no accurate measurement, homogeneous from 
country to country, of capital/labour substitution has yet 
been carried out, it is reasonable to take the view that at 
the level of the economy as a whole, capital replaced 
labour on a large scale (an increase of from 4 to 6% 
a year, according to country, in the capital per person 
employed). At the level of individual industries, the 
capitalization process generally involved a decline in 
employment in declining industries (agriculture, coal-
mining, textiles) but stimulated job creation in growth 
industries like chemicals and certain market services, but 
also in building and construction. In the rest of the 
economy, the substitution rate was lower or below 
average. 
Structural change in demand and production since 
1973 
The 1973-76 period was one of flagging growth throughout 
the industrial economies, of declining world trade, of sharp 
increases in energy costs, of a marked decline in the 
investment rate, and of persisting inflation in several 
countries; it was also one during which many industries 
ran into exceptionally serious difficulties. Those hardest 
hit included steel, certain branches of textiles, shipbuild-
ing, and paper and printed material, whilst building and 
construction, which had already been declining in relative 
terms in several countries even before the crisis, suffered 
severe setbacks in all the countries. 
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These are all important industries from the points of view 
of production and employment, and there is no doubt that 
the problems they had to contend with helped to aggravate 
the general crisis besetting the European economies. The 
combined impact of developments having little or no 
relation to each other, such as population trends in Europe 
(helping to reduce the demand for new building), the need 
to contain public-sector deficits in several member 
countries (which tended to inhibit the expansion of public 
investment), new competition from countries undergoing 
rapid industrialization, and the renewed competitive 
vigour of the Community's main trading partners (United 
States and particularly Japan) exerted a depressive effect 
on all the European economies which tended to aggravate 
the general climate of crisis. 
But the accumulation of sectoral difficulties only in part 
accounts for the recession. This is true in the first place 
because many of these difficulties were in fact the result of 
flagging demand and would therefore be tempered or 
disappear altogether with a recovery; secondly, the 
decline or actual disappearance of industries is a 
phenomenon inherent in the growth process. 
Table 29 
Annual rates of growth of value-added by sector (1970-prices) 
D F 
1960- 1970- 1973- 1960- 1970- 1973-
1973 1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 
1. Agr. prod. 1,4 3,8 -1,9 1,9 2,6 -4,4 
2. Energy prod. 4,2 5,3 -0,6 7,4 6,1 3,8 
3. lnterm. prod. 6,0 5,7 0,6 7,0 6,8 0,4 
4. Equipment prod. 4,3 2,6 1,7 8,6 7,7 5,0 
5. General con. 
products 4,1 4,3 0,7 5,2 4,8 1,3 
6. Food products 4,4 3,5 3,7 4,4 5,7 5,6 
Total manufact. 
industry 4,8 3,8 1,5 6,6 6,5 3,3 
7. Building con., 
civil eng. 4,4 4,6 -4,2 6,8 1,9 2, 1 
8. Market services 4.3 3,3 2,0 5,9 6,4 3,4 
9. Non-market serv. 4,4 4,2 2,8 3,0 2,8 2,8 
Total 4,4 3,9 1,1 5.7 5,4 2,8 
Industries: 3, 4. 5, 6. 
Source For 1960-1973, see Table 27. 
For 1970-1973 and 1973-1976, Eurostat, National Accounts, ESA 1970-1976. 
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In 1he approach adopted in this study (carried out at the 
level of about twenty branches for the whole economy), no 
single industry was found to have been 'spared' by the 
crisis. Although some industrial sectors made good during 
the short recovery of 1976, some of the production losses 
suffered in preceding years, those which were able to keep 
up to the long-term growth-rate recorded between 1960 
and 1973 were few in number (see Table 29). 
Slower growth meant narrower disparities between the 
growth-rates for the various industries. Thus, the process 
of steady change in the structure of the production 
facilities resulting from widely differing growth-rates 
during the ten years preceding the crisis slowed down 
sharply, and the pace at which the industrial structures of 
the European economies were tending to come into line 
therefore also slowed down. 
Within manufacturing industry, the hierarchy of industries 
arranged according to growth-rates also changed ap-
preciably. For example, the food industries sector, whose 
performance was only average or poor during the 1960-73 
(percentages) 
UK NL B 
1970- 1973- 1960- 1970- 1973- 1960- 1970- 1973- 1960- 1970- 1973-
1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 
-0,1 0,6 2,7 3,5 -3,1 3,0 4,9 1,8 1,2 3,1 -7,5 
5,4 0,6 1,9 3,3 0,9 10,2 12,5 5,5 6,3 10,8 3,6 
6,5 3,1 4,1 4,7 -1,9 9,1 8,1 1,4 8,2 8,1 -1,7 
3,1 1,6 2,6 2,2 -2,4 5,5 3,8 1,9 6,3 8,6 4,7 
5,5 2,8 2,4 4,4 -3,6 3,9 1,1 -1,1 5,3 7,8 0,4 
4,9 3,2 2,6 2,9 0,5 4,4 4,7 2,8 4,6 4,5 2,7 
5,0 2,6 2,9 3,4 -2,6 5,6 4,5 1,4 6,8 7,6 1,5 
-0,3 -2,2 2,6 2,2 -5,9 4,9 1,0 -2,1 3,2 2,8 3,4 
4,5 2,8 3,0 4,2 0,7 4,6 4,5 3,5 3,5 4,4 2,8 
3,6 2,5 0,7 2,3 2,7 4,7 2,6 2,7 5,1 5,2 3,2 
3,8 2,0 2,6 3,5 -0,5 5,1 4,5 2,5 4,7 5,7 2,2 
period, moved to the top of the growth table in most 
countries during the recession. On the other hand, the 
performance of certain industries producing primary 
products, such as chemicals, whose previous growth had 
been rapid, was now only average or even below average. 
The main features of demand from firms were a slowdown 
in their consumption of intermediate products, more 
cautious policies with regard to stocks, and a sharp fall in 
investment. This was bound to lead to a very poor 
performance by capital goods industries and inhibit the 
growth of output of intermediate goods. 
Conversely, the maintenance of an appreciable rate of 
growth of private consumption (in some countries, higher 
than that of GDP) should have helped industries producing 
goods for current consumption, as it helped the agri-
foodstuffs industries. Given the influence of both external 
demand and competition from non-member countries, 
however, these industries performed in almost exactly the 
opposite manner. 
In all member countries, the current consumption goods 
industries were amongst those worst affected. Internal 
causes were partly responsible: the firms in these 
industries were financially more vulnerable, were ge-
nerally less concentrated and were more affected by the 
general contraction of markets; there was a continued 
tendency for private consumption to favour durable goods 
(motor vehicles, household equipment, etc.), which are 
classified in the equipment products industries. However, 
external competition also aggravated the position of many 
industries by reducing their shares of the European 
market and more especially of external markets, thus 
keeping prices down and preventing firms from correcting, 
through price increases (which had been possible in the 
motor vehicle industry) financial positions compromised 
by weak demand. 
The intermediate products industries-steel, chemicals, 
building materials, etc.-were amongst those hardest hit 
by the recession. Here again, internal factors alone cannot 
account for what happened: it was expected that, following 
a period of adaptation during which existing stocks were 
used up by firms, the growth of the intermediate products 
industries would catch up with that of the economy 
generally (or at least of the manufacturing sector). In fact, 
this happened in only one country, Italy. 
The explanation lies in the trend of external trade in these 
products. Whereas in the past, the European countries· 
exports of intermediate products had tended to expand at a 
rate well above the rate of growth of world trade, their. 
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export performance was much weaker between 1973 and 
1976. During the same period, their imports increased at a 
rate almost equal to that of world trade. Italy, which 
achieved the best rates of growth in these industries, owed 
this mainly to its export successes (particularly in the steel 
industry) and to a much lower import elasticity than that of 
its partner countries (see Table 30). 
On the other hand, the equipment products industries 
(capital goods and private consumer durables) were least 
affected by the crisis. Although their rate of growth fell 
appreciably compared with earlier trends, it remained in 
each country above that of the economy or industry as a 
whole. This can be explained only in part by the continuing 
satisfactory rate of purchases of durable goods by 
households or by the policies adopted in some countries to 
boost investment. The main reason was the sharp growth 
of external demand for capital goods-growth which was 
maintained for the whole of the Community (extra-
Community exports) at about 19,5% per annum in value 
terms between 1973 and 1976. As trade in capital goods 
between industrialized countries had been adversely 
affected by the slowdown in national rates of investment, it 
was orders from a number of developing countries, from 
the USSR (increasing by 35% per annum since 1973) and 
especially from OPEC countries (increasing by 58%) 
which accounted for this Community export performance. 
Most European countries especially France and the 
Benelux countries (see Table 30) shared fully in the export 
boom. However, the trend was less favourable in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, 
which, while maintaining substantial surpluses on trade in 
these products, forfeited part of their shares of the world 
market (their exports growing at an annual rate of 15, 1 % 
and 15,6% respectively, compared with 19, 1 % for world 
trade), while imports made substantial progress on their 
domestic markets (Tables 31 and 32). 
In these two countries, external demand therefore 
compensated only slightly for the depressing effect of the 
fall in business investment. Germany and the United 
Kingdom therefore fared worst of the six major European 
countries in terms of the growth of their equipment 
products industries and of their economies generally; 
however, Germany remained on a par with the United 
States as the leading world exporter. 
The analysis of the overall trend of the market services 
sector does not show any special features during the 
period 1973-76. Demand for market services is made up 
largely of intermediate consumption by firms and of final 
consumption of households. Despite a long-term shift in 
the pattern of household consumption towards services, 
the overall growth of the sector remains fairly closely 
related to that of industrial output. An analysis of the period 
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Table 30 
Growth of foreign trade 1973-1976 (In current USO) 
(percentages) 
World D F UK NL B 
trade 1 
Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. 
Agricultural prod. 10,4 9,9 8,6 13,2 6,6 4,7 14,3 8,9 6,8 14,9 17,7 15,0 14,9 
Food 10,1 10,8 16,3 11,3 9,4 7,1 14,6 3,4 13,7 16,4 14,6 15,5 12,0 
Intermediate prod. 14,2 13,0 13,3 14,2 14,3 11,7 19,7 11,7 11,5 16,4 17,3 13,7 9,4 
of which: 
ores, iron, steel 10,9 9,7 11,0 12, 1 14,2 9,2 26,9 11,4 6, 1 11,4 12,4 10,4 3,5 
chemical products 17,2 18,7 14,7 16,5 15,1 15,0 17,2 16, 1 17, 1 18,3 18,5 18,3 18,5 
Equipment prod. 19, 1 17,3 15, 1 16,4 22,1 12,0 18,9 12,2 15,6 15, 1 19,8 14,7 18,3 
of which: 
motor veh. 19,5 18,2 14,3 22,9 19,9 17,7 19,4 15, 1 13,8 19,5 22,7 18,3 19,2 
electrical and electronic equipment 20,3 17,2 15,8 19, 1 22,0 11,9 16,7 5,5 21,3 17,2 18,9 14,4 17,4 
Current consumption products 13,0 14,2 14,4 17,6 9,0 9,4 17,8 8,0 12,5 17,0 10,9 14,8 9,2 
of which: 
Textiles, clothing 10,5 13,5 11,9 16, 1 5,4 8,8 14,4 8,8 8,6 16,5 8,0 12,5 8,0 
The sum of the total exports of OECD countries + the sum of the imports of these countries from non-OECD countries. 
Source: OECD, External Trade Statistics. 
1973-76 confirms this close relationship, since in most 
countries the growth of market services was very close to 
that of these two aggregated. The trend towards the 
'tertiarization' of the economy was therefore not more 
pronounced during the recession than before. 
In the case of non-market services, the changes in volume 
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terms are not easily interpreted owing to the conventional 
method of estimating them (this sector is also dealt with in 
Chapter 6). However, except, perhaps, in the United 
Kingdom, their rate of growth does not appear to have 
been much higher than that of GDP. The non-market 
services sector therefore played only a modest anti-
cyclical role in the recession, at least until 1976. 
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Table 31 
Levels of Import penetration in industry (imports/production + imports - exports) 
(percentages) 
D F UK NL 
1970 1973 1976 1970 1973 1976 1970 1973 1976 1970 1973 1976 1970 1973 1976 
Intermediate 
products 16,2 15, 1 18, 1 21,4 22,2 25,0 
Equipment 
products 12,5 13,6 18,3 16,2 18,2 21,0 
Current 
consumption 
products 11,3 13,6 16;4 11,5 13,7 16,8 
Food 9,0 9,7 10,6 8,8 10,1 10,7 
Total industry 12,7 13,3 16,3 14,8 16,4 18,9 
Table 32 
Proportion of production exported in industry (exports/production) 
D F 
1970 1973 1976 1970 1973 1976 
Intermediate 
products 18,3 19,9 23,8 20,5 20,9 23,7 
Equipment 
products 28, 1 32,0 38,8 18,5 20,3 26, 1 
Current 
consumption 
products 8,4 10,0 12,2 11,9 13,9 14,0 
Food 2,8 4,5 5,7 8,4 11,5 11,5 
Total industry 17,0 19,3 23,4 15,4 17,2 20,1 
Note: Production is defined here as: value-added plus intermediate consumption. 
Source: OECD External Trade Statistics, national sources and Commission staff estimates. 
Structural change in employment and labour 
productivity since 1973 
The generally very unfavourable employment trend and 
the resultant unemployment have been the most serious 
aspects of the recession. Table 33 pinpoints two main 
factors-both linked to the slowdown in growth-which 
have contributed to the general increase in the number of 
unemployed: the reduction in the numbers employed in 
industry and in building and construction and the sharp 
deceleration in the rate of growth of jobs in the tertiary 
sector. Although it has caught the public eye much less 
24,9 25,0 24,9 27,1 28,7 
22, 1 23,6 14,8 22,3 26,1 
10,8 11,6 17,4 19,9 21,9 
10,4 15,6 15,6 17,0 14,7 18, 1 17,8 24,9 
17,1 18,8 17,9 17,9 21,5 23,0 43,3 42,4 53,7 
(percentages) 
UK NL 
1970 1973 1976 1970 1973 1976 1970 1973 1976 
15,5 18,1 23,5 28,0 29,6 
31,0 22,9 27,2 29, 1 35,6 
18,2 17, 1 13,6 12,6 15,5 
3,9 4,9 5,6 6,6 +0,3 30, 1 28,8 37, 1 
18, 1 15,8 20,9 19,0 20,3 23,7 40,0 42,8 54,4 
than the situation in industry, the slowdown in the growth 
of jobs in the tertiary sector has had at least as marked a 
quantitative impact on the disequilibrium of employment 
generally. The unfavourable employment trends which 
were already discernible before the recession were thus 
accentuated during the period 1973-76. Since the very 
beginning of the 1970s, only the tertiary sector had been a 
net creator of jobs in the Community as a whole. Despite 
the remarkable growth of manufacturing industry during 
the period 1970-73, the number of jobs in this sector was 
already declining (except in Italy and France where the 
rate of growth of GDP was strongest). 
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During the recession, the number of jobs in industry had to 
be adjusted, with time-lags and to varying extents 
according to country and industry, to the downward trend 
of production. The redundancies were heaviest-and 
came most rapidly-in Germany, where the number of 
wage and salary-earners in industry fell very sharply (by 
3,7% per annum between 1973 and 1976) and where 
labour productivity (measured by the value-added per 
employee) not only did not slacken, but actually increased 
at a sharper rate than in previous years (see Table 34). A 
similar movement was observed in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, where productivity in industry forged ahead 
(at a rate of between 4%% and 5% per annum), entailing 
heavy losses of jobs (3,7% and 1,6% respectively). Owing 
to a still fairly rapid growth of industry in France, the 
productivity performance there remained fairly good 
(4,3% per annum), with relatively few job losses (1 % per 
annum), whereas in the United Kingdom employment and 
labour productivity fell (by 2,5% and 0, 1 % per annum 
respectively). In Italy, however, the position was the 
opposite of that in Germany: with an almost identical rate 
of growth in industry, the number of jobs continued to 
increase, while labour productivity fell. 
Table 33 
Annual rates of growth of employment by sector 
D F 
1960- 1970- 1973- 1960- 1970- 1973-
1973 1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 
1. Agricultural 
products -4,6 -3,9 -2,1 -3,9 -4,2 -4,0 
2. Energy products -3,0 -2,5 1,4 -1,0 -2,3 -0,5 
3. Intermediate 
products -0,3 -0,9 -3,2 0,8 0,9 -0,7 
4. Equipment 
products 1,3 -0,1 -3,4 2,2 2,2 0,0 
5. Current consumption 
products -1,2 -1,6 -5,3 -0,1 0,2 -2,5 
6. Food -0,2 -1,0 -2,0 -0,2 0,0 -0,6 
Total manufacturing 
industry 1 0,3 -0,7 -3,7 0,6 1, 1 -1,0 
7. Building and civil 
engineering 0,3 -0,2 -7,4 1,8 -0,4 -2,0 
8. Market services 0,9 +1,6 -0,7 2,9 2,6 1,7 
9. Non-market 
services 2,5 3,2 2,3 2,1 2,1 1,2 
Total 0 0,6 -1,9 0,9 0,9 -0,1 
Branches 3, 4, 5, 6. 
Source: see Table 29. 
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Structural factors, such as the varying mobility of labour or 
the capacity for adapting the industrial apparatus, 
certainly contributed to these great differences in the 
adjustment of industrial employment. Assessments of the 
scale of the crisis and expectations regarding recovery 
probably varied from one country to the next. However, the 
revaluation of the German, Belgian and Dutch currencies 
undoubtedly acted as a constraint on industry in these 
countries and as an incentive to managements to seek a 
high rate of labour productivity, so that employment 
necessarily suffered. 
The retention of labour was most marked in the in-
termediate products sector, particularly in the ores and 
steel branch. In all European countries, output fell so 
sharply that, in spite of heavy redundancies, productivity 
per employee marked time or increased very slowly. In 
most countries, therefore, there were extensive reserves 
of productivity available in these industries at the end of 
1976. 
Conversely, in the branches producing goods for current 
consumption, employment levels were adjusted very 
(percentages) 
UK NL B 
1970- 1973- 1960- 1970- 1973- 1960- 1970- 1973- 1960- 1970- 1973-
1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 
-4,0 -2,8 -3,6 -3,0 -2,8 -3,1 -2,1 -1,5 -5,8 -6,1 -3,9 
-0,6 3,5 -3,4 -4,7 -0,7 -3,7 -2,9 -3,2 -5,6 -2,8 -3,1 
0,2 1,8 -0,6 -2,5 -2,2 1,8 -0,1 -1,1 -1,7 
1,9 1,7 -0,2 -2,4 -2,3 1,0 2,2 1,2 -1,8 
-0,8 0,0 -1,0 -1,6 -3,1 -1,7 -4,8 -5,2 -0,1 -0,4 -5,3 
-0,8 0,1 -0,2 -1,6 -1,8 -0,5 -1,3 -2,8 -0,9 -1,1 -2,8 
0,2 0,8 0,1 -2,1 -2,5 0,9 -2,1 -2,6 -0,7 -0,1 -3,1 
-4,2 -1,3 -0,7 3,3 -3,4 1,4 -2,2 -2,5 1,2 -1,5 1,3 
1,5 2,4 1,4 1,1 -0,3 2,4 1,5 1,0 1,1 2,5 1,5 
3,0 2,3 1,6 2,7 3,0 1,2 1,8 1,7 2,4 1,9 1,2 
-0,2 0,8 0,2 0,3 -0,4 0,9 -0,1 -0,3 0,7 0,7 -0,2 
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Table 34 
Annual rates of growth of value-added per person employed, by industry (1970 prices) 
D F 
1960- 1970- 1973- 1960- 1970- 1973-
1973 1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 
1. Agricultural 
products 6,3 7,9 0,3 6,3 7,1 -0,4 
2. Energy products 7,5 8,0 -2,0 6,6 8,7 4,4 
3. Intermediate 
products 6,2 6,7 4,0 6,6 5,8 1, 1 
4. Equipment 
products 3,3 2,7 5,3 6,8 5,4 5,0 
5. Current consumption 
products 5,0 6,0 6,4 5,7 4,5 3,8 
6. Food 5,0 4,5 5,8 4,8 5,8 6,3 
Total manufacturing 
industry 1 4,5 4,6 5,5 6,0 5,4 4,3 
7. Building and civil 
engineering 3,3 4,9 3,5 4,9 2,4 4,2 
8. Market services 3,4 1,7 2,8 3,0 3,8 1,7 
9. Non-market 
services 1,8 1,0 0,5 0,9 0,8 1,5 
Total 4,2 3,3 3,1 4,9 4,5 2,9 
Branches 3, 4, 5, 6. 
Source: see Table 29. 
rapidly and labour productivity maintained a good rate of 
increase, especially in Germany and Belgium. These 
differences of behaviour must be attributed to the varying 
sizes of firms in the various industries. In the intermediate 
products industries, more dominated than others by large 
firms, the opportunities for borrowing or for attracting 
subsidies enabled managements (frequently backed by 
the authorities and under pressure from the unions, which 
tend to be relatively stronger in big firms) to hoard labour 
they might otherwise have shed. There was less room for 
manoeuvre in the consumer industries, where there are 
1960-
1973 
6,9 
4,4 
6,8 
3,2 
5,8 
5,8 
5,6 
2,9 
4,4 
5,2 
{percentages) 
UK NL B 
1970- 197J- 1960- 1970- 1973- 1960- 1970- 1973- 1960- 1970- 1973-
1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 1973 1973 1976 
4,0 3,5 6,9 6,7 -0,3• 6,2 7,1 3,4 5,3 9,8 -3,7 
6,0 -2,8 5,5 8,4 1,6 14,4 15,8 9,0 17,8 13,9 6,9 
6,2 1,3 3,8 7,3 Cl,3 7,3 7,7 9,3 0,0 
1,2 -0,1 2,5 4,7 -0,2 4,6 6,7 7,3 6,6 
6,4 2,8 3,2 4,6 2,4 4,9 6,1 4,4 4,5 8,3 6,0 
5,7 3,1 2,7 3,4 -0,5 4,9 6,2 5,8 4,5 5,7 5,7 
4,8 1,8 3,0 5,6 -0,1 6,5 6,8 4,1 6,1 7,8 4,7 
4,0 -1,0 2,2 -1,1 -2,6 3,3 3,3 0,5 2,8 4,3 2,1 
3,0 0,4 1,6 3,0 0,4 2,2 3,0 2,4 2,4 1,9 1,3 
0,5 0,2 -0,4 -0,2 3,4 0,8 1,0 3,1 3,3 1,9 
4,1 1,2 2,2 3,3 -0,1 4,3 4,6 2,8 4,2 4,9 2,4 
many more small firms, which had either to rationalize or 
go out of business altogether. 
In the equipment products industries, the same differ-
ences occurred between countries as for industry ge-
nerally. Germany and Belgium (no figures are available 
for the Netherlands) seem to have given priority to 
maintaining productivity improvements, whereas pro-
ductivity fell in Italy and the United Kingdom, although in 
the latter country numbers employed also fell sharply. 
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Annex - Table 1 
GDP 1958-1978, 'OOO millions national currencies , at current prices 
DK D F IRL 11 NL B L UK 
1958 34,477 246,628 244,380 0,557 18,758 35, 010 506,564 22,817 22,797 
1959 38,085 264,908 264,987 0,598 19,772 36,81 9 522,483 23,259 23 ,923 · 
1960 41 ,098 302,800 296,506 0,634 21,632 41,840 557, 01 8 25,574 25,489 
1961 45,616 331 ,800 323,459 0,683 24,118 44,173 592,441 25,058 27,209 
1962 51 ,387 360,880 361 ,164 0,739 27,117 47,554 633,7 14 26,648 28,486 
1963 54,705 382,470 404,881 0,794 31,053 51,592 681,300 28,068 30,276 
1964 62,529 420,280 449,157 0,904 33,941 60,708 762,525 32,394 33,047 
1965 70,251 459,270 483,488 0,962 36,530 67,802 829,955 33,688 35,521 
1966 76,798 488,340 523,416 1,015 39,521 73,829 892,11 4 35,011 37,850 
1967 84,597 494,460 565,389 1,109 43,517 80,997 955,350 35,442 39,960 
1968 94,101 534,900 614,517 1,251 46,953 89,811 1 022,336 38,879 43, 146 
1969 107,389 596,950 700,689 1,445 51,691 101 ,715 1 134,165 45,169 46,109 
1970 119,067 578,750 782,560 1,620 57,937 114,573 1 262,110 53,395 50,724 
1971 131,633 754,880 872,433 1,854 63,056 129,650 1 382,972 55,144 56 ,826 
1972 151,484 825,990 981 ,115 2,220 69,080 146,730 1 542,627 61,404 62,881 
1973 174,634 918,600 1 114,200 2,681 82,503 168,110 1 751 ,922 75,521 71,963 
1974 193,969 987,130 1 278,302 2,930 101,723 190,290 2 057,045 91 ,452 81,932 
1975 215,666 1 030,020 1 450,932 3,664 115,072 209,690 2 262, 781 84,521 103,139 
1976 248,982 1 125,400 1 669,308 4,492 143,849 237,990 2 577,300 92,681 121,978 
1977 276,243 1 198,500 1 870,341 5,380 172,988 261 ,120 2 791 ,200 98,529 139,789 
(1978) 302,800 1 277,100 2 121,300 6,272 200,850 280,300 2 972,600 105,498 157 ,660 
Italy : 'OOO bill ions LIT . 
Annex - Table 2 
GDP 1958-1978, 'OOO millions EUA, at current prices and exchange rates 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 4,551 53,543 52,980 1,423 27,366 8,401 9,238 0,416 58,203 216, 122 
1959 5,220 59,717 50,817 1,585 29,952 9,174 9,894 0,440 63,420 230,219 
1960 5,633 68,259 56,861 1,683 32,769 10,425 10,548 0,484 67,571 254,233 
196.1 6,188 77,030 61 ,383 1,793 36,154 11 ,331 11 ,101 0,470 71,379 276,828 
1962 6,954 84,333 68,380 1,934 49,556 12,279 11 ,847 0,498 74,556 301 ,340 
1963 7,493 89,379 76,658 2,079 46,443 13,322 12,737 0,525 79,241 327 ,786 
1964 8,462 98,214 85,040 2,376 50,762 15,676 14,255 0,606 86,494 36 1,877 
1965 9,507 107,326 91 ,541 2,518 54,634 17,508 15,516 0,630 92,969 392, 148 
1966 10,393 114,119 99,100 2,659 59,108 19,064 16,678 0,655 99,065 420,841 
1967 11 ,397 116,091 107,549 2,062 65,389 21 ,013 17,944 0,666 103,082 445,993 
1968 12,195 129,971 120,976 2,919 73,016 24,113 19,873 0,756 100,643 484,462 
1969 14,008 148,265 132,449 3,394 80,910 27,488 22,191 0,884 108,259 537,879 
1970 15,530 181,417 137,381 3,804 90,683 30,962 24,693 1,045 11 9,090 605,055 
1971 16,979 207,063 151 ,145 4,326 97,397 35,448 27,188 1,084 132,590 673,220 
1972 19,448 230,929 173,428 4,945 105,584 40,759 31,252 1,244 140,065 747,656 
1973 23,548 280,365 203,777 5,337 115,154 49,033 36,650 1,580 143,26 1 858,705 
1974 26,720 320,131 222,939 5,747 131 ,130 .59,424 44,333 1,971 160,713 973, 108 
1975 30,279 337,779 272,771 6,544 142,144 66,889 49,656 1,855 184,168 1 092,085 
1976 36,822 399,722 312,320 7,223 154,651 80 ,534 59,708 2, 147 196,293 1 249,420 
1977 40,294 452,553 333,628 8,230 171,822 93 ,254 68,274 2,410 213,842 1 384,307 
(1978) 43 ,161 497,008 369,568 9,516 188,176 101,571 74,012 2,627 239,213 1 525,190 
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Annex - Table 3 
GDP per capita 1958-1978, ElJA, at current prices and exchange rates 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 1 008 986 1 183 499 553 751 1 024 1 337 1 122 947 
1959 1 148 1 088 1 123 557 601 808 1 091 1 407 J 216 1 OOO 
1960 1 230 1 231 1 245 594 653 908 1 157 1 538 1 286 1 095 
1961 1 340 1 371 1 330 636 716 974 1 21 1 1 473 1 348 1 181 
1962 1 496 1 484 1 455 684 798 1 041 1 285 1 544 1 396 1 272 
1963 1 580 1 557 1 603 730 907 1 114 1 372 1 612 1 476 1 370 
1964 1 793 1 694 1 760 826 984 1 293 1 522 1 835 1 601 1 500 
1965 1 998 1 831 1 877 876 1 051 1 424 1 642 1 891 1 710 1 611 
1966 2 167 1 929 2 016 922 1 129 1 531 1 754 1 955 1 813 1 716 
1967 2 355 1 958 2 171 987 1 242 1 668 1 878 1 986 1 877 1 808 
1968 2 506 2 184 2 424 1 002 1 378 1 895 2 072 2 246 1 825 1 954 
1969 2 864 2 468 2 632 1 159 1 518 2 135 2 309 2 611 1 955 2 154 
1970 3 151 2 991 2 715 1 289 1 690 2 376 2 562 3 077 2 145 2 406 
1971 3 421 3 379 2 949 1 453 1 803 2 687 2 811 3 142 2 380 2 657 
1972 3 896 3 745 3 354 1 641 1 940 3 058 3 218 3 573 2 506 2 93 1 
1973 4 689 4 524 3 910 1 749 2 097 3 649 3 762 4 480 2 557 3 346 
1974 5 296 5 159 4 250 1 860 2 366 4 388 4 537 5 515 2 867 3 775 
1975 5 984 5 463 5 775 2 093 2 546 4 897 5 067 5 176 3 286 4 226 
1976 7 258 6 496 5 905 2 284 2 753 5 847 6 081 6 024 3 504 4 828 
1977 7 909 7 371 6 286 2 575 3 043 6 731 6 942 6 788 3 822 5 340 
(1978) 8 446 8 139 6 942 2 955 3 316 7 288 7 506 7 400 4 280 5 879 
Annex - Table 4 
GDP volume growth 1958-1978, percentage changes on preceding year 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 (a) 2,6 3,4 3,0 -2, 1 4,9 - 1,0 - 0,7 0,4 2,2 
1959 6,4 6,6 2,6 4,5 6,1 3,9 2,3 3,8 3,8 4,7 
1960 6,6 10,5 7,6 5,8 6,7 9,9 5,8 5,6 5,0 7,7 
1961 6,4 5,1 5,6 5,0 8,2 2,9 5,0 3,4 3,3 5, 1 
1962 5,7 4,4 6,7 3,2 6,2 4,3 5,2 1,6 1,0 4,4 
1963 0,6 3,0 5,2 4,8 5,6 3,3 4,4 2,2 3,9 4,0 
1964 9,3 6,7 6,2 3,8 2,6 8,6 7,0 7,3 5,6 5,9 
1965 4,6 5,6 4,8 1,9 3,2 5,3 3,6 1,8 2,3 4,2 
1966 2,7 2,5 5,3 0,9 5,8 2,8 3,2 1,7 1,9 3,5 
1967 4,7 -0,2 4,7 5,8 7, 0 5,3 3,9 0,2 2,6 3,1 
1958-1967 5,0 4,8 5,2 3, 1 5,6 4,5 4,0 3,0 3,0 4,5 
1968 4,2 6,3 4,3 8,2 6,3 6,7 4, 2 4, 1 3,4 5,1 
1969 6,9 7,8 7,2 5,9 5,7 6,8 6,6 8,3 1,4 5,9 
1970 2,6 6,0 5,9 .3,2 5,0 6,9 6,4 2,8 2,5 5,1 
1971 2,4 3,2 5,4 4, 1 1,6 4,4 4,1 4,5 2,8 3,5 
1972 5,5 3,7 5,9 5,7 3, 1 3,9 5,6 6,2 2,4 4,0 
1973 5,2 4,9 5,4 4,6 6,9 5,9 6,5 11,3 6,6 5,8 
1974 0,6 0,5 2,8 2, 1 4,2 4,2 4,7 5,0 - 0,6 1,7 
1975 - 1,2 - 2,1 0,3 1,2 -3,5 -0,9 (b) - 2,1 - 11,0 - 1,6 - 1,6 
1976 6,3 5,6 4,6 2,9 5,7 4,5 (b) 5,7 2,9 2,6 4,7 
1977 1,8 2,8 3,0 5,5 1,7 2,4 (b) 1,3 1,3 0,7 2,2 
1968-1977 3,4 3,9 4,5 4,0 3,7 4,5 4,3 3,4 2,0 3,6 
(1978) (c) 0,3 2,7 3,0 6,0 2,2 1,9 2,0 2,5 3,2 2,6 
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Annex - Table 5 
Industrial production (a ) 1958-1978, percentage changes on preceding year 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 3,0 2,6 4,0 3,0 3,6 2,2 - 4,7 - 4,3 - 1,3 1,7 
1959 11,5 7,1 1,1 8,8 10,6 8,7 4,6 4,5 5,2 5,7 
1960 8,7 11,7 8 ,9 6,9 16,7 10,0 6,8 9 ,0 6,8 10, 1 
1961 5,1 6,1 5,5 8,5 9,5 3,6 6,2 2 ,9 0,0 4,8 
1962 8,9 8,4 5, 1 7,2 7,8 3,5 5,7 - 4,2 1,1 5,7 
1963 1,3 3,5 6 ,0 5,9 7,8 5, 1 7,4 1,0 4,0 4,8 
1964 11,7 7,8 6,2 7,6 1,3 9,7 6,5 9,2 7,9 6,8 
1965 6,6 5,3 1,6 4,2 3,8 4,4 2,5 0,8 3,3 3,8 
1966 2,9 1,2 5,9 3,2 12,0 4,2 2,0 - 3,2 1,4 3,6 
1967 3,9 - 2,6 2,4 7,9 8,9 2,7 1,8 - 0,6 0,2 1,1 
1958-1967 6,4 5,1 4,7 6,3 8,2 5,4 3,9 1,5 2,9 4,8 
1968 7,4 9,4 3 ,5 10,5 6,7 9,2 5,5 6,0 6,7 7,0 
1969 12,4 12,9 10,9 7,2 3,0 10,8 9,7 12,8 3,3 9,0 
1970 2,5 6,2 5,6 4,4 6,4 8,7 3,1 0,5 0,5 4,9 
1971 2,4 1,5 6,4 3,7 - 0,5 6,0 1,7 - 1,3 - 0,2 2,3 
1972 4,4 4, 1 5,5 4,2 4,9 4,7 7,5 4,2 2,2 4,4 
1973 3,4 7, 1 6 ,7 9,9 9,7 7,2 6,2 12,0 8,2 7,4 
.1974 - 1, 1 - 1, 1 2 ,5 2,9 3,9 5,0 4,0 3,5 - 1,8 0,6 
1975 - 5,7 -6,2 - 7 ,2 - 6,1 - 8,8 -4,8 - 9,8 - 21 ,9 - 4,9 - 6,6 
1976 11,4 7,4 8 ,6 8,5 11 ,6 5,9 7,7 6,3 1,1 7,3 
1977 0,3 2,8 1,6 8, 1 0,0 0,8 0,0 0,5 1,7 1,7 
1968-1977 3,5 4,5 4,4 5,3 3,7 5,4 3,6 2,3 1,7 3,8 
(1978) 1,0 2,2 4,0 10 0 1,5 3,6 2, 1 2,3 
Annex - Table 6 
GDP price deflator 1958-1978, percentage changes on preceding year 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 (a) 1,8 3,4 11 ,8 5,8 2,5 1,8 1,5 4,0 4,8 
1959 3,6 0,8 5,7 2,7 -0,7 1,2 0,8 - 1,8 1, 1 1,7 
1960 1,8 3,4 4,0 0,3 2,5 3,4 0,7 4,1 1,5 2,8 
1961 4,3 4,3 3,3 2,5 3, 1 2,6 1,3 - 5,2 3,3 3,4 
1962 6,6 4,2 4,6 4,8 5,9 3,2 1,7 4,7 3,7 4,3 
1963 5,8 2,9 6,6 · 2,6 8,5 5,0 3,0 3, 1 2,3 4,5 
1964 4,6 3,0 4,5 9,7 6,5 8,4 4,6 7,6 3,3 4,3 
1965 7,4 3,5 2,7 4,4 4,3 6, 1 5, 1 2,2 5, 1 4, 1 
1966 6,8 3,7 2,8 4,7 2,3 5,9 4,2 2,2 4,6 3,7 
1967 5,2 1,4 3,1 3,2 2,9 4, 1 3, 1 1,0 2,9 2,6 
1958-1967 4,8 3,1 4,9 4,1 3,8 4,2 2,6 2,0 3,2 3,6 
1968 6,8 1,8 4,2 4,2 1,5 3,9 2,7 5,4 4,4 · 3, 1 
1969 6,8 3,5 6,4 9, 1 4,2 6, 1 4,0 7,3 5,4 4,9 
1970 8, 1 7,3 5,4 8,6 6,8 5,4 4,6 15,0 7,3 6,6 
1971 8,0 7,7 5,8 9,9 7,2 8,4 5,2 - 1,1 9,0 7,3 
1972 9, 1 5,6 6,2 13,2 6,2 8,9 5,6 4,8 8,0 6,6 
1973 9,6 6,0 7,7 15,5 11,7 8,2 6,8 10,5 7,4 7,9 
1974 10,4 6,9 11,6 7, 1 18,3 8,6 12, 1 15,4 14,6 11,6 
1975 12,5 6,7 13,2 23,6 17,2 11 ,2 (b) 13,0 3,8 27,9 14,7 
1976 8,6 3,4 10,0 19, 1 18,2 . 8,6 (b) 7,3 6,6 15,3 10,1 
1977 9,0 3,6 8 ,7 13,6 18,3 7,2 (b) 6,8 5 14,0 9,5 
1968-1977 8,9 5,3 7,9 12,4 11,0 7,6 6,8 7,3 11 ,3 8,2 
(1978) (c) 9,5 3,8 10,1 10,0 , 13,6 5,4 4,4 4,4 9,3 7,7 
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Annex - Table 7 
Consumer prices 1958-1978, percentage changes on preceding year 
DK D F IRL NL B UK EC 
1958 (a) 0,5 2,5 12, 1 3,8 2,3 1,6 0, 1 2,7 4,3 
1959 (a ) 2,5 1,0 5,8 0,4 - 0,7 1,2 - 0,3 1,0 1,8 
1960 (a) 2,9 1,0 3,6 0,9 1,4 2,5 2,4 1, 1 1,7 
1961 3,6 3,6 3, 1 2,4 2, 1 2, 1 2,7 0,5 2,9 3,0 
1962 6,2 3,2 4,2 3,5 5,6 2,7 1,0 0,9 3,9 3,8 
1963 5,7 2,9 5,7 2,2 7,4 3,9 3,7 2,9 1,8 4,0 
1964 4,0 2,6 3,7 7,4 5,2 6,9 4,1 3,1 3,5 3,8 
1965 6, 1 3,4 2,4 4,9 3,9 4,1 4,6 2,7 5,0 3,8 
1966 6,5 3,8 3,0 3, 1 2,9 5,5 4, 1 3,3 4, 1 3,7 
1967 6,0 1,7 3,0 3, 1 2,9 3,1 2,5 2,2 2,8 2,6 
1958-1967 4,4 2,6 4,7 3,2 3,3 3,4 2,5 2,2 2,9 3,3 
1968 6,9 1,8 5,0 4,7 1,6 2,8 2,9 2,5 4,7 3,3 
1969 6,0 2,3 6,8 7,4 2,9 6,5 2,9 2,3 5,6 4,4 
1970 7,3 3,5 4,7 8,2 5,4 4,4 2,5 4,6 6,0 4,9 
1971 7,0 5,4 5,5 8,9 5,8 8,1 4,9 4;6 8,5 6,4 
1972 7,9 5,6 5,9 8,7 6,5 8,4 4,8 4,8 6,7 6,2 
1973 9,8 7,1 6,9 11,3 12,2 8,9 5,8 5,5 8,2 8,3 
1974 12,3 7,0 13,4 17,0 21,0 9,7 12,2 9,5 16,5 13,2 
1975 9,5 6,2 11 ,7 20,9 17,6 10,7 (b) 12, 1 10,7 23,6 13,4 
1976 10,1 4,5 9,9 18,0 17,9 9,2 (b) 7,7 9,8 15,5 10,7 
1977 10,1 3,8 9,1 13,6 18,0 6,8 (b) 6,6 6,7 14,2 9,9 
1968-1977 8,7 4,7 7,9 12,6 10,9 7,5 6,2 6,1 11,0 8, 1 
(1978) (c) 9,0 2,5 9,2 8,0 12,5 4,4 4,0 3, 1 8,6 6,9 
Annex - Table 8 
Private consumption in GDP 1958-1978, percentage shares (current prices) 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 67,8 62,8 63,2 84,4 67,8 60,6 68,5 59,4 66,7 65,0 
1959 66,1 61 ,6 62,5 80,2 66,6 60,0 69,5 60,3 66,8 64,3 
1960 65,9 59,8 61 ,4 80,5 65,9 58,3 68,7 56,2 66,1 63,2 
1961 65,9 59,7 61 ,6 79,0 64,7 59,4 67,4 60,4 65,1 62,7 
1962 65,6 59,5 61,8 78,3 64,7 60,1 66,3 59,9 65,9 62,9 
1963 65,2 59,7 62,4 77,6 65,8 61 ,6 66,7 61 ,2 65,8 63,2 
1964 64,1 58,5 61,4 76,3 65,1 59,0 63,7 59,3 64,2 62,0 
1965 62,6 59,1 61 ,0 75,9 64,9 58,9 63,8 61 , 1 63,7 61,8 
1966 60,1 59,7 61 ,0 75,2 66,1 58,5 63,4 61 ,8 63,3 62,0 
1967 60,3 60,9 61 ,1 73,7 66,0 57,6 62,4 62,1 63,1 62,3 
1958-1967 64,3 60,3 61,7 78,1 65,8 59,4 66,0 60, 1 65, 1 62,9 
1968 59,2 60,0 61 ,2 74,2 65,1 56,6 63,3 60,8 62,9 61,8 
1969 57,7 59,2 61 ,2 72,6 64,5 56,8 61 ,8 55,9 62,6 61,3 
1970 57,4 57,7 60,2 70,9 · 65,0 56,7 59,4 51,9 62,0 60,4 
1971 55,6 57,9 60,6 69,7 65,1 56,2 59,7 55,6 61,8 60,4 
1972 53,2 58,3 60,5 66,3 65,5 56,0 59,5 54,7 63,0 60,6 
1973 54,3 57,7 60,1 64,6 65,1 55,4 59,8 47,5 62,3 60,0 
1974 54,6 58,2 61 ,2 68,3 65,6 55,2 59, 1 45,8 63,2 60,6 
1975 55,7 61 ,3 62,0 64,6 67,3 57,4 60,6 58,2 61,5 61,9 
1976 56,1 60,9 62,3 63,6 65,7 56,5 61 ,3 59,2 60,5 61,4 
1977 56,2 61,3 62,1 63,2 65,8 57,2 60,0 60,0 60,0 61,5 
1968-1977 56,0 59,2 61,1 67,7 65,5 56,4 60,4 54,7 62,0 61 ,0 
(1978) 55,8 61 ,1 61 ,9 63,2 65,1 57,6 59,7 58,8 61, 1 61,3 
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Annex - Table 9 
Public consumption in GDP 1958-1978, percentage shares (current prices) 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 12,8 10,6 13, 1 12,6 12, 1 14,3 11,9 11,9 16,3 13,2 
1959 12,5 10,7 13,6 12,4 12,2 13,4 12,4 10,8 16,5 13,3 
1960 12,3 10,7 13,0 12,4 12,2 13,4 12,4 9,6 16,5 13,2 
1961 13,8 11, 1 13, 1 12,5 12,0 14,0 11,9 9,9 16,7 13,3 
1962 14, 1 11,9 13,3 12,5 12,4 14,5 12,3 10,7 17,1 13,7 
1963 14,3 12,6 13,4 12,7 13,3 15,4 13,0 12, 1 16,9 14, 1 
1964 14,4 11,9 13,3 13,3 13,7 15,5 12,5 10,6 16,5 13,8 
1965 15, 1 12,7 13, 1 13,6 14,5 15,5 12,8 10,6 16,8 14, 1 
1966 17,3 12, 1 13,0 13,6 14,2 15,9 13, 1 11,2 17,2 14, 1 
1967 18,0 12,6 13,0 13,3 13,6 16,2 13,5 11,7 18,0 14,4 
1958-1967 14,4 11,6 13,2 12,9 13,0 14,8 12,6 10,9 16,8 13,7 
1968 18,7 11,8 13,5 13,3 13,6 15,9 13,6 11,7 17,7 14,2 
1969 18,9 12,0 13,3 13,5 13,3 16,0 13,6 10,7 17,3 14,0 
1970 20,0 12,1 13,4 14,8 12,7 16,3 13,4 10,0 17,7 14, 1 
1971 21,3 12,8 13,4 15,4 14, 1 16,7 14,1 11 ,0 18,0 14,7 
1972 21,3 12,8 13,2 15,6 14,6 16,7 14,5 11,2 18,5 14,7 
1973 21,0 13,2 13,2 16, 1 14,0 16,3 14,5 10,3 18,4 14,6 
1974 23,0 14, 1 13,6 18, 1 13,5 17,0 14,6 10,7 20,2 15,4 
1975 24,7 14,6 14,4 19,5 13,8 18,4 16,5 14,2 22, 1 16,3 
1976 24,0 14,0 14,6 19,5 13,2 18,3 16,5 14,4 21,8 16,0 
1977 24,0 13,9 14,9 19,2 13,7 18,5 16,7 15,3 21 ,0 15,9 
1968-1977 21,6 13, 1 13,7 16,3 13,6 17,0 14,8 11 ,8 19,2 15,0 
(1978) 24,0 13,8 14,9 19,2 14,2 18,6 17,2 15,4 20,2 15,9 
Annex - Table 10 
' Fixed investment in GDP 1958-1978, percentage shares (current prices) 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 17,3 22,4 20,3 14,2 20,8 23,0 17,0 22,9 15,7 19,6 
1959 18,8 23,6 20,1 13,9 21, 1 23,8 17,8 22,3 15,9 20,0 
1960 19,4 24,3 20,1 14,3 22,3 24,0 19,3 21,3 16,4 20,6 
1961 20,9 25,2 21,2 16,2 22,9 24,7 20,7 25,3 17,3 21,6 
1962 20,8 25,7 21,4 17,8 23,2 24,4 21 ,3 26,8 17,0 21,8 
1963 19,8 25,5 22,1 19,5 23,6 23,7 20,7 31,4 16,7 21,9 
1964 22,0 26,6 22,9 20,4 21,9 25,4 22,4 34,9 18,3 22,7 
1965 21,7 26,1 23,3 21,3 19,0 25,0 22,4 29,2 18,3 22,3 
1966 23,7 25,4 23,7 19,7 18,5 26,1 22,9 28,0 18,3 22,2 
1967 23,9 23, 1 23,8 19,7 19,2 26,2 22,9 25, 1 18,8 21,8 
1958-1967 20,7 24,8 21,8 17,5 21,2 24,6 20,6 26,4 17,2 21,4 
1968 23,0 22,5 23,3 20,8 20,2 26,8 21,5 23,0 19,0 21,7 
1969 24,4 23,4 23,4 23,2 20,9 24,5 21 ,3 23,1 18,7 22,0 
1970 24,7 25,6 23,4 22,6 21,3 25,7 22,7 23,7 18,7 22,8 
1971 24,4 26,4 23,6 23,8 20,3 25,8 22, 1 28,9 18,6 23,0 
1972 24,9 25,9 23,7 23,4 19,7 23,7 21,4 27,6 18,6 22,8 
1973 25,4 24,5 23,8 25,3 20,8 23,0 21,5 25,2 19,7 22,8 
1974 24,7 21,9 24,3 26,1 22,4 21,8 22,7 24,4 20,7 22,4 
1975 22, 1 20,8 23,2 23,4 20,6 21,0 22,6 27,8 20,0 21,4 
1976 24,2 20,7 23,3 24,5 20,0 19,7 22,0 26,9 19,2 21, 1 
1977 23,3 20,8 22,6 25,9 19,8 20,8 21,6 28,0 18,2 20,9 
1968-1977 24, 1 23,2 23,5 23,9 20,6 23,2 21,9 26,2 19,1 22,1 
(1978) 21,9 21,4 22,1 27 ,2 18,9 21,0 21,4 27,6 17,8 20,7 
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Annex - Table 11 
Net stockbui lding in GDP 1958-1978, percentage shares (curre nt prices) 
OK 0 F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 - 0,5 1,5 3,2 - 1,4 0,8 0,3 0,8 1,8 0,5 1,6 
1959 2,3 1,5 2,2 4,0 1,0 0,7 0,2 2,0 0,7 1,4 
1960 3,6 2,9 3,0 2,0 1,6 3,3 - 0,1 - 0,3 2,2 2,5 
1961 1,4 1,9 1,7 1,4 2,0 2,7 0,5 1,5 1,0 1,6 
1962 2,5 1,5 2,3 1,6 1,7 1,5 0 1,4 0 1,3 
1963 0,2 0,6 1,5 0,9 1,3 1,1 0,4 0,7 0,5 0,9 
1964 1,5 1,4 2,4 1,2 0,5 3,0 1,5 - 0,3 2,2 1,8 
1965 2,1 2,2 1,6 2,3 0,7 1,9 0,8 0,9 1,4 1,6 
1966 0,6 1,0 2,0 0,8 0,9 1,3 1,0 0,6 0,9 1,2 
1967 - 0,1 - 0,2 1,8 - 0,4 1,5 0,9 0,4 0,3 0,8 0,8 
1958-1967 1,3 1,4 2,2 1,2 1,3 1,7 0,6 0,9 1,0 1,5 
1968 0,5 2,0 1,8 1,1 0 0,6 0,9 0,6 1, 1 1,3 
1969 1,2 2,6 2,6 2,4 0,9 2,4 1,9 0,4 0,9 1,9 
1970 1,0 2,3 2,7 1,7 1,8 2,5 1,6 2, 1 0,8 2,0 
1971 0,6 0,5 1,5 0,4 0,7 1,4 1,5 2,2 0,1 0,8 
1972 0,2 0,3 1,9 1, 1 0,6 0,7 0,5 2,2 0 0,7 
1973 1,4 0,8 2,4 1,8 3,6 1,8 1,2 5,4 1,9 1,8 
1974 1,0 0,6 2,4 3,7 4,5 2,9 2,2 3,0 1,4 1,9 
1975 - 1,5 - 0,3 - 0,4 -1 ,2 - 0,4 - 0,7 - 0,7 1,0 - 1,3 - 0,6 
1976 0,6 1,2 1,1 0,7 3,9 1,4 0,4 - 0,2 0,3 1,3 
1977 0,2 1,9 0,9 0,8 1,4 1,5 0,3 0 0,9 1,0 
1968-1977 0,4 1, 1 1,7 1,2 1,7 1,4 1,0 1,8 0,6 1,2 
(1978) - 0,2 0,7 0,7 0,4 1,4 1,2 0,2 - 0,2 1, 1 0,8 
Annex - Table 12 
Total exports in GDP 1958-1978, percentage shares (current prices) 
OK 0 F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 33,8 18,5 12,3 30,4 12,5 48,3 31 ,9 77,3 21 ,5 18,9 
1959 33,0 19,6 13,8 29,7 12,9 49,6 30,8 79,0 21 ,0 20,0 
1960 32,8 19,0 15,0 31,4 14,7 50,2 32,9 88,9 21,3 20,5 
1961 30,4 18, 1 14,5 34,1 15,0 47,8 33,7 87,2 20,7 19,9 
1962 29, 1 17,4 13,3 31 ,7 14,9 47,2 34,0 82,6 20,3 19,2 
1963 30,9 17,9 13,2 33,0 14,3 47,1 34,6 78,5 20,1 19,2 
1964 30,4 18, 1 13,1 32,9 15,1 45,8 35,9 78,9 19,4 19,2 
1965 30,8 18, 1 13,8 34,7 17,2 45,0 36,3 76,5 19,5 18,6 
1966 30,0 17, 1 13,8 37,0 17,7 45,4 36,2 74,1 19,6 19,6 
1967 28,8 20,5 13,7 37,7 17,3 42,9 36,3 72,3 19,3 20,2 
1958-1967 31 ,0 18,4 13,6 33,2 15,1 46,9 34,2 79,4 20,3 19,5 
1968 29,4 21 ,3 13,7 38,7 18,5 43,4 38,7 75,1 21 ,6 21,3 " 
1969 29,1 21,7 14,6 37,1 19,3 45,1 41,9 79,9 22,6 22,2 
1970 29,6 21 , 1 16,3 36,8 19,3 47,2 43,9 87 ,4 23,4 22,9 
1971 30,5 20,8 17, 1 36,0 19,8 47,7 43,4 85,8 23,5 23, 1 
1972 30,3 20,7 17,2 34,8 20,5 47,3 43,6 80,1 22,2 22,8 
1973 32, 1 21,9 18,2 38,2 20,4 49,6 47,6 86,4 24,5 24,4 
1974 35,0 26,3 21,6 43 ,6 24,5 56,5 53,4 97 ,3 28,6 28,9 
1975 34,2 24,8 19,8 45,0 25,0 51,9 46,2 86,0 26,5 26,9 
1976 33,4 26,0 20,3 48,8 26,7 54,3 48,2 85,4 29, 1 28,7 
1977 33,5 25,9 20,0 51,6 26, 1 50,1 47, 1 80 ,8 31, 1 28,5 
1968- 1977 31,6 22,9 17,7 40,7 21 ,8 49 ,2 45,2 84,2 25, 1 24,8 
(1978) 28,8 25,3 19,6 53,6 25,4 47 ,2 45,9 80,5 30,5 27,6 
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Annex - Table 13 
Intra-Community exports in GDP 1958-1978, percentage shares (current prices) 
DI< D F IRL NL BLEU UK EC 
1958 14,4 5,4 2,4 18,8 2,7 19, 1 14,9 2,8 4,9 
1959 14,3 5,8 3,3 17,2 3,2 20,7 16, 1 2,9 5,5 
1960 14,0 6,0 4, 1 19, 1 4,0 21,9 19,0 3,0 6,0 
1961 12,4 6,1 4,4 21,6 4,3 21 ,6 19,4 3,3 6,2 
1962 11 ,8 6,1 4,3 18,5 4,5 22,0 21 ,0 3,6 6,3 
1963 12,4 6,8 4,4 20,1 4,3 22,7 23,3 3,8 6,7 
1964 12,0 6,8 4,5 20,8 4,9 23 ,2 24,4 3,8 6,9 
1965 11 ,3 6,7 4,8 19,0 5,7 22 ,8 25,2 3,6 7, 1 
1966 11 ,5 7,2 4,9 19,7 5,9 21,8 25,4 3,6 7,2 
1967 9,7 7,7 4,7 21,7 5,6 21,3 24,5 3,5 7,2 
1958-1967 12,4 6,5 4,2 19,7 4,5 21 ,7 21,3 3,4 6,4 
1968 9,6 8,3 5,0 21,4 6,2 22,8 26,9 4,0 7,9 
1969 9,2 8,9 5,8 20,1 6,7 24,7 31, 1 4,5 8,8 
1970 9,0 8,5 6,8 21,2 6,8 26,3 32,4 4,6 9,1 
1971 8,8 8,8 7, 1 21,6 7,3 27,7 31,6 4,7 9,4 
1972 8,9 8,5 7,5 22,6 7,9 27,3 32,9 4,7 9,6 
1973 10,4 9, 1 8,0 24,4 7,9 28,9 35,0 5,6 10,5 
1974 11 ,0 10,5 9,2 25,8 8,9 33,1 36,2 6,7 12, 1 
1975 11 , 1 9,4 7,6 31,4 9,0 30,4 32,0 6,2 10,9 
1976 10,8 10,4 8, 1 31 ,9 10,3 32,6 35,2 7,5 12,2 
1977 10,4 10,3 8,4 36,5 10,7 29,2 32,7 8,6 12,2 
1968-1977 9,9 9,3 7,4 25,7 8,2 28,3 32,6 5,2 10,3 
(1978) 10,2 10,0 8,6 37,3 10,5 27,1 31 ,7 8,6 12,0 
Annex - Table 14 
Extra-Community exports in GDP 1958-1978, percentage shares (current p r ices) 
DK D F IRL NL BLEU UK EC 
1958 10,5 10,3 6,2 4,3 5,8 14,7 13,3 11 ,5 9,4 
1959 10,7 10,4 6,8 4,4 5,8 15,0 13,6 11 ,3 9,6 
1960 10,9 9,9 7,3 4,6 6,6 14,7 13,6 11,4 9,6 
1961 10,5 9,3 6,6 5,1 6,6 14,0 12,6 10,8 9, 1 
1962 10,4 8,6 5,7 4,7 6,2 13,0 11,8 10,2 8, 1 
1963 11,2 8,5 5,5 5,0 5,9 12,0 10,8 10,2 8, 1 
1964 11 , 1 8,6 5,4 4, 1 6,0 11 ,3 10,8 10,0 8,1 
1965 11 ,2 8,9 5,5 3,7 6,6 11 ,4 11 ,7 10,2 8,3 
1966 11 , 1 . 9,3 5,3 4,8 6,8 11,3 11,5 10,2 8,4 
1967 10,9 9,9 5,2 7,1 6,9 . 11 ,2 13,2 9,6 8,4 
1958-1967 10,9 9,4 6,0 4,8 6,3 12,9 12,3 10,5 8,7 
1968 11 ,4 10,3 5,2 7,6 7,4 10,9 11 ,6 10,8 8,8 
1969 11,8 10,2 5,2 7,7 7,5 10,8 11 ,5 11 ,4 8,9 
1970 12, 1 9,9 5,8 7,6 7,4 10,9 11,8 11 ,2 9,0 
1971 11,8 10, 1 5,8 7, 1 7,5 10,4 11,5 11,5 9, 1 
1972 11,8 9,6 5,8 6,4 7,8 9,6 11,7 10,8 8,8 
1973 12,4 10,3 6,2 7,7 7,8 10,9 12,9 11 ,7 9,4 
1974 14,5 12,9 8, 1 9,0 10,7 13,6 15,6 13,4 11,8 
1975 13,5 12, 1 7,9 8, 1 11 ,0 12,4 13,4 13,0 11,2 
1976 12,8 12,4 7,9 10,2 11,3 11 ,7 12,6 13,6 11,3 
1977 13, 1 12,6 8,3 11 ,2 12,3 12,3 13,2 15,0 11,9 
1968-1977 12,5 11 ,0 6,6 8,3 9, 1 11,4 12,6 12,2 10,0 
(1978) 11,3 12,3 7,7 11 ,0 11 ,8 11, 1 12,8 14,6 11,4 
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Annex - Table 15 
Total imports in GDP 1958-1!!78, percentage shares (cu rrent prices) 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 31 , 1 15,0 12,8 36,2 12,0 45,3 30, 1 74, 1 21, 1 18,2 
1959 32,6 16, 1 12,3 36,2 11,8 46,3 31,8 75, 1 21,3 18,7 
1960 33,8 16,5 13,2 36,6 14,9 48,1 33,9 76,0 22,6 19,8 
1961 31 ,8 15,8 13,0 39,1 15,0 47,5 34,8 80,2 21,0 19, 1 
1962 32,0 16, 1 12,6 38,3 15,5 46,6 34,3 81,5 20,4 19,7 
1963 30,3 16,3 12,8 40,1 16,9 47,7 35,8 83,3 20,4 19,2 
1964 32,2 16,5 13,3 40,4 15,0 47,8 36,6 85, 1 21,0 18,9 
1965 32 , 1 17,8 12,9 43,7 14,4 45,6 36,2 78,3 20, 1 19,3 
1966 31 ,3 17,5 13,6 42,9 15,5 46, 1 37,2 75,7 19,6 19,5 
1967 30,6 16,8 13,4 40,7 16, 1 43,9 36,2 71,7 20,2 19,3 
1958-1967 31 ,8 16,4 13,0 39,3 14,6 46,5 34,6 78, 0 20,8 19,2 
1968 30,6 17,7 13,8 45,0 15,9 43,5 38,6 71,2 22,4 20,2 
1969 31 ,2 18,8 15,2 46, 1 17,4 45,3 41, 1 70, 0 22, 1 21,2 
1970 32,3 19,0 15,8 44,8 18,7 49,0 41 ,6 75, 1 22,5 22,0 
1971 32 ,0 18,8 16, 1 43,2 18,6 48,0 41,4 82,7 21,9 21,8 
1972 29,4 18,6 15,9 40,2 19,5 44,4 40,4 75,9 22,3 21,6 
1973 33 ,9 18,9 17,6 45,0 22,7 46,3 45,6 74,3 23,6 23,2 
1974 37,6 21,9 23, 1 58,8 29,4 53 ,6 53 ,0 80,7 33,9 29,2 
1975 34 ,9 22 ,1 19,0 50,7 25,0 48,9 46,0 87,4 28,4 26, 1 
1976 38,0 23 ,7 21 ,5 56,4 28, 1 51 ,0 49,3 86,4 30,3 28,3 
1977 36,8 23,5 20,5 60,4 26,8 49,4 47,9 84,7 30,2 27,9 
1968-1977 33,5 20,2 17,6 48,6 21,7 47,8 44,3 78,6 25,4 23,9 
(1978) 30,2 22,8 19,2 63,4 25, 1 46,9 46,8 82,5 29,9 26,7 
Annex - Table 16 
Intra-Community imports in GDP 1958-1978, percentage shares (current pr ices ) 
DK D F IR L NL BLEU UK EC 
1958 15,8 4,4 2,5 23,7 3, 1 19, 1 15,9 3,3 5,0 
1959 17 ,2 5,2 2,9 22,7 3,5 20,6 17,4 3,3 5,5 
1960 16,3 5,2 3,5 22,2 4,7 22,0 19,0 3,6 6,0 
1961 15,2 5,1 3,7 25,0 4,8 24, 1 20, 1 3,6 6, 1 
1962 14,8 5,4 4,0 24,2 5,4 23,8 20,5 3,5 6,3 
1963 13,6 5,5 4,5 26,3 6,2 24,9 22,0 3,6 6,7 
1964 14,3 5,8 4,8 26,3 5,3 25,2 22,9 4,0 6,9 
1965 13,6 6,8 4,7 25,8 4,7 24,3 23, 1 3,8 7, 1 
1966 13,0 6,6 5,2 24,7 5,2 24,0 24,8 4,0 7,3 
1967 12,2 6,4 5,3 23,9 5,6 22,7 23,0 4,3 7,2 
1958-1967 14,6 5,6 4, 1 24,5 4,9 23, 1 20,9 3,7 6,4 
1968 12,2 7, 1 5,9 27,4 5,7 23, 1 24,8 4,8 7,9 
1969 12,8 8, 1 7, 1 28,2 6,6 24,7 27,6 4,7 8,9 
1970 13,3 8,0 7,3 28,8 7,4 26,4 28,2 4,8 9,2 
1971 11 ,9 8,8 7,4 26,9 7,4 25,2 30,5 5,1 9,5 
1972 11 , 1 8,4 7,7 26,2 8,0 23,6 30,4 5,6 9,6 
1973 13,0 8,2 8,2 30, 1 9,6 24,6 33,2 7,2 10,5 
1974 14,9 8,7 9,5 34,1 11,2 26,9 36, 1 8,5 11,9 
1975 13,4 8,9 7,9 32,3 9,4 24,2 32,5 7,6 10,8 
1976 15, 1 9,5 9, 1 36,8 8,5 24,7 35,0 8,2 11,6 
1977 14,8 9,7 9, 1 42,6 10,4 23,7 33,3 10,0 12,2 
1968-1977 13,3 8,5 7,9 31 ,3 8,4 24,7 31 ,2 6,7 10,2 
(1978) 13,0 9,5 8,3 45,8 10, 1 23, 1 32,2 10,4 12,0 
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Annex - Table 17 
Extra-Community imports in GDP 1958-1978, percentage shares (current prices) 
DK D F IRL NL BLEU UK EC 
1958 11,0 8,8 7,0 11 , 1 7,5 19, 1 13,2 12,9 10,0 
1959 11,8 8,8 6,3 11,6 6,8 18,4 13,6 13, 1 9,9 
1960 14,2 8,8 6,9 12,9 9,0 19,2 15, 1 14,2 10,7 
1961 13, 1 8,2 6,5 13,5 8,7 18, 1 14,2 12,6 9,8 
1962 13,9 8,3 6,2 12,2 7,5 17, 1 14,0 12,2 9,6 
1963 13,3 8,2 6, 1 12,8 9, 1 16,8 14,0 12,3 9,5 
1964 14,7 8, 1 6,2 12,8 8, 1 16,8 14,3 13,3 9,7 
1965 14,2 8,4 5,8 12,8 7,9 15,6 13,7 12,4 9,4 
1966 14,0 8,2 6,0 12,6 8,4 15,3 14,0 11 ,8 9,3 
1967 13,9 7,7 5,5 14,0 8,5 14,6 13,2 11 ,8 9 ,0 
1958-1 967 12,4 8,4 6,3 12,6 8,2 17, 1 13,9 12,7 9,7 
1968 14,0 7,9 5,3 13,9 8,0 14,4 14,5 13,5 9 ,2 
1969 14,2 8,3 5,7 13,9 8,5 14,4 14,8 13,4 9 ,5 
1970 14,9 8, 1 6,2 12,8 8,8 16,0 15,0 13,0 9,6 
1971 14,3 8,0 6,0 13,4 8,3 16, 1 13,2 12, 1 9,2 
1972 13, 1 7,2 6,0 11 ,6 8,3 14,3 12,3 12, 1 8,8 
1973 15,4 7,5 6,5 11 ,9 10,1 15,7 13,8 14,8 9,8 
1974 17,9 9,5 10,5 17,6 15,2 20,0 18,5 19,8 13,5 
1975 15,8 9,0 8,3 14,4 12,5 18,4 15,9 15,7 11 ,5 
1976 17,0 10,3 9,3 16,2 16,7 20,0 16,7 17,3 13, 1 
1977 16,3 10,0 9,4 15,9 13,8 19,6 16,0 16,0 12,4 
1968-1977 15,3 8,6 7,3 14,2 11 ,0 16,9 15, 1 14,8 10,7 
(1978) 13,2 9,4 9 ,0 14,9 13,0 17,3 15,5 16,6 11 ,9 
Annex - Table 18 
Balance of payments: current balance in GDP, 1958-1977, percentage shares 
DK D F IR L NL BLEU UK EC 
1958 2,9 2,5 - 0,4 - 1,6 2,0 4,5 3,9 1,7 1,7 
1959 0,4 1,6 1,5 - 6,4 2,5 4,8 0,7 0,7 1,5 
1960 - 1, 1 1,6 1,4 - 0,6 0,9 3,2 1,0 - 1, 1 0,7 
1961 - 1,8 0,9 1,8 - 0,7 1,3 1,5 0,4 0 0,9 
1962 - 3,5 -0,5 1,3 - 3,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,3 
1963 0,3 0,2 0,5 - 4,4 - 1,4 - 1,4 - 0,7 0 ,4 0,1 
1964 -2,2 0,1 - 0,1 -4,4 1,3 1,3 0 - 1,1 - 0,2 
1965 - 1,7 - 1,4 0 ,8 - 4,6 3,8 3,8 0,9 - 0,1 0,3 
1966 - 1,9 0,1 0,2 - 2,5 3,4 3,4 - 0,5 0,3 0,5 
1967 - 2,4 2,0 0,2 1, 1 2,3 2,3 1,0 - 0,8 0,7 
1958-1967 - 1,1 0,7 0,7 - 2,8 1,7 2,4 0,7 0 , 1 0,7 
1968 - 1,8 2,2 - 0,9 - 2,0 3,5 3,5 0, 1 - 0,7 0,7 
1969 - 2,9 1,3 - 1,5 - 5,6 2,8 2,8 0,3 1,0 0,5 
1970 
- 3,5 0,5 - 0,1 - 4,8 0,8 0,8 2,7 1,4 0,4 
1971 
- 2, 5 0,4 0,3 - 4,2 1,6 1,6 2,9 1,9 0,8 
1972 
- 0,3 0,3 0 ,2 - 2,4 1,7 1,7 3,2 0,2 0,7 
1973 1,7 1,3 - 0 ,3 - 3,6 - 1,8 - 1,8 2,5 - 1,4 0, 1 
1974 3,0 2,6 - 2 ,3 - 9,3 - 5,1 2,9 1,7 - 4,4 - 1,0 
1975 
- 1,5 1,0 0 - 0,3 - 0,3 1,9 1, 1 - 1,6 0, 1 
1976 
- 5,0 0,9 - 1,8 - 3,3 - 1,6 2,7 - 0,5 - 0,7 - 0,5 
1977 
- 3,8 0,7 - 0 ,9 - 2,3 1,2 0,2 - 0,4 0, 1 0, 1 
1968-1977 
- 2,6 1, 1 - 0,7 - 3,8 0,3 1,6 1,4 - 0,4 0,2 
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Annex - Table 19 
Structure of EC exports by country and region, 1958 and 1976, percentages of total 
DK D F IRL NL BLEU UK EC 
1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 
DK 2,96 2,59 0,75 0,79 0,05 0,63 0,77 0,85 2,63 1,72 1,64 1,44 2,37 2,55 2,00 1,77 
D 20,05 14,60 10,46 17,28 2,22 8,78 14,29 19, 19 18,98 31,46 17,57 23,42 4,20 7, 15 6,7 1 12,82 
F 2,97 4,17 7,58 13,15 0,79 5,18 5,31 15,24 4,87 10,82 10,60 21, 17 2,42 6,67 4,59 10,38 
IRL 0,30 0,42 0,25 0,27 0,16 0,32 0,13 0,24 0,45 0,38 3,50 0,27 3,50 4,86 1,16 0, 94 
I 5,31 4,50 5,02 7,42 3,37 ,10 ,89 0,43 2,34 2,74 5,25 2,27 4,77 2, 11 3,22 3, 08 5,92 
NL 2,19 3,19 8,10 9,71 2,03 5,10 0,51 5,98 2,05 4, 14 20,70 17, 07 3,14 5,85 5,4 1 7, 07 
BLEU 1,24 1,68 5,69 7,92 6,34 10,16 0,80 4,55 2,27 3,91 14,97 15,58 1,93 5,46 4,89 7,43 
UK 25,91 17,11 3,95 7,76 4,89 6,03 78,76 49,42 6,83 4,86 11.90 8,45 5,7 1 6, 07 5,72 5,69 
Total 1ntra-Comm un1ty trade 57,92 45,70 34,49 45,85 27,98 50,61 83,54 76,92 31 ,64 48,47 56 ,53 73,69 52 ,81 74,25 19,64 35,78 34,28 52,08 
Other European 
DECO-countries 17,58 29,53 25,17 19,82 11 ,14 12,23 1,87 4,45 18,69 13,68 13,19 9,15 11,07 18,02 10,31 15,64 15,46 14,88 
USA 9,34 5,83 7,31 5,63 5,93 4,52 5,85 7,01 9,71 6,55 5,64 2,89 9,42 3,57 8,83 9,60 7,79 5,59 
Canada 0,68 0,78 1,19 0,78 0,83 0,78 0,67 1,13 1,19 0,96 0,79 0,37 1,13 0,36 5,77 2,45 2,34 0,59 
Japan 0,20 1,4 1 0,95 1,09 0,32 0,75 0,05 1,28 0,32 0,87 0,41 0,48 0,60 1,40 0,61 1,40 0,59 0,93 
Australia 0,26 0,42 1,02 0,69 0,46 0,27 0,08 0 ,97 0,79 0,70 0,68 0,41 0,55 0,29 7,11 2,68 2,50 0,82 
Develop ing countries 9,65 12,50 22,30 17,85 48,38 24,17 1,57 7,29 27,86 21 ,86 18,1 4 10,58 18,80 9,86 33,81 25,97 28,49 18,61 
of which : 
OPEC 4,19 8,10 9,11 3,48 11 ,63 4,36 4,02 11,16 8,09 
Other developing countnes 8,31 9,75 15,06 3,81 10,23 6,22 5,84 14,81 10,52 
Centrally planned economies 3,80 3,56 5,00 6,90 3,70 5,76 0,21 0,64 4,69 5,96 1,98 2,15 3,75 2,64 3,09 3,00 3,75 4,88 
Rest-world and unspecified 0,61 0,69 2,62 1,39 1,27 0,9 1 6,19 0,31 4,99 0.95 2,68 0,28 1,90 0,47 10,87 3,48 4,79 1,26 
World (exc l. EEC) 42,08 54,30 65,51 54,15 72,02 49,39 16,46 23 ,08 68,36 51,53 43,47 26,31 47, 19 27,75 80,36 64,22 65,72 47,92 
World (incl. EEC) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Annex - Table 20 
Structure of EC imports by country and region, 1958 and 1976, percentages of tota l 
DK D F IRL NL BLEU UK EC 
1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 1958 1976 
DK 3,35 1,50 0,63 0,61 0,70 0,87 2, 19 0,89 0,67 0,74 0,53 0,45 ' 3,07 2,20 2,04 1,11 
D 19,84 20,85 11 ,64 19,21 4,00 6,88 12,13 16,97 19,48 23,78 17,16 22,39 3,60 8,60 8,33 13,05 
F 3,43 3,80 7,59 11,63 1,60 4,70 4,86 13,55 2,79 6,93 11 ,60 16,26 2,67 6,63 4,29 8,46 
IRL 0,01 0,17 0,10 0,36 0,05 0,28 0,05 0,21 0,05 0,40 0, 10 0,40 2,90 2,76 0,91 0,71 
I 1,70 2,84 5,46 8,51 2,35 8,92 0,85 2,55 1,77 3,33 2,15 3,82 2,04 3,59 2,57 5,34 
NL 7,34 5,48 8,03 13,77 2.53 6,08 2,86 3,18 2,58 4,70 15,72 17,59 4,22 5,45 5,29 8, 19 
BLEU 3,81 3,84 4,53 8,60 5.37 9,59 1,83 1,94 2,02 3,68 17,85 13,98 1,61 2,99 4,46 6,73 
UK 22,82 10,22 4,38 3,85 3,59 4,90 56,41 49,27 5,50 3,50 7,39 6, 12 7,40 6,73 5, 14 4,72 
Total intra -Co mmunity trade 58,92 47,18 33,4 1 48,20 26 ,13 49 ,55 68,21 69,38 29,30 43,47 49,97 55,25 54,63 67 ,63 20,09 32,20 33,00 48, 16 
Other European 
OECD-countnes 19,51 26,70 17,55 12,16 8,55 8,82 4,43 5,40 12,50 8,04 7,84 6,43 8, 19 5,64 14, 11 12.04 12,69 9,97 
USA 9,10 5,15 13,57 7,91 10,04 7,33 6,98 8,55 16,23 7,88 11 ,31 9,06 9.92 6, 12 9,34 11 ,37 11,16 8,22 
Canada 0,25 0,38 3,10 1,05 1,02 0,95 2,97 1,29 1,44 1,30 1,43 0,69 1,42 1,04 8, 17 3,63 3,71 1,42 
Japan 1,48 2,88 0,61 2,45 0,18 1,91 1,07 2.22 0,41 1,35 0,82 1,58 0,63 1,58 0,94 2,74 0,69 2,08 
Auslra l1a 0,03 0,09 1,21 0,70 2,42 0,72 1,21 0,15 3,01 0,90 0,20 0,31 1,73 0,59 5,40 1,25 2, 71 0,73 
Developing countries 6,06 12. 14 24,43 20,44 46,71 26,26 9,67 8,58 31,18 28,19 25,02 23,54 19,50 14,51 34,98 25,80 30,41 22,70 
of which : 
OPEC 5,40 10,23 17,71 4,10 18,42 15,76 7,44 13,84 13, 56 
Other developing cou ntri es 6,74 10,21 8,55 4,48 9,77 7,78 7,07 11,96 9,17 
Centrally planned economies 4,59 4,85 5,31 4,97 3,30 3,48 1,24 2,37 3,60 6,09 2,61 2,61 2,01 1,85 3, 19 3,78 3,55 4,01 
Rest-world and unspecified 2,1 7 0,63 0,84 2,12 1,68 0,98 4,26 2,06 2,36 2,78 1,83 0,50 1,73 1,04 3,82 7,20 2,28 2, 71 
World (excl. EEC) 41,08 52.82 66,59 51,80 73,87 50,45 31,79 30,62 70,70 56,53 50, 03 44,75 45,37 32,37 79,91 67,80 67 ,00 51,73 
World (incl. EEC) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Annex - Table 21 
Population, 1958-1978, 'OOOs 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 4 515 54 292 44 789 2 853 49 476 11 185 9 024 3 11 51 870 228 315 
1959 4 547 54 876 45 240 2 846 49 831 11 347 9 072 3 13 52 157 230 229 
1960 4 581 55 433 45 684 2 832 50 198 11 483 9 119 315 52 559 232 204 
1961 4 617 56 175 46 163 2 818 50 523 11 637 9 166 319 52 954 234 372 
1962 4 647 56 837 46 998 2 830 50 843 11 801 9 21 8 323 53 414 236 911 
1963 4 684 57 389 47 816 2 850 51 198 11 964 9 283 326 53 691 239 201 
1964 4 720 57 97 1 48 310 2 864 51 600 12 125 9 367 330 54 033 24 1 320 
1965 4 758 58 619 48 758 2 876 51 987 12 293 9 448 333 54 378 243 450 
1966 4 797 59 148 49 164 2 884 52 332 12 455 9 508 335 54 653 245 276 
1967 4 839 59 286 49 548 2 900 52 667 12 597 9 557 335 54 933 246 662 
1968 4 867 59 500 49 914 2 913 52 987 12 726 9 590 337 55 157 247 990 
1969 4 891 60 067 50 138 2 929 53 317 12 873 9 613 339 55 372 249 718 
1970 4 929 60 65 1 50 772 2 950 53 661 13 032 9 638 340 55 522 251 495 
1971 4 963 61 284 51 251 2 978 54 005 13 194 9 673 345 55 712 253 405 
1972 4 992 61 669 51 701 3 014 54 412 13 330 9 711 348 55 882 255 059 
1973 5 022 61 976 52 118 3 051 54 913 13 438 9 742 353 56 021 256 633 
1974 5 045 62 054 52 460 3 089 55 413 13 543 9 772 357 56 053 257 787 
1975 5 060 61 829 52 705 3 127 55 830 13 660 9 801 358 56 042 258 412 
1976 5 073 61 531 52 891 3 162 56 170 13 774 9 8 18 356 56 001 258 777 
1977 5 095 61 396 53 078 3 192 56 460 13 853 9 835 355 55 956 259 220 
1978 5 110 61 066 53 239 3 222 56 750 13 937 9 860 355 55 894 259 433 
Annex - Table 22 
Employment, 1958-1978, percentage changes on preceding year 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 0,7 0,4 - 0 ,3 - 1,5 0,0 - 0,9 - 1, 1 0,0 - 1,1 - 0 ,3 
1959 3, 1 0 ,9 - 0,9 - 0 ,7 0,0 1,0 - 0,6 0 ,0 0,3 0,2 
1960 2,8 1,4 0,1 - 0 ,5 - 0,2 1,9 0,3 - 1,5 - 0 ,1 0,5 
1961 1,5 1,4 0,1 -0,2 0 ,2 1,5 0,8 0,2 1,2 0,8 
1962 1,5 
' 
0,4 0,2 0,7 - 1,0 2,0 1,6 0 ,3 0,7 0 ,3 
1963 1,2 0,2 1,0 0 ,6 - 1,5 1,4 0 ,7 - 0 ,6 0 , 1 0 , 1 
1964 2 , 1 0,1 - 1, 1 0 ,5 - 0 ,4 1,8 1,3 0 ,8 1,1 0,6 
1965 1,8 0,6 0,4 - 0 ,2 - 1,9 0 ,9 0,2 0 ,3 0 ,9 0 ,2 
1966 1,7 - 0 ,3 0 ,8 - 0 ,3 - 1,5 0 ,8 0 ,5 0 ,3 0,6 0,0 
1967 2, 1 - 3,3 0,3 - 0 ,6 1, 1 - 0,3 - 0,3 - 1,8 - 1,5 - 0,9 
19S8-1967 1,9 0,2 0,3 - 0,2 -0,5 1,0 0,3 - 0 ,2 0 ,2 0, 2 
1968 0,3 0 , 1 -0,1 0,3 - 0,1 0 ,9 - 0,1 - 0 ,2 - 0,7 - 0,1 
1969 0,9 1,6 1,7 0,3 0 ,5 1,7 1,7 0 ,7 0 ,2 1,0 
1970 1,4 1,3 1,3 - 1,2 0,4 1,2 - 0,5 2 ,6 - 0 ,5 0,6 
1971 0,3 0,3 0 ,4 0 ,2 - 0,2 0 ,6 1,0 2,7 - J ,4 - 0,1 
1972 0,3 - 0,2 0 ,6 - 0 ,5 - 1,3 - 0,9 - 0,1 2 ,7 - 0 ,1 - 0 ,2 
1973 0 ,7 0 ,3 1,3 0,7 0,7 . 0,0 1,3 2, 1 2, 4 1,1 
1974 - 0 ,5 - 1,9 0,6 0,9 1,4 0 ,0 1,4 2,6 0,4 0, 1 
1975 -2,1 - 3,4 - 1,3 - 1,5 0 ,5 - 0,7 - 1,4 0 ,2 - 0 ,5 - 1,3 
1976 1,2 - 0,9 0,2 - 1,4 0 ,8 - 0 ,3 - 0,6 - 1,5 - 0 ,9 - 0,3 
1977 0,3 - 0 ,3 0, 1 0,2 0,4 0 ,3 - 0,5 - 0,8 0 ,2 0, 1 
1968-1977 0,3 - 0 ,3 0,5 - 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,2 1, 1 - 0 ,1 0 , 1 
(1978) 
- 0,1 - 0 ,2 - 0,1 1, 1 0,2 0,1 - 0 ,7 - 1,0 0,5 0 
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Annex - Table 23 
Numbers unemployed, 1958-1978 , as a percentage of civil active population (a) 
OK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 3,0 2,9 0,5 5,5 9,8 2,0 2,9 0, 1 1,9 3,7 
1959 0,0 2, 1 0,7 5,2 8,7 1,5 3,8 0, 1 1,9 3,2 
1960 1,5 1,0 0,7 4,7 7,2 0,7 3, 1 0, 1 1,6 2,5 
1961 1,2 0,7 0,6 4,2 6,6 0,5 2,5 0, 1 1,4 2,2 
1962 1,1 0,6 0,7 4,2 5,5 0,5 2,0 0,1 1,9 2,0 
1963 1,5 0,7 0,7 4,5 5,2 0,6 1,5 0,2 2,3 2, 1 
1964 0,9 0,6 0,6 4,3 5,3 0,5 1,5 0 1,6 1,9 
1965 0,7 0,6 0,7 4,5 5,8 0,6 1,8 0 1,4 1,9 
1966 0,8 0,6 0,7 4,3 5,5 0,8 2,0 0 1,4 1,9 
1967 1,0 1,8 1,0 5,0 5,0 1,7 2,6 0, 1 2,2 2,4 
1958-1967 1,2 1,2 0,7 4,6 6,5 0,9 2,4 0, 1 1,8 2,4 
1968 1,7 1,3 1,3 5,2 4,7 1,5 3, 1 0,1 2,3 2,3 
1969 1,4 0,7 1, 1 5,1 4,4 1, 1 2,3 0 2,3 2,0 
1970 1,0 0,6 1,3 5,8 4,4 1,0 2,2 0 2,5 2,0 
1971 1,2 0,7 1,6 5,6 5, 1 1,3 2,2 0 3,2 2,5 
1972 1,2 0,9 1,8 6,5 5,2 2,3 2,8 0 3,5 2,7 
1973 0,7 1,0 1,8 6,0 4,9 2,3 2,9 0 2,5 2,5 
1974 2,0 2,2 2,3 6,3 4,9 2,9 3,2 0 2,4 2,9 
1975 4,6 4,2 3,9 8,8 5,3 4, 1 5,3 0,2 3,8 4,4 
1976 4,7 4,1 4,3 9,8 5,6 4,4 6,8 0,3 5,3 4,9 
1977 5,8 4,0 4,9 9,7 6,4 4,3 7,8 0,6 5,6 5,3 
1968-1977 2,4 2,0 2,4 6,9 5, 1 2,5 3,9 0,1 3,4 3,2 
(1978) 6,6 3,9 5, 1 8,9 7.0 4.2 8,3 0,9 5,7 5,5 
Numbers unemployed, 1976-1978, as a percentage of active population (b) 
1976 5, 1 4,1 4, 4 9,5 6,0 4,3 6,7 0,3 5,2 5,0 
1977 5,9 4,0 5, 1 9,4 7,2 4,2 7,3 0,5 5,6 5,5 
1978 7,2 3,9 5,5 8,9 7,2 4.2 8,2 1,0 5,8 5,7 
Annex - Table 24 
Current receipts of general government (taxation, social security contributions and other) in GDP percentage shares, 
1958-1978 
DK D F IRL NL B L UK EC 
1958 27,7 35,9 34,9 26,5 28,3 33,0 25,7 33,5 32,7 33,0 
1959 28,0 36,4 35,0 25,8 29, 1 33,3 26,2 31,7 32,5 33,2 
1960 28, 1 35,8 34,2 25,4 30, 1 34,0 27,6 33,6 30,7 32,7 
1961 27 ,4 36,7 35 ,3 26,3 29,5 35,0 28,6 35,0 32,5 33,9 
1962 28,7 37 ,3 35,6 25,7 30,5 34,5 29,4 33,8 34,2 34,6 
1963 29 ,4 37 ,2 36 ,5 26,7 31, 1 35,7 29,5 34,4 32,8 34,4 
1964 30,3 36,8 37 ,4 27,5 32,0 35,8 30,2 33,9 32,6 35,0 
1965 31,7 36,0 37,8 28,6 31,9 37,4 30,9 34,9 34,4 35,2 
1966 34,0 36,6 37,6 30,6 31 ,8 39,3 32,6 36,8 35,4 35,9 
1967 34,6 37,2 37,7 31 ,3 33, 1 40,7 33,4 37,2 37,2 36,7 
1958-1967 30 ,0 36 ,6 36,2 27,4 30,7 35,9 29,4 34,5 33,5 34,5 
1968 37 ,5 36,9 37 ,9 31 ,7 33,8 41,9 34,0 41 ,2 38,9 37,3 
1969 37,7 38,7 38,8 32,3 33,2 42,7 34,5 40,4 41,0 38,7 
1970 42,2 37,9 39,3 33,9 32,9 43,9 35,4 41 , 1 42,4 38,7 
1971 45,4 38,9 38,7 35, 1 34,6 46, 1 36,0 44,8 40,5 39, 1 
1972 45,8 39,3 38 ,6 34,4 34,6 47,2 36,0 46,5 38,8 38,9 
1973 45,4 41,8 38 ,6 36,0 33,6 48,9 36,9 46,5 38,4 39,7 
1974 48,3 42,0 39,8 35,6 34,3 50,7 39,4 44, 1 39,2 40,6 
1975 45,1 41 ,5 41,5 34,2 34,7 51,9 42,8 51,3 40,5 41,2 
1976 47,5 42,9 43,7 37 ,9 36,3 5~,6 43,1 54,7 40,0 42,6 
1977 45,2 44,0 43,2 38,2 37,7 53,9 43,6 55 ,8 40, 1 43, 1 
1968-1977 44,0 40,4 40 ,0 34,9 34,6 48, 1 38,2 46,6 40,0 40,0 
(1978) 45,8 43,4 43 ,1 35,5 38,5 54,9 45,5 55,6 38,9 42,9 
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Annex - Table 25 
Expenditure of general government in GDP percentage shares, 1958-1978 
DK D F IRL NL 8 L UK EC 
1958 26,0 34,3 35, 1 28,2 29,7 34,7 27,9 34,5 32,2 32,9 
1959 25,2 34,3 33,3 27,4 30,6 32,8 29,6 35,2 32,4 32,5 
1960 25, 1 32,5 33,6 27,5 30,4 33,2 30,3 30,5 32,2 32 ,2 
1961 27 ,3 33,6 34,8 29,3 29,7 35,0 29,8 30,3 33,8 33 ,2 
1962 28,1 35,7 36,1 29,2 30,6 35,6 30,5 32,2 34,7 34,5 
1963 28,6 36, 1 36,9 30,1 31,4 37,6 31 ,5 32,8 35, 1 35, 1 
1964 28,4 35,7 37,0 31,4 31 ,8 37,6 30,8 32 , 1 35,4 35, 1 
1965 29,9 36,4 37,5 32,7 35 ,0 38,7 32,3 33,5 36,5 36,2 
1966 31,7 36,7 37,3 33,2 35 , 1 40,7 33,4 35,2 36, 1 36,3 
1967 34,3 38,5 37,9 34,4 34 ,8 42,5 34 ,5 38, 1 38,7 37 ,7 
1958-1967 28,5 35,4 36,0 30,3 31,9 36,8 31 , 1 33,4 34,7 34 ,6 
1968 36,3 37,7 38,8 34,8 36,3 43,5 36,3 43,7 39,9 38,4 
1969 36,3 37,6 39,2 36,3 35,9 43,9 36, 1 39,8 42,0 38,9 
1970 40,0 37,4 38,3 38, 1 35,4 45,5 36,5 38,0 39,8 38 ,2 
1971 42,4 39,2 ·38 ,0 39,0 39,2 47,4 38, 1 42 ,f 39, 1 39 ,4 
1972 42,0 39,4 38,0 38,8 41,2 47 ,8 39,2 44, 0 40 ,9 40 ,1 
1973 39,5 40,1 38, 1 40,7 41 ,5 49,1 39,5 44, 3 41,9 40 ,6 
1974 42,8 43,3 39,2 44,7 39 ,7 50,6 41 ,3 39,6 43 ,7 42,3 
1975 47 ,3 47,4 43,7 48,1 46 ,0 54,9 46,6 51 , 1 45,3 46 ,4 
1976 48,1 46,5 44,0 48,1 45,8 55,6 48,0 55,5 44,9 46 ,3 
1977 45,6 46,6 44,5 47 ,2 46 ,8 55,4 48,6 55,2 43,4 46 ,3 
1968-1977 42,0 41,5 40,2 41,6 40 ,8 49,4 41,0 45,3 42 , 1 41 ,7 
(1978) 46,5 46,6 44,9 47,3 49,5 57 ,8 50,6 55 ,9 43 , 1 46 ,9 
Annex - Table 26 
Net lending or net borrowing of general government in GDP percentage shares, 1958-1978 
DK D F IRL NL 8 L UK EC 
1958 1 ,7 1,6 - 0 ,2 - 1,7 - 1,4 - 1,7 - 2 ,2 - 1,0 0 ,5 - 0,1 
1959 2 ,8 2 , 1 1, 7 - 1,6 - 1,5 0 ,5 - 3,4 - 3,5 0,1 0 ,7 
1960 3 ,0 3,3 0 ,6 - 2,1 - 0 ,3 0,8 - 2,7 3, 1 - 1,5 0,5 
1961 0 , 1 3, 1 0,5 - 3 ,0 - 0 ,2 - 1,2 4 ,7 - 1,3 0,7 
1962 0,6 1,6 - 0,5 - 3 ,5 - 0 ,1 - 1, 1 - 1, 1 1,6 - 0 ,5 0 , 1 
1963 0,8 1 , 1 - 0 ,4 - 3 ,4 - 0,3 - 1,9 - 2,0 1,6 - 2,3 - 0,7 
19ff4 1,9 1, 1 0 ,4 - 3 ,9 0,2 - 1,8 - 0,6 1,8 - 2 ,8 - 0 ,1 
1965 1 ,8 - 0 ,4 0 ,3 - 4 ,1 - 3,1 - 1,3 - 1,4 1,4 - 2 ,1 - 1,0 
1966 2 ,3 - 0,1 0 ,3 - 2 ,6 - 3,3 - 1,4 - 0,8 1,6 - 0 ,7 - 0 ,4 
1967 0,3 - 1,3 - 0 ,2 - 3,1 - 1,7 - 1,8 - 1, 1 - 0,9 - 1,5 - 1,0 
1958-1967 1,5 1,2 0,2 - 2,9 - 1,2 - 0,9 - 1,7 1, 1 - 1,2 - 0 ,1 
1968 1,2 - 0 ,8 - 0,9 - 3 ,1 - 2 ,5 - 1,6 - 2,3 - 2 ,5 - 1,0 - 1, 1 
1969 1,4 1, 1 - 0 ,4 - 4 ,0 - 2,7 - 1,2 - 1,6 0,6 - 1,0 - 0 ,2 
1970 2,2 0,5 1,0 - 4,2 - 2,5 - 1,6 - 1, 1 3, 1 2,6 0 ,5 
1971 3,0 - 0,3 0,7 - 3,9 - 4 ,6 - 1,3 - 2 ,1 2,7 1,4 - 0 ,3 
1972 3 ,8 - 0 ,1 0 ,6 - 4 ,4 - 6,6 - 0,6 - 3,2 2,5 - 2,1 - 1,2 
1973 5,9 1,7 0,5 - 4 ,7 - 7 ,9 - 0,2 - 2,6 2 ,2 - 3,5 - 0 ,9 
1974 4,6 - 1,3 0 ,6 - 9 ,1 - 5 ,9 0 ,9 - 1,9 4,5 - 4,0 - 1,7 
1975 - 1,7 - 5,9 - 2,3 - 13,9 - 12 ,3 - 2,9 - 3,8 0,2 - 4 ,8 - 5,2 
1976 - 0,7 - 3 ,6 - 0 ,4 - 9,4 - 9,7 -:- 2,0 - 5,0 0,0 - 5,0 - 3 ,7 
1977 - 0,4 - 2,6 - 1,3 - 9,0 - 9 ,1 - 1,6 - 5, 1 0,6 - 3,2 - 3 ,3 
1968-1977 2,0 - 1,1 - 0 ,2 - 6,7 - 6,2 - 1,3 - 2,8 1,3 - 2, 1 - 1,7 
(1978) - 0,7 - 3, 1 - 1,8 - 11 ,8 - 11 ,0 - 3,0 - 5,1 0,0 - 4 ,2 - 4 ,0 
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Annex - Table 27 
Growth of money supply (M2) 1958-1978, percentage changes on preceding year 
DK D F IRL NL BLEU UK EC 
1958 6,5 3,8 13,9 6,7 
1959 13,8 2,0 14,3 4,2 5,0 
1960 10,9 16,2 5,5 13,3 4,5 4,0 
1961 14,8 16,7 6,9 15,8 4,9 10,3 
1962 10,4 18,7 7,1 16,7 6,6 7,3 
1963 9,9 14,1 5,5 12,8 9,8 10,3 
1964 9,4 9,8 10, 1 8,7 10,4 7,6 5,8 8,3 
1965 10,6 10,9 4, 1 15,4 6,2 8,7 6,7 9,8 
1966 13,0 8,3 10,6 17,9 13,8 5,9 8,5 3,2 7,5 
1967 9,9 12,0 13, 1 11,8 13,4 10,9 7,6 9,3 11,5 
1958-1967 13,0 7,5 7,7 7,6 
1968 14,4 11 ,8 11 ,6 15,6 11,4 14,8 9,4 8,5 11, 1 
1969 10,4 9,4 6, 1 10,8 11,4 10,2 9,6 2, 1 7,5 
1970 2,9 9,0 15,2 6,8 13,6 11,0 9,3 9,5 11, 1 
1971 8,8 13,3 18,2 11,9 17,0 9,0 13,5 13,3 14,5 
1972 15,0 14,3 18,6 14,3 18,2 11,9 17,3 27,1 18,2 
1973 12,7 9,0 15,0 25,7 23,0 21,9 14,6 27,2 16,5 
1974 8,9 8,4 18,1 20,2 15,4 20, 1 11, 1 10,3 12,8 
1975 25,5 8,5 15,9 20,7 23,5 5,7 17,2 6,6 12,7 
1976 11 ,3 8,4 12,8 14,3 21,1 22,7 13,4 8,9 11 , 1 
1977 9,8 11, 1 13,9 16,3 21,9 5,5 10,0 10, 1 12,5 
1968-1977 12,0 10,3 14,5 15,7 17,7 11 ,2 12,5 12,4 12,8 
Annex - Table 28 
Short-term interest rates, 1958-1978, percentages 
DK D F IRL NL BLEU UK EC 
1958 3,6 6,5 6,4 3,9 3,0 2,9 
1959 3,2 4, 1 5,8 3,6 1,9 1,9 
1960 5,1 4,1 6,5 3,6 2,1 3,9 5,0 4,4 
1961 3,6 3,6 6,6 3,6 1, 1 4,4 5,2 3,9 
1962 3,4 3,6 6,2 3,5 1,9 3, 1 4,1 3,6 
1963 4,0 4,0 5,8 3,6 1,9 3,3 3,7 3,7 
1964 4,1 4,7 6,3 3,6 3,4 4,4 4,8 4,2 
1965 5,1 4,2 7,3 3,6 3,9 4,6 5,9 3, 1 
1966 6,6 4,8 7,6 3,6 4,7 5,3 6, 1 5,3 
1967 4,3 4,8 7,7 3,6 4,6 5,2 5,9 4,6 
1958-1967 4,3 4,4 6,6 3,6 2,8 3,9 
1968 3,8 6, 1 8,4 3,6 4,4 4,1 7,0 5,0 
1969 5,8 9,0 9,0 3,7 5,6 7,1 7,7 6,6 
1970 9,4 8,7 9,5 6,5 6,0 7,8 7,0 7,9 
1971 7,1 5,8 8,5 5,7 4,3 5,0 5,5 5,9 
1972 6,3 5,6 5,0 7,2 ·5,5 2,2 3,8 5,6 5,2 
1973 8,1 12, 1 8,9 9,9 6,2 4,1 6,3 9,5 9,3 
1974 13,3 9,9 12,9 12, 1 15,,6 6,9 10,3 11 ,3 11 ,5 
1975 14,5 5,0 7,9 11,0 9,2 4,4 6,8 10,2 7,5 
1976 10,3 4,2 8,6 11,2 15,9 5,8 9,9 11 ,5 8,5 
1977 14,5 4,4 9, 1 9,7 15,0 3,9 7, 1 7,7 7,8 
1968-1977 6,7 8,2 9,7 8,7 4,8 6,8 8,3 7,5 
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Annex - Table 29 
Long-term interest rates, 1958-1978, percentages 
DK D F IRL NL BLEU UK EC 
1958 6,5 7,6 6,7 4,3 5,5 5,0 6,1 
1959 5,8 6,3 5,7 4, 1 5,0 4,8 5,2 
1960 6,0 6,3 5,7 5,3 4,2 5,6 5,4 5,6 
1961 6,6 5,9 5,5 5,3 3,9 5,9 6,2 5,7 
1962 6,6 6 ,0 5,4 5,8 4,2 5,2 6,0 5,9 
1963 6,5 6 , 1 5,3 6, 1 4,2 5, 3 5,6 5,6 
1964 7, 1 6,2 5,4 7,0 4,9 6,5 6, 0 6,0 
1965 8,6 6,8 6,3 6,7 5,2 6,4 6,4 6,5 
1966 8,7 7,8 6,6 6,4 6,2 6,7 6,8 6,9 
1967 9, 1 7,0 6,7 6,5 6,0 6,7 6,7 6,7 
1958-1967 5,8 6,1 6, 1 4,7 5,9 5,9 
1968 8,7 6,7 7,0 6,5 6,2 6,5 7,4 6,9 
1969 9,7 7, 0 8,2 6 ,7 7,0 7,3 8,9 7,7 
1970 11, 1 8,2 8,6 8 ,6 7,8 7, 8 9,2 8,5 
1971 11,0 8,2 8,4 9,2 8 ,0 7,1 7,3 9, 1 8,3 
1972 11,0 8 ,2 8,0 9, 1 7 ,3 6,7 7,0 9,1 8,1 
1973 12,6 9,5 9,0 10,7 7 ,3 7,3 7,5 10,9 9, 1 
1974 15,9 10,6 11 ,0 14,6 9,4 8,9 8,8 15,0 11 , 1 
1975 12,7 8,7 10,3 14,0 10,6 8,0 8,5 14,7 10,4 
1976 14,9 8,0 10,5 14,6 12,2 8, 1 9, 1 14,3 10,4 
1977 16,2 6,4 11 ,0 12,9 14,6 7,3 8,8 12,3 9,9 
1968-1977 12,4 8,2 9,2 9 ,1 7,4 7,9 11 , 1 9,0 
Annex - Table 30 
Gross external financial reserves, 1958-1978, annual averages, 'OOO million u.a./EUA 
DK D F IRL NL BLEU UK EC 
1958 0,20 6,09 0,87 0,26 1,96 1,37 1,41 2,64 14,80 
1959 0 ,30 4,89 1,62 0,26 2,99 1,46 1,37 2,80 15,69 
1960 0,27 5,89 2,06 0,31 3,08 1,59 1,38 3, 19 17,77 
1961 0 ,27 7, 10 2,97 0,33 3,44 1,87 1,63 3,47 21,08 
1962 0,25 6,75 3,81 0,34 3,73 1,97 1,77 3,40 22,02 
1963 0,32 7,22 4,63 0,37 3,91 2,01 1,90 3,27 23,63 
1964 0,52 7,71 5,26 0,43 3,28 2, 12 2,03 3, 04 24,39 
1965 0,53 7,48 6, 13 0,42 4,20 2,39 2,31 2,65 26,11 
1966 0,57 7,52 6,69 0,44 4,83 2,39 2,33 3, 30 28,07 
1967 0,54 7,96 6,78 0,48 5, 13 2,48 2,47 2,96 28,80 
1958- 1967 0,38 6,86 4,08 0,36 3,66 1,97 1,86 3,07 22,24 
1968 0,46 8,95 5,51 0,43 5,42 2,47 2,21 2,68 28,13 
1969 0,37 9,66 3,87 0,59 5, 13 2,47 2,67 2,46 27,22 
1970 0,40 9,70 4,51 0,73 4,83 2,87 3,24 2,73 29,01 
1971 0,48 15,91 6, 11 0,80 5,96 3 ,36 3,10 4,04 39,76 
1972 0,71 19,99 8,29 0,93 5,78 4,04 3,41 5,96 49, 11 
1973 0,88 26,03 8,62 0,85 5,03 4,70 3,98 5,19 55,28 
1974 0,76 27,67 7,05 0,93 5,17 5 ,18 4,15 5,76 56,67 
1975 0,70 26,21 8,49 1,06 4,89 5,69 4,72 5, 18 56,94 
1976 0 ,80 30,31 8,99 1,47 4,87 6 ,13 4,58 4,86 62,01 
1977 1,57 30,91 8,74 1,72 8,00 6,70 4,92 11 ,99 74,55 
1968-1977 0,71 20,53 7,02 0,95 5,51 4,36 3,70 5,09 47,87 
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Annex - Table 31 
EUA yearly average rates (currency amount for 1 EUA) 
DK D F IRL NL BLEU UK us 
1958 7,57507 4,60614 4,61264 0,31 1678 685,438 4, 16745 54,8350 0,391678 1,09670 
1959 7,29535 4,43605 5,21454 0,377215 660,126 4,01357 52,8 101 0,377215 1,05621 
1960 7,29535 4,43605 5,21454 0,377215 660,126 4,01357 52,8101 0,377215 1,05621 
1961 7,37224 4,30742 5,26950 0,381191 667,084 3,89854 53,3667 0,381191 1,06734 
1962 7,38928 4,27921 5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87268 53,4901 0,382073 1,06981 
1963 7,38928 4,27921 5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87268 53,4901 0,382073 1,06981 
1964 7,38928 4,27921 5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87268 53,4901 0,382073 1,06981 
1965 7,38928 4,27921 5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87268 53,4901 0,382073 1,06981 
1966 7,38928 4,27921 5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87268 53,4901 0,382073 1,06981 
1967 7,42293 4,25924 5,25703 0,387652 665,506 3,85461 53,2404 0,387652 1,06482 
1968 7,71663 4, 11554 5,07967 0,428702 643,052 3,72456 51,4442 0,428702 1,02889 
1969 7, 66640 4,02622 5,29027 0,425912 638,866 3,70032 51,1093 0,425912 1,02219 
1970 7,66675 3,74138 5,67767 0,425931 638,895 3,70049 51 , 1116 0,425931 1,02223 
1971 7,75264 3,64566 5,77214 0,428583 647,414 3,65750 50,8663 0,428583 1,04776 
1972 7,78909 3,57681 5,65717 0,448541 654,264 3,59991 49,3611 0,448941 1,12178 
1973 7,41598 3,27644 5,46775 0,502321 716,460 3,42853 47,8009 0,502321 1,23173 
1974 7,25927 3,08352 5,73386 0,509803 775,743 3,20224 46,3994 0,509803 1,19270 
1975 7, 12266 3,04939 5,31 923 0,559814 809,545 3, 13490 45,5690 0,560026 1,24077 
1976 6,76176 2,81545 5,34486 0,621920 930,150 2,95515 43, 1654 0,621578 1, 11805 
1977 6,85567 2,64831 5,60607 0,653701 1 006,785 2,80010 40,8826 0,653701 1,14112 
(1978) (a) 7,02507 2,57018 5,73995 0,659085 1 067,35 2,75964 40, 1640 0,659079 1,24542 
Annex - Table 32 
Budgetary expend iture of the European Communities, 1958-1979, in 'OOOs u.a ./EUA (a) 
ECSC European Euratom EC general budget Total 
opera- Develop- (b) 
tiona l ment FEOGA Social Regiona l Industry Adm. Total 
budget Fund (c) Fund Fund Energy and EC 
Research others 
(d) 
1958 21 700 7 858 5 935 5 935 35 493 
1959 30 700 51 200 39 071 25 245 25 245 146 216 
1960 23 500 63 200 19 990 28 272 28 272 134 962 
1961 26 500 172 OOO 72 489 8 600 25 447 34 047 305 036 
1962 13 600 162 300 88 561 11 300 81 026 92 326 356 787 
1963 21 900 55 500 106 382 4 600 79 468 84 068 267 850 
1964 18 700 35 OOO 124 372 7 200 85 853 93 053 271 125 
1965 37 300 248 800 120 OOO 102 695 42 891 55 524 201 110 607 210 
1966 28 100 157 800 129 200 310 287 26 160 65 782 402 229 717 329 
1967 10 400 105 800 158 482 561 968 35 600 77 532 675 100 949 782 
1968 21 200 121 OOO 73 400 2 250 368 42 959 115 313 2 408 640 2 624 240 
1969 40 700 104 800 59 200 3 818 012 50 501 182 675 4 051 188 4 255 888 
1970 56 200 10 500 63 400 5 228 253 63 999 156 148 5 448 400 5 578 500 
1971 37 400 236 100 1 883 586 56 473 65 010 284 272 2 289 341 2 562 841 
1972 43 700 212 700 2 477 557 97 498 75 145 424 349 3 074 549 3 330 949 
1973 86 900 210 OOO 3 768 837 269 220 69 144 533 813 4641 014 4 937 914 
1974 92 OOO 157 OOO 3 651 336 292 116 82 770 1 011 945 5 038 167 5 287 167 
1975 127 400 71 OOO 4 586 563 360 215 150 OOO 99 036 1 017 795 6 213 609 6 412 009 
1976 94 OOO 320 OOO 6 033 288 176 746 300 OOO 113 315 1 329 225 7 952 574 8 366 574 
1977 (e) 93 OOO 800 OOO 6 667 639 55 276 400 OOO 166 998 1 303 886 8 483 247 9 376 247 
1978 EUA 9 131 959 559 107 525 OOO 295 336 1 851 253 12 362 655 
1979 EUA 10 069 824 748 182 390 OOO 516 265 2 135 048 13 859 319 (draft) 
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Annex - Table 33 
Budgetary receipts of the European Communities, 1958-1978, in 'OOOs u.a./EUA (a) 
ECSC European Euratom EC budget To tal 
Levies Dev. contri-
and Fund butions Misce llan. Own resources Totat 
othe r contri- ( research and EC 
butions only) contri- Miscella- Agri- Import GNP 
butions neous cultural duties contri-
under Levies butions 
spec ia l o r VAT 
keys (b) (c) 
1958 43 963 116 OOO 7 858 16 5 919 5 935 173 756 
1959 49 612 116 OOO 39 071 97 25 148 25 245 229 928 
1960 53 325 116 OOO 19 990 212 28 060 28 272 217 587 
1961 53 112 116 OOO 72 489 2 842 31 205 34 047 275 648 
1962 45 264 116 OOO 88 561 2 120 90 206 92 326 342 151 
1963 47 061 106 382 6 685 77 383 84 068 237 511 
1964 61 262 124 372 2 915 90 138 93 053 278 687 
1965 66 146 98 752 3 530 197 580 201 110 366 008 
1966 71 249 116 494 3 905 398 324 402 229 589 972 
1967 40 324 40 OOO 158 482 4 188 670 912 675 100 913 906 
1968 85 366 90 OOO 81 985 2 408 640 2 665 991 
1969 106 802 110 OOO 62 719 78 548 3 972 640 4 051 188 4 330 709 
1970 100 001 130 OOO 67 651 121 056 5 327 344 5 448 400 5 746 052 
1971 57 900 170 OOO 69 515 713 800 582 200 923 826 2 289 341 2 517 241 
1972 61 100 170 OOO 80 935 799 600 957 400 1 236 614 3 074 549 3 305 649 
1973 120 300 150 OOO 510 986 477 963 1 564 749 2 087 316 4 641 014 4 911 314 
1974 124 600 150 OOO 65 256 323 625 2 684 446 1 964 840 5 038 167 5 312 767 
1975 189 500 220 OOO 320 512 590 078 3 151 023 2 151 996 6 213 609 6 623 109 
1976 (d) 129 600 311 OOO 282 772 1 163 665 4 064 558 2 482 121 7 993 116 8 433 716 
1977 123 OOO 410 OOO 283 048 1 778 495 3 927 209 2 494 495 8 483 247 9 016 247 
1978 147 OOO 135 900 2 063 OOO 4 833 OOO 5 330 800 12 362 700 
1979 (draft) 158 500 2 144 100 4 745 500 6811 219 13 859 319 
Annex - Table 34 Annex - Table 35 
Borrowing operations of the European Communities Net outstanding borrowing of the European 
and of the European Investment Bank, 1958-1977 (in Communities and of the European Investment Bank, 
millions u.a./EUA (a)) 1958-1977(in millions u.a./EUA (a)) 
ECSC EIB Euratom EEC ECSC EIB Euratom EEC 
1958 50,0 1958 212,2 
1959 1959 208,6 
1960 35,0 1960 236,4 
1961 23,2 21,4 1961 247,8 21,4 
1962 69,8 32,3 1962 304,3 53,7 
1963 33,2 35,2 
''} 
1963 321,7 88,4 
1964 127,8 66,8 8,0 1964 436,0 153,7 
1965 54,3 65,0 11 ,0 (b) 1965 474,7 217,2 
1966 103,0 138,5 13,7 1966 559,7 355,0 
1967 58,0 194,5 2,6 1967 601 ,3 547,8 
1968 108,0 212,5 1968 685,9 736,8 
1969 52,0 146,0 1969 718,6 882,6 
1970 60,0 168,9 1970 740,6 1 020,0 
1971 102,3 412,9 0,6 (b) 1971 801,7 1 423,3 
1972 230,0 462,0 1972 963,0 1 784,3 
1973 262,9 608,0 1973 1 172,3 2 286,5 
1974 527,7 825,5 1974 1 617, 1 3 123,8 
1975 731,3 813,7 1975 2 393,1 3 926,0 
1976 956,2 73 1,9 1 249,3 1976 3 476,5 4 731 ,8 1 160,8 
1977 727,4 (c) 1 029 ,5 99,2 571,4 1977 3 955,9 (c) 5 420,5 110,0 1 499,8 
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Note to the Statistical Annex 
General remarks ; 
Un less oth e rw ise spec ified , agg regates a re def ined as in the ESA (Eu rope an syste m of i nteg ra ted 
eco no mic accoun ts). Whe re poss ib le , th e tab les inc lude the latest informati o n ava i lable. T hus, 
data m ay diffe r fro m those g ive n in pub l icat ions by th e Statistica l Offi ce o f th e European 
Co mmun iti es . 
Unless othe rw ise spec if ied , th e data fo r 1978 refe r to the w ho le year ; as the repo rt was comp le ted 
at the end of Se ptembe r (th e cut-off d ate fo r data ), fo recasts a re used for the latte r part of the year. 
Remarks on the Tables; 
Tables 
1 - 3 
4, 6, 7 
4, 6, 7 
5 
7 - 11 
12, 15 
Notes 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(a) 
Sources: 
Sources: 
1958-76: Eu rostat Nationa l Accounts ESA , 1977, e xce pt 
fo r De nma rk fro m 1966 (Statistiske Efterretninger 1978 , 
No 20, Danmarks Stat ist ik) and for Ire land from 1970 
(CSO, Nationa l Income and Expenditure 1976). 
1977: Eurostat, natiofl a l sou rces and Commi ssi on 
estim ates. 
1978 : Comm iss ion departm ents. 
1958: Tab les 4 and 7, a nd 1958-60 , Table 6 : Euros tat, 
Nationa l Accounts , 1972, (no n-ESA system) . 
1959-76: Tables 4 and 7. 
1960-76: Ta bl e 6. 
Eu rostat Nationa l Acco unts ESA , 1977 for al I countr ies 
except Den m ark and I re land (see sources for Tabl es 
(1 - 3). 
1977: Eu rostat, na tiona l sources and Commission 
depa rtm e nts . 
1978 : Com missio n departments. 
1970 p r ice base except for 1958 (1963 pr ice base). 
1975 pr ice base fo r the Nether lands . 
Prev ious year's pr ices a nd excha nge rates. 
Sources: 1958-77: Eurostat Genera l Statis tics. 
1978 : Commiss ion departments (value-added ). 
Not inc lu di ng bu ild ing. 
Sources: 1958-60: Eu rostat, National Accounts , 1972 (th e se ri es 
have been l inked to the 1961-76 ESA series). 
1961-76: Eu rostat, Nationa l Accounts ESA. 
1977 : Eu rostat , nationa l so u rc es and Commiss ion 
estimates. 
1978: Com m iss io n departmen ts . 
Coverage: Goods , se rvices (incl uding touri s m) , not inc luding 
factors payments . 
Sources : 1958-67: Eu rostat , Nationa l Accounts, 1972, except fo r 
th e FR of Germ a ny and the Un ited Kingdom , whe re 
nat iona l sou rces w e re used . 
1968-77: OECD , Nationa l Accounts. 
1978: Com m ission departments. 
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106 
Tables 
13, 14, 
16, 17 
18 
19, 20 
21, 22 
23 
24, 25, 
26 
27 
28 
Notes 
(a) 
(b) 
Coverage : Mercha ndise: imports cif at nati o nal front ier exports 
fob at nati ona l fron ti e r. 
Sources : 
Sources: 
Sources : 
Sources: 
1958-75: Eu rostat, Foreign trade (mont hl y bu ll etin ) 
special ed it ion 1958-75, and National Accounts ESA. 
1976-77 : Eurosta t, For eign trade (monthl y bull etin) No 5 
1978 and Natio nal Accounts ESA . 
1978: Commission departments. 
1958-60, Eu rostat , National Accounts, 1972. 
1961-76, Eu rostat, Nationa l Accounts ESA. 
Eurostat, Foreign Trade by Country and OECD, Overa ll 
Trade by Countries. 
1958-76 : Eurostat , National Accounts ESA. 
Sources: 1958-77: Eurostat (SOEC def init ion). 
1978 : Average January-August. 
Econom ic ·budgets drawn up by Commission departm ents , w hich are 
cons istent w ith national defi n itions . Th ese d iffe r fro m SOEC 
def initions both w ith respect to the active popu lati on and in some 
cases with respect to the unemployed. 
Sources: 
Sources : 
Sources: 
1958-73: OECD , National Accounts . 
1974 -78: Econo mic budgets drawn up by Com m iss io n 
depart ments. 
DK : money supply M2, national de finition, Dan marks 
Nationalbank , Monetary Review. 
D : money supp ly M3 , national defi nition , Deutsche 
Bu ndesbank , Monatsbericht. 
F : money supply M2, nat ional definiti on, Co nse il 
Natio na l du Cred it, Rappor ts. 
IRL : money supp ly M3 , national defi niti o n, Centra l Bank 
of Ireland . 
Est imates for the periods of bank stri kes and industri a l 
acti on , i. e. March-September, 1966 and March 1970 -
Marc h 1971. 
I : primary and secondary li qui d assets (M2), nati o na l 
defin itions , Banca d ' ltalia , Supplemento al Bolletino . 
NL : domestic l iqu idity, Nederlandse Bank, Kwa rtaa l-
bericht. 
B: 1958-69: money supply inclu di ng oth er comm it-
ments towards firms and ind ivid uals , Banque Nationa le 
de Be lg ique, Bulletin . 
1970-77: depos its up to one year he ld by firms and 
ind iv iduals with nationa l fin anc ia l bod ies , Banque 
Nationa le de Be lg ique, Bulletin. 
UK : money supp ly sterl ing M3 : CSO, Eco nomic Trends , 
Annua l Suppl ement, 1977 and Economic Trends , Ju ly 
1978. 
DK: money ma rket rates, ann ua l average da il y rate: 
OECD, Main Econo mic Indicators . 
D : three-months ' money Deutsche Bund esbank , Mo-
natsber icht. 
F : dai ly rates fo r loans agai nst no n-governmen t 
secur it ies between banks on the money market : 
Co nse il Nat iona l de Cred it, Rapports . 
IRL : pr ime lendi ng rate (average rate of last Friday of 
each mo nth) . Central Bank of Ire land. 
Tables 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Notes 
(a) 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Sources: 
Sources: 
Sources: 
I: yie ld on twelve-month treasury bonds: Banca d'ltalia, 
Supplemento a l Bolletino . 
NL: three-month treasury bonds: Nederlandse Bank 
Kwartaalbericht. 
B : three-month treasury bonds: Nationale Bank van 
Belgie , Bulletin. 
UK : Treasu ry bill rate: OECD , Main Economic In-
dicators , Historical Statistics 1960-75, and CSO, Econ-
om ic Trends. 
EC : average weighted by GDP of each country. 
DK: 1960-70: y ie lds on m ortgage debentures: OECD, 
Main Economic Indicators. 1971-77: average of y ie lds 
on State bonds and ordinary and specia l m ortgage 
loans : Da n marks Na ti ona lba nk , Monetary Review. 
D : interest rate on cap ita l ( Kapitalzi ns) Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Monatsbericht. 
F : long-term inte rest ra te : stock exchange yie ld on 
public and semi-public sector bo nds. 
1958 and 1959: publi c -sector industrial bonds. 
From 1965 , issues subject to withho lding tax. 
IRL: Governm ent bond y ie ld . Average of the last 
Thursday of each month. 
I : y ield on bonds: Banca d'ltalia , Supplemento al 
Bolletino . 
NL: y ie ld on Nederland 1948 bonds (3 ,25 %) : Neder-
landse Ban k, Kwartaa fb ericht. 
B: y ield on Government secu ri ties maturing after more 
than five years : Nationale Bank van Be lgie , Tijdschrift . 
UK: British Governm e nt securities 2,5 % conso ls yie ld : 
CSO, Economic Trends , ·Jul y 1977 a nd Economic 
Trends , Annual Supplement 1977. 
EC: average we ighted by GDP of each country. 
OECD, Main Economic Indica tors , converted to u .a ./ 
EU A. 
Commission depa rtme nts 
average to August 1978. 
Coverage: Out-turns except au thori zat ions fo r 1978 and 1979. 
Sources: 1958-77: Management accou nts . 
1978: General EC budget adopted by the Parliament on 
21 December , 1977. 
1979: Draft general EC budget, Jun e 1978, doc. COM 
(78) 250. 
u .a. until 1977 , EUA 1978 onwards. 
Inco rporated in the EC budget from 1971. 
Th is column includes , for the years to 1970, substanti al 
amounts carried forward to following years. 
In 1977 app ropria ti ons for th e Social Fund carr ied 
forward. 
Inc luding the Eu ropean Parliament, the Counci l , th e 
Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors and th e 
ad mini strative part of the ECSC budget. 
In 1977 appropriations for the Socia l Fund carried 
forward from 1976 and subsequently ca nce l led amoun-
ted to 227 716 611 u .a. while total expenditure for 1977 
amou nted to on ly 173 799 040 u .a. giving the net figure 
shown here. 
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Tables 
33 
34, 35 
Notes 
(a) 
(b} 
(c) 
(d) 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Sources: 1958-77: Management accounts. 
1978 : Genera l EC budget adopted by the Parliament on 
21 December, 1977. 
1979: Draft general EC budg et , June 1978, Doc. COM 
(78) 250. 
u.a . until 197.7, EUA 1978 onward. 
GNP unti l 1978, VAT from 1979 onward . 
Th is colum n includes for th e years to 1970 surplus 
revenue from previous yea rs car ri ed forward to 
following years . 
As a result of the ca lculatio ns to estab li sh th e re lat ive 
shares of the Member States in the 1976 budget, an 
excess of revenu e over expenditure occurred amount-
ing to 40 543 573 u.a . This was carried forward to 1977. 
Coverage : Actual figures , except for 1978 and 1979, where 
appropriations are given. 
Sources : ECSC : European Investment Bank, 20 years 1958-78. 
Euratom: D. Strasser , Les Fin ances de / 'Europe, 
Presse Universitaire de France, 1975 and 
Euratom prospectus. 
EEC : Commission departments . 
ECSC: 1958-74 : u.a . 
1975-77: EUA. 
EIS : 1961 -73 : u.a. 
Euratom : 1963-71 : u.a. 
1977: EUA. 
Withdrawa ls from cred it lines opened with Eximbank 
(USA). 
Provisional figures . 
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